Ukraine and the Academy: One War, Many Theories

Introduction

Aeschylus, the ancient Greek tragedian, proclaimed that truth is the first casualty of war. This observation holds true for the ongoing war in Ukraine, where competing narratives concerning its root causes, progression, potential resolution, and broader implications for the international system are often mired in distortions that challenge empirical evidence and serve various agendas. Cutting through this cacophony of narratives, this paper examines how certain theoretical frameworks influence perceptions and beliefs about the war in Ukraine. Specifically, we explore the perceptions of the underlying causes of the war, its evolution, its possible resolutions, and its strategic ramifications for the international system and for China. We contend that strategic thinkers and policy makers as homines theoretici, are profoundly shaped by their theoretical understandings of the world, which in turn influences their normative engagements with world affairs.¹ The beliefs of liberals in “Wilsonian moments” or the support of realists for “Rooseveltian spheres of influence” significantly impact strategic evaluations, choices, and outcomes.

In our analysis, we primarily engage with four major schools of international relations: neorealism, classical realism, geopolitics, and liberalism. While the first three schools generally (but not absolutely) attain convergence in their insights into the conflict, a significant dichotomy emerges between this group and liberalism. Crucially, our investigation into both academic and policy documents from both the West and China reveals that these theoretical schools transcend cultural barriers. Although a “realist – geopolitical” approach predominantly guides Chinese perspectives and policies regarding the Ukraine war, the liberal school has nevertheless produced scholarly articles featured in elite journals in China. Conversely, in the West, while liberal worldviews have shaped strategic responses to the war in Ukraine, realist arguments maintain a robust academic presence. In our paper, we do not take up a position on which school is correct when it comes to the war in Ukraine. Rather, we are simply investigating theoretical arguments and evaluating them against the empirical record (primarily from the open-source data). Ultimately, the interplay between theoretical perspectives and practical realities will hinge upon the material conditions on the ground, on the battlefield. Power, after all, has a disciplining effect. “War is a violent teacher,” as Thucydides once put it in his History of the Peloponnesian War.

International Relations Theory and the Causes of the Ukraine War

The debate regarding the causes of the war in Ukraine has primarily focused on attributing responsibility for the conflict to either the strategies of the United States or Russia. The neorealist schools attribute most of the blame to the United States, while the Liberal school condemns Russia. A third perspective, the geopolitical school, views Ukraine’s geographical location as the root of all troubles and the fundamental cause of the war. Finally, the Classical Realist school sees the war as caused by the failure of political leadership to address a pressing security dilemma affecting both Ukraine and Russia. While the Realists and Geopolitical schools can be grouped together and, to some extent, complement each other, the Liberal school remains distinct, offering explanations for the causes of the war that are completely antithetical to those of the other schools.²

The liberal interpretation, prevalent in Western capitals, asserts that the war is solely attributable to Russia. Governed by an authoritarian regime, Russia pursued a revisionist agenda aimed at resurrecting the Soviet empire and undermining the post-Cold War Liberal International Order (LIO). This view frames Russia’s aggression in Ukraine as totally unprovoked.³ Simply put, Moscow would never risk seeing a fellow Slavic Orthodox nation and signatory to the Belovezha Accords becoming a flourishing liberal democracy within the EU and NATO.⁴ Liberals also see Russia’s actions as a manifestation of a broader threat. If the West fails to contain Russian expansionism, Russia might target other neighboring countries it views as within its arbitrary sphere of influence. According to this perspective, the stakes extend much beyond Ukraine’s territorial integrity and independence to the very foundation of the rules-based LIO. Thus, from this liberal viewpoint, NATO’s refusal to allow Russia a say in the decisions of sovereign states like Ukraine is fully justified, compelling democratic nations in the West to support Ukraine in the face of unprovoked Russian aggression.⁵

The first major realist interpretation (which could be framed as neorealist) suggests that the war’s roots lie primarily in the policies of the West. In particular, realists blame the U.S. policy, which spearheaded NATO’s eastward expansion. This expansion exerted pressure on Russia, leading to the crossing of its red lines. Leading neorealist scholars in international relations, such as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, who prominently advocated for this viewpoint contend that Russia’s red lines had been well-established and communicated to the American leadership over decades.⁶ Red lines were exemplified through repeated warnings by Russian President Vladimir Putin and by experienced American diplomats, including George Kennan, the strategist behind the Cold War containment policy, Paul Nitze, the author of the anti-Soviet rollback strategy in NSC-68, Jack Matlock, the last U.S. ambassador to the USSR and Will Burns, former U.S. Ambassador to Russia and current CIA director.

According to the neorealist perspective, the United States took advantage of Russia’s post-Soviet weakness, expanding NATO to former Warsaw Pact countries via the open-door policy. Notably, the decision by the Alliance at the 2008 Bucharest Summit to entertain Ukraine’s (and Georgia’s) NATO membership, making it effectively a quasi-member of the alliance, was the tipping point. It is noteworthy that in the Russian historical narratives attempts to attack Moscow often originated from this region (e.g., by Swedes, French, and Germans). To prevent NATO’s eastward expansion, Russia demonstrated its resolve with the war in Georgia in 2008 and the invasion of Crimea in 2014. In response to the U.S. strategic expansion, however, Russia launched a preventive war against Ukraine in 2022 to safeguard its vital security interests.

The second major realist interpretation draws from classical realism, invoking Thucydides’ assertion that state behavior in an anarchic international system is driven by fear, interest, and honor (prestige). In an anarchic international system, the predominant driver of a state’s strategic action is the fear of survival. Russia, with its vast expanse from Eastern Europe to the Pacific Ocean, its imperial past, and its formidable military power, including the possession of the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, understandably invokes fear among its neighbors.⁷ This fear was especially pronounced in Ukraine, which, after peacefully seceding from the Soviet Union in 1991 sought to safeguard its newfound sovereignty. Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership, sought as a security guarantee for its nascent sovereignty, epitomizes its security concerns. This Ukrainian effort, however, unintentionally heightened a significant security dilemma for Russia by potentially bringing NATO closer to its borders. The possibility of NATO establishing a military presence in Ukraine significantly troubled the Russian leadership. Ukraine’s strategic location near Russia’s strategic underbelly, its vast territory (Ukraine is the second largest state in Europe after Russia), and its significant population within the post-Soviet space — coupled with the presence of a substantial Russian minority (constituting approximately 17–20% of Ukraine’s population) helped to increase these fears. Thus, Ukraine’s endeavor to bolster its security inadvertently exacerbated Russia’s sense of vulnerability, precipitating a severe security dilemma. In reaction, Moscow initially employed threats, which only served to further unsettle Ukraine, prompting Kyiv to seek increased support from the West. The United States’ decision to respond positively to Ukraine’s calls by providing lethal aid and reaffirming Ukraine’s trajectory toward NATO membership further intensified Russian apprehensions. This vicious cycle of action–reaction–escalation, ultimately culminated in the February 2022 war.

Security dilemmas often intensify following the collapse of multinational empires with diverse populations, leading to increased insecurity and rivalry. The management of these dilemmas plays a pivotal role in determining the outcome of war and peace.⁸ The seminal work of classical realism, Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, provides numerous instances where poor handling of security dilemmas escalated tensions and led to conflict. For example, Corinth faced a dire situation after the alliance between Athens and Corcyra in 433 BCE (which Athens had framed as defensive, but Corinth saw as offensive).⁹ Similarly, Ukraine’s recent history exemplifies such mismanagement. Had Ukraine’s leadership sought to maintain the country’s neutrality as a “buffer zone” between two geopolitical rivals and ensured fair treatment for its Russian-speaking minority, the war might have been averted. Opting for constitutionally guaranteed perpetual neutrality, akin to Austria’s policy, could have offered a more prudent solution to Ukraine’s strategic quandary than its actual course: seeking membership in the Atlantic alliance despite strong Russian opposition and clinging to the baseless hope that Russia would “bark but not bite.”¹⁰ This situation highlights the crucial lesson that “hope is not a strategy.” Unlike neorealism which sees the war outcome as predetermined based on NATO’s will to expand East, Classical Realism stresses the consequentiality of political leadership is determining strategy and through strategy the path to war or peace, victory or defeat.¹¹

Moreover, according to classical realism, the significance of Russia’s quest for prestige should not be underestimated. Despite being a power in relative decline, Russia strives to sustain its stature as a superpower. The invasion offered Russia a prime opportunity to assert itself against Western nations that regarded it as inferior. Concurrently, for the United States, the war in Ukraine has also become a prestige litmus test, framed as a clash between democracy and authoritarianism. Failure would undermine the confidence of the U.S. allies and validate claims by its adversaries (China and Russia) of a prolonged, irreversible American decline since the 2008 financial crisis.

Overall, classical realists acknowledge the missteps in Western diplomacy but also recognize that Moscow’s decision to invade Ukraine was driven by factors beyond merely countering a geopolitical threat. Influences likely included Russia’s demographic concerns, economic ambitions, and energy interests, with a primary goal of addressing Russia’s demographic decline by integrating a closely related Orthodox-Slavic population. Additionally, the ambition to seize territories rich in industrial infrastructure and resources such as coal, oil, natural gas, metals, and rare earth elements played a role in the decision to invade. However, these motivations alone do not fully account for the significant risks associated with invading the largest country in Europe. NATO’s open-door policy which inspired fear in Moscow, and, most importantly, the inability of Ukrainian leadership to resolve a pressing security dilemma is the primary cause of the war.

The last interpretation which as argued previously falls within the domain of Realism is the geopolitical interpretation. The geopolitical interpretation highlights Ukraine’s geographical position, which, over many centuries (longue durée), has established it as a critical battleground between competing great powers. Ukraine is strategically located at the Eurasian border, a region considered by geopolitical theorists like Halford Mackinder as the “Heartland”; that is, the geopolitical core of the world. Thus, control over Eurasia could grant a continental power significant geostrategic and geoeconomic advantages, potentially challenging the dominance of Oceanic Powers, such as the United Kingdom in the 19th century and the United States since 1945, which have historically relied on naval supremacy for global dominance.¹² As two scholars have put it, “by definition, the Eurasian frontier is a zone of competition among rivals. It is an object coveted in its own right for its strategic location, but it is also the place where colliding agendas — between powers seeking to maintain the geopolitical status quo and those seeking to revise it — inevitably play out. While it is possible to mitigate the clash through negotiations, trade, or bribes, a frontier separates powers that have deep conflicts of interests grounded in history, civilizational contrasts, or ideological differences. As a result, violence is never too far below the surface.”¹³

According to this geopolitical rationale, Oceanic Powers have historically endeavored to keep Eurasia fragmented and to limit any expansion of Eurasian Powers (mainly Czarist Russia or the Soviet Union) by controlling Eurasia’s external rim.¹⁴ Ukraine’s strategic location on the unquiet frontier of this critical external perimeter has historically made the country a highly contested prize in a great power game.¹⁵ Historically, the vast plains where Ukraine now lies (the East European Plain) were controlled by Poland, Lithuania, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Russian Empire.¹⁶ The Ukrainian shores of the Black Sea and in particular Crimea were the territory of a major European war in 1853 (Crimean War) with the Anglo-French expeditionary force blocking Russia’s Southern expansion into the rimland. A 1919 Anglo-French expedition attempted to repeat the 1853 task but failed.¹⁷ Though President Truman later moved the defensive perimeter southern to Greece and Turkey, the Anglo-Americans never fully abandoned Ukraine. The CIA from the early days of the Cold War continued to support nationalist Ukrainians in an effort to destabilize the Soviet grasp west of Dnieper.¹⁸ Mackinder himself had after all called for the Anglo-Americans to establish a defensive perimeter from the Gulf of Finland all the way to the Black Sea. With this area secured, Mackinder argued, the “new Russian Czardom of the proletariat” might have been swept into the dustbin of history.”¹⁹

From a Russian geopolitical perspective, maintaining control over Ukraine has always been essential for Moscow’s position as a major world power. This stance is not inherently due to malevolence or expansionist desires but reflects a common strategic principle: states typically seize opportunities to enhance their power (analogous to the U.S. concept of Manifest Destiny). As Zbigniew Brzezinski aptly stated, “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire.”²⁰ Consequently, the struggle for control over Ukraine — whether by Russia or its rivals — has historically made it a contested territory, a “chessboard” where great powers maneuver. According to this interpretation, geography has seemingly predestined Ukraine to a tragic fate.

From a U.S. geopolitical perspective, engaging indirectly in the conflict against Russia through proxy support is a highly advantageous strategy. The United States weakens Russia without risking American lives, placing the primary burden of conflict on Ukrainians. Additionally, the financial cost of involvement is kept substantially lower than in previous conflicts with direct U.S. military engagement, such as in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. Importantly, the economic impact of the war is primarily absorbed by the U.S. allies, sparing the United States from the most severe financial repercussions.

Additionally, the United States benefits economically, particularly in the energy sector, by stepping in as one of Europe’s main suppliers of natural gas. The United States has now captured a significant market share that was previously dominated by Russia, a shift paved by sanctions imposed on Russia. The conflict advances U.S. geoeconomic interests by severing Europe’s energy ties with Russia, as evidenced by the destruction of the Nord Stream gas pipelines, and by disrupting Europe’s economic relations with China, demonstrated through the gradual European focus on de-risking supply chains, a process initiated by the war. This shift also aligns with the U.S. strategy to reduce European dependence on Chinese markets.

U.S. strategists have compared the strategic role of the Ukraine war to that of the Korean War in 1949. Similarly, just as the Korean War solidified the emerging transatlantic alliance and connected European and Asian defense strategies, the Ukraine war serves to strengthen these ties today creating an indivisible “Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security space.” Consequently, the United States has been proactive in highlighting the Russian threat alongside the Chinese threat, leveraging the perceived Russo–Chinese alliance to strategically distance Europe from China.²¹ Realist thinkers disagree on the viability of this strategy, arguing that China’s ascendancy means that bringing Moscow closer to Beijing may ultimately undermine the U.S. strategic interests.²² They suggest that a better approach would be to foster a less adversarial relationship between the West and Russia.

The various interpretations presented offer a range of explanations for the causes of the War in Ukraine. Some perspectives, such as the geopolitical and realist ones, complement each other, while others, like the realist and liberal interpretations, stand in opposition.

The Nature of the War: Who Benefits from a War of Attrition?

As the war nears its two-and-a-half-year mark, Ukraine’s resistance against the Russian invasion continues, bolstered by significant Western military and economic aid. However, perspectives on the nature and trajectory of the war vary greatly, largely influenced by the theoretical frameworks of scholars. In contrast to the previous section, which covered four schools of thought, this section narrows the focus to two broader schools: realism versus liberalism. The two realist schools — neorealism and classical realism — along with the geopolitical school, have been consolidated into a unified Realist perspective.

Liberal theorists, operating under the assumption that democracies inherently prevail over autocracies, predicted a decisive Ukrainian victory. They envisioned a 2023 counteroffensive capable of ousting Russia from Crimean and reinstating the borders established in 1991. According to liberals, democracies demonstrate superior efficiency and valor in defensive conflicts against aggressive autocracies. Demotivated Russian troops would likely abandon their weapons and flee in the face of Ukrainian forces equipped with modern Western military hardware. Moreover, liberals argued that since this war is perceived as “Putin’s war,” Russian society would soon rebel against the strongman, potentially leading to regime change in Russia. They believe that with Putin’s fall, the war would end.

On the contrary, realists, who largely disregard ideological factors and do not differentiate between types of regimes, focus instead on tangible resources and strategic considerations. Drawing from Thomas Schelling’s insights, realists argued, even before February 2022, that NATO did not possess a clear theory of victory over Russia in a full-scale conflict over Ukraine.²³ This perspective was evident in Barack Obama’s decision in 2014, when he rejected hawkish advice to escalate the conflict with Russia after the annexation of Crimea. Although NATO might theoretically outmatch Russia in a conventional war due to its superior material resources, the balance of resolve in the context of Ukraine heavily favors Russia. Russia is likely to resort to nuclear escalation to avoid a conventional defeat, reflecting the high stakes it places on the conflict.²⁴ For Russia, the war in Ukraine is seen as vital, whereas for NATO, it represents a secondary interest, given that Ukraine is not a member and therefore not covered under the Article 5 collective defense clause.

The Russian military strategy in a conflict with NATO in Ukraine mirrors the doctrine NATO applied on the Central European front during the Cold War. During that period, potentially outmatched by conventional Soviet forces, NATO depended on the threat of nuclear escalation. Russia’s escalation dominance (and superior resolve) in Ukraine suggests that NATO cannot afford to provide unrestricted military support to Ukraine, as evidenced by debates over long-range missiles and a no-fly zone. Consequently, Russia maintains a material and operational upper hand, leading realists to conclude that Ukraine cannot achieve victory on the battlefield. The best outcome Ukraine can hope for is a bloody stalemate or a limited defeat.

Which perspective has more accurately predicted the course of the war so far — the liberal or the realist?

In the lead-up to the invasion, Russia’s strategy was designed to disrupt the emerging strategic relationship between Ukraine and NATO, aiming to reclaim Ukraine within its sphere of influence. To this end, Russia amassed military forces along the Ukrainian border in September 2021, escalating to threats of invasion by December. When this attempt at coercive diplomacy proved fruitless, Russia launched an invasion in February 2022 with the hope of swiftly capturing Kyiv and establishing a pro-Russian regime. Moscow anticipated minimal resistance, reminiscent of its unchallenged annexation of Crimea in 2014.²⁵ However, the invasion, hastily orchestrated, resembled less a military offensive and more a symbolic march toward Kyiv or a police operation, ill-equipped to face staunch U.S.-guided Ukrainian resistance. The invasion force, numbering between 180,000 and 190,000 soldiers, was capable of instilling fear but insufficient for subduing a nation as vast as Ukraine in the face of determined opposition and Western support.

As this approach floundered, Russia pivoted to a more insidious strategy of exhaustion, designed to erode the Ukrainian leadership’s resolve and calculate that the prolonged conflict would ultimately enable Moscow to impose its will. This strategy, spearheaded by Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian Armed Forces, mirrors tactics previously employed by British Field Marshal Douglas Haig during World War I. Gerasimov orchestrated a series of defensive lines in Russian-held territories in southeastern Ukraine — regions with a significant Russian populace — while concurrently targeting Ukraine’s strategic infrastructure, including its energy, transportation, and telecommunications networks, in a deliberate campaign of exhaustion.

In a war of attrition, Russia stands to benefit due to its substantial quantitative advantage in economic, demographic, and military terms. Economically, Russia’s advantage is approximately 10 to 1. At the war’s outset, the demographic advantage was 3.5 to 1 in Russia’s favor, a margin that has since widened as 6 million Ukrainians sought refuge in the EU and another 2.8 million relocated to Russia, expanding Russia’s demographic edge to roughly 5 to 1. The Russian leadership has capitalized on this demographic superiority by orchestrating successive mobilizations to bolster the ranks of its forces engaged in Ukraine.²⁶ Conversely, Ukraine lacks the manpower to counterbalance Russia’s numerical superiority.

In a war of attrition, a critical indicator is the casualty exchange ratio.²⁷ This ratio favors the Russian side for two reasons: first, Russia has entrenched itself in fortifications and defends with the aim of maintaining control of the approximately 18% of territories it has occupied. Considering that defense is a stronger form of warfare, advantaging over the offense in a ratio of about 3:1, the Ukrainians trying to counterattack to reclaim territories suffer greater losses. Second, Russia has an advantage in the production of weapons systems and ammunition, which is crucial in a war of attrition. The Russian advantage in artillery — which is the primary weapon in trench warfare where each side bombards the other — is overwhelming. Russian forces also enjoy significant advantages in Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) dropped by Russian bombers. The Western military industry is unable to counter Russia’s quantitative advantage in weapons and ammunition suited to attrition warfare, putting Ukraine in an exceptionally disadvantageous position. Therefore, under these material conditions, Ukraine cannot defeat Russia in a war of attrition.

Moreover, Russia has strategically aimed to mitigate any potential qualitative advantage the West might offer Ukraine, effectively using the threat of nuclear escalation as a deterrent.²⁸ This nuclear posture has achieved its strategic objective as it has prevented NATO from intervening directly (boots on the ground or non-flying zone). Consequently, Ukraine finds itself constrained in a war of attrition, where the focal point of conflict increasingly shifts from the battlefield to the societies of Russia, the West, and Ukraine itself. The war has evolved into a test of societal endurance, with Russian society demonstrating a higher degree of resilience in comparison to its Western and Ukrainian counterparts.²⁹

Efforts by the West to undermine the Russian economy and social fabric through economic sanctions have not succeeded (again disproving the Liberal argument that an authoritarian state cannot survive when cut off economically from rich Western democratic states). Russia has swiftly recalibrated its economy to meet wartime demands, ramping up the industrial production of military hardware and leveraging the surge in energy prices to amass wealth. It has also deepened economic ties with China and nations in the Global South, such as India, Brazil and South Africa, to circumvent the impacts of Western sanctions, resulting in unexpected GDP growth. The rise in Russian GDP for 2023, surpasses that of both the EU and the United States, and according to IMF, this is to be repeated in 2024.³⁰ As a result, Russian society has been shielded from the economic repercussions of the war with nationalistic propaganda uniting the populace despite significant battlefield casualties. Such losses would have demoralized any Western society, yet Russian society has historically demonstrated immense resilience in the face of war’s human toll, recalling the enormous sacrifices made during World War II, when the Soviet Union endured up to 20 million fatalities.

In contrast, Ukrainian society has been shown to be more vulnerable to the effects of the war, suffering significantly more damage than Russia. The early months of the war were marked by enthusiasm due to the success of the Ukrainian resistance, which ignited a wave of patriotism. It could even be argued that the Russian invasion catalyzed the formation of Ukrainian national identity in unprecedented ways and spurred a wave of spontaneous volunteerism to support the war effort. However, as the war settled into the stalemate of trench warfare, enthusiasm began to fade. Ukrainian society came to the grim realization that it was witnessing the loss of an entire generation, either through casualties or emigration, while the nation’s wealth diminished, infrastructure crumbled, and the economy experienced a deep downturn of approximately 30%, all with only a slender hope of reversing the situation on the battlefield.

Moreover, the U.S. political elite’s enthusiasm has waned as new geopolitical challenges have emerged in the Middle East (Gaza, Iran, and Houthis), raising concerns that China might leverage the U.S. overextension to assert control over Taiwan or achieve its objectives in the South China Sea. These compounding threats have relatively diminished America’s strategic focus on Ukraine. Western leaders seem to abandon the liberal euphoria and eventually recognize the absence of a viable theory of victory in the proxy war against Russia without risking a catastrophic nuclear escalation. Indeed, Russia has effectively signaled its readiness for nuclear escalation demonstrating its resolve.³¹ It has deployed nuclear weapons in Belarus and withdrew from nuclear arms limitation treaties, indicating a preference for nuclear options over defeat in Ukraine.

Washington had hoped that a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023, coupled with the impact of economic sanctions, might induce internal political instability leading to a regime change in Russia.³² However, these expectations were not met. The Russian leadership remains in control, supported by an economic elite enriched by the war and a society that, despite significant losses, remains rallied by a narrative framing the conflict as an extension of the World War II Great Patriotic War.³³ What failed in 2023, was the highly anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive. The aftermath saw internal political strife in Ukraine and public disputes between military and political leaders, culminating in the dismissal of General Valery Zaluzhny, the once-celebrated Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Ukrainian society is evidently fatigued. The idea of restoring Ukraine’s 1991 borders has lost its appeal to many potential recruits, leading to a demoralized and aging army, now exhausted after two years of attritional conflict.

This analysis reaffirms Thucydides’ observation that wars begin with heightened enthusiasm, yet that enthusiasm well evaporates, as a society realizes that original assessments for easy victory were wishful. The strategic exhaustion faced by Ukraine in a war of attrition against Russia has seemingly tipped the scales in Moscow’s favor. The current status of the war, however, prompts a pressing question: how will this all end?

How the War Ends?

The topic of terminating the war has been somewhat overlooked in the literature, perhaps due to a prevailing misconception that achieving absolute victory on the battlefield automatically resolves subsequent issues. Yet, reality proves to be more complex. Wars seldom conclude with decisive victories by one side entirely imposing its will upon the other, as illustrated by the unconditional surrender of Japan and Germany in World War II. In the context of the war in Ukraine, achieving absolute victory is unattainable; neither can Russia fully conquer Ukraine (west of Dnieper), nor can Ukraine completely expel Russia from its occupied territories (east of Dnieper), including Crimea. Thus, the possible range of outcomes ranges from limited victory of one side to limited defeat of the other side. Again, like in part two, this session narrows the focus to two broader schools: realism versus liberalism.

Liberals argue that Russia must be decisively defeated in Ukraine, drawing on the domino theory, which posits that a Russian victory could embolden Moscow to expand its aggression further west, potentially threatening countries like the Baltics or even Poland. Consequently, liberals advocate for the continuation of the conflict at any cost, urging NATO to escalate its involvement to prevent an expansive Russia. In response to concerns about nuclear escalation by Russia, liberals argue that Russia’s nuclear infrastructure is deteriorating, thereby questioning Moscow’s capability to engage in a nuclear conflict with NATO. They contend that Moscow’s nuclear rhetoric is merely saber rattling. For liberals, the war must conclude with an absolute Russian defeat, meaning the complete expulsion of Russia from every inch of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.

For realists, negotiations present the main avenue for ending wars. The failure to terminate a war favorably through negotiations is a repeated strategic oversight. According to realists, Ukraine appears to have missed at least two opportunities for a beneficial termination of the war. The first occurred during negotiations in Turkey shortly after the onset of the Russian invasion (March–April 2022), when Moscow’s bid to capture Kyiv had faltered. Despite the appearance of a feasible agreement, Ukraine ultimately withdrew. A second chance was squandered in November 2022, following a successful counteroffensive that allowed Ukraine to reclaim a significant size of the territories originally seized by Russia. At this critical juncture, American Chief of Staff, General Mark Milley, advised the Ukrainians to exercise restraint and leverage their military success for political advantage in negotiations.³⁴ Despite this, Ukrainian officials believed time remained on their side, a belief disproven as the conflict unfolded.

For realists wars often commence due to a disagreement over the balance of power and conclude once the involved states reach a mutual understanding of it. Despite the balance of power evidently favoring Russia as of June of 2024, Ukraine has yet to be incentivized to negotiate, hoping for continued American support to potentially turn the tide on the battlefield. Conversely, Russia, perceiving the balance of power as beneficial, shows little interest in initiating negotiations, anticipating a stronger bargaining position in the future. The conflict persists as each party hopes for an improved position, though this does not imply an indefinite duration. The potential for a rapid deterioration of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, due to fatigue or a depletion of arms and ammunition, or an end to the war driven by public demand, cannot be dismissed.

For realists, the pivotal factor in both the commencement and conclusion of wars is political leadership.³⁵ History provides numerous instances where leaders have unnecessarily prolonged conflicts that could have been settled advantageously, such as the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs during the Bosnian War, or continued wars already lost to the detriment of their countries, like Hitler in World War II. Conversely, changes in leadership have sometimes facilitated the termination of wars, as exemplified by Charles de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw France from the Algerian War.

The upcoming U.S. presidential election in November 2024 presents a potential turning point, as Republican candidate Donald Trump has claimed that if elected, he could end the war within 24h, presumably through direct negotiations with Putin. He suggests that he would enforce the resulting agreement on Ukraine by threatening to withhold arms supplies. This scenario is typical of major powers enforcing their will on dependent states, illustrating the realist view of the influence of political leadership on war dynamics.

The heart of potential negotiations lies in the maximalist positions articulated by each side, with both Russia, on one side, and Ukraine and the West, on the other, viewing their opponent as an existential threat necessitating total defeat. Yet, as realists would advise, if all parties were to show restraint and thus prioritize their core interests pragmatically, a window of opportunity for a political agreement might open.³⁶ Realists emphasize controlling emotions and limiting objectives, focusing on practical, mutual interests. Central to these interests is the avoidance of nuclear escalation, which could form the basis for a ceasefire.³⁷ There is a compelling argument here, echoing John F. Kennedy’s understanding during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and the Berlin crises that preceded it. The challenge lies in finding a delicate balance between “humiliating retreat or a nuclear war” — a path best navigated through diplomacy.³⁸

Overall, the central issue for war termination would be Ukraine’s geopolitical status: whether it will be neutral or a member of NATO. More specifically, for Russia, the main objective is to ensure Ukraine’s neutrality and gain control over the eastern oblasts with a predominantly Russian population. Without the fulfillment of these two conditions, Russia has no incentive to end the war.³⁹ For Ukraine, the primary goal is to secure reliable international guarantees to protect against any future Russian invasions and create a tangible path toward reconstruction and prosperity, potentially including prospects for joining the European Union. For the United States, the priorities involve guaranteeing that Russia refrains from attacking third countries, including NATO members and neighboring states like Moldova and Georgia, while also maintaining the existing U.S.-centric European security architecture. Addressing these objectives entails navigating a myriad of issues that must be either resolved or strategically left unsolved (frozen) to facilitate an initial first agreement.

To be sure, because there is no trust that political agreements will be honored (see failure of Minsk accords) and because resolving all these issues will incur significant political costs, it is likely that the leaderships in Moscow, Washington and Kiev will prefer to end the war through an armistice, which, however, will be accompanied by informal understandings on some of the aforementioned key issues. A classic precedent is the armistice that ended hostilities in Korea in 1953. An armistice for Ukraine that would “freeze” the conflict will nonetheless remain fragile. As Clausewitz aptly pointed out: “Even total victory in war cannot be considered final. Defeated states often view the outcome of the war as a temporary misfortune that can be corrected when the political conditions change at some point in the future.”⁴¹ Realists, however, prioritize a solution that may allow space for political consultations later on instead of the continuation of a costly attritional war that provides no space for negotiations.

The conflict will only conclude when the three principal parties involved — Ukraine, Russia, and the Western allies — determine that the advantages of ending the war outweigh the costs of continuing it. At that point, a formal or informal agreement will be pursued, guided by the previously discussed realist parameters of limiting objectives and focusing on mutual interests like avoiding nuclear escalation. The resolution ultimately adopted to terminate the war will reflect the current balance of power and will remain viable until such a balance shifts. If the realist perspective holds true, even with an armistice or a wider political agreement, Ukraine is poised to remain a source of instability within the international system for years to come.

The Strategic Effects of the War on China and the International System

The strategic effects of the War in Ukraine have been the subject of extensive debate, with various schools of international relations providing differing interpretations. As in the previous section, we narrow our focus to two broader schools: realism versus liberalism. The two realist schools, along with the geopolitical school, have been consolidated into one unified perspective.

The liberal school views the situation as a clear net benefit for the United States and a costly outcome for China.⁴² Drawing on the Korean War analogy, liberals argue that the war in Ukraine has solidified a democratic alliance against authoritarianism. In this context, it has unified the European and East Asian fronts, positioning Europe alongside the United States in its efforts to contain China.⁴³ Prior to the war, European allies were either indecisive or remained neutral, reluctant to support the U.S. economic and security measures against China. However, after the war, Europeans have shown increased support for the American strategy, perceiving China’s relationship with Russia as an indirect threat to European security. This stance is underscored by numerous public statements from American and Japanese officials, framing the effects of the Ukraine war as a rallying point for the democratic West against authoritarian Eurasianism. Japan and South Korea participated in the 2022 NATO summit in Madrid and NATO’s latest strategic declaration described China as a security challenge. Thus, liberals echoing the domino theory link the fate of Ukraine to cross-strait stability believing that a Ukrainian defeat will embolden Beijing’s stance against Taipei.⁴⁴

Lastly, liberals refute the argument that the Russian–Chinese alignment forms a powerful geopolitical bloc on two grounds. First, they contend that Russia has been significantly weakened by the war to the point of becoming a liability to Chinese power. Second, they argue that a weakened Russia has become so dependent on China that this dependency is likely to provoke a resurgence of Russian nationalism, potentially leading to a new Russo–Chinese conflict similar to the one in the late 1960s. The history of Russo–Chinese bilateral relations after all has been rather tense.⁴⁵ Liberals moreover argue that authoritarian regimes are more susceptible to breaches in alignment because these alliances are driven by strongmen and personalistic politics, rather than by societies and liberal values.⁴⁶ If either President Putin or Xi were to be ousted, a crisis in Sino–Russian relations could quickly ensue.

Conversely, realist schools unanimously agree that the war in Ukraine has destabilized Europe and distracted the United States, it simultaneously has enhanced China’s leverage in global geopolitics. The most compelling argument stems from the Mackinderian geopolitical school, which focuses on Eurasian integration. Mackinder highlighted those technological advancements, primarily in railways and more efficient transportation methods, could reduce the significance of geographical distances. This reduction would amplify the resource advantages of the Eurasian heartland, enabling it to exert dominance over peripheral regions and potentially rule the “world island.” Oceanic powers like the United States and Great Britain, he feared, would struggle to compete with a Eurasian colossus.

The conflict in Ukraine, combined with the U.S. “dual containment” strategy against both Russia and China, has dismantled the Nixon-era division between the two, forming a potent Eurasian geopolitical mass rich in natural resources, capital, industry, and technology.⁴⁷ Given the greater threat the United States poses to both Moscow and Beijing compared to the threat they pose to each other, China and Russia have strategically aligned for the first time since the late 1950s.⁴⁸ This informal alliance⁴⁹ has also drawn Iran into its fold creating an irresistible gravitational pull for the rest of Central Asian countries.⁵⁰ Russia retains the role of being the security underwriter and China offers investments and prosperity. Bolstered by Belt and Road infrastructure investments, Eurasia is becoming increasingly more integrated unleashing immense geopolitical power hard that will be difficult for the United States to contain. This Mackinderian strategic perspective was perhaps reflected in Xi Jinping’s statement to Vladimir Putin in Moscow last year: “right now we are seeing change unseen in a century, let us push forward together.”⁵¹

On the western edge of the Eurasian landmass, the European Union has experienced negative economic and political effects. Germany’s forced decoupling from cheap Russian energy has led to a loss of competitiveness and partial de-industrialization. On the other hand, as Russia has diverted its energy exports to the East, China has secured unobstructed access to cheap energy, hence further advancing its already formidable industrial competitiveness.⁵² As Isabel Schnabel, a member of the European Central Bank’s executive board has recently put it, Europe needs to address a “‘competitiveness crisis,’ with EU manufacturers facing higher energy prices and bigger workforce challenges than their American or Chinese counterparts.”⁵³ Inflation in the EU and unrealized promises of Russia collapsing due to sanctions have bolstered the Euroskeptic populist right. Discussions about European defense though extensive have yet to yield significant outcomes. The European Procurement Act without the issuance of shared debt (Eurobonds) may increase the overall defense capabilities of European states but it will hardly lead to a defense union. Even, however, if European states increase their military budgets, the overall impact of the Ukraine war will be economically detrimental to Europe. From a geopolitical standpoint, EU states standing by the heartlands border need to be strong to contain Eurasian powers. A weakened Europe compromises this strategic objective. Ultimately, some European states might opt to sit on the fence and pass the buck of Eurasian containment to the major Oceanic power, the United States. Seeing this Washington has called for increased burden sharing demanding that the Europeans increase their defense spending.

To be sure currently, as Europe currently decouples from Russian energy, the United States has gained significant revenue flows and increased its strategic influence over Europe. However, it is too early to determine whether this transatlantic “energy union” will endure, and whether the rise of the populist right in Europe will lead to a renewed energy relationship with Russia, particularly for Germany, whose competitiveness relies on affordable energy. Realists argue that although the United States has secured some financial benefits from energy exports, its overall preoccupation with Russia in Eastern Europe has shifted strategic focus away from East Asia, thereby undermining the U.S. efforts to contain China — the sole peer rival to the U.S. global hegemony.⁵⁴ China on the other hand, secure with resources and protected by safe northern borders can focus laser sharp on the modernization of its economy and double down on its maritime capabilities with Thalassocracy over the global commons of oceans being the ultimate goal.⁵⁵

Conclusion

The war in Ukraine has triggered a dramatic reshaping of the international system. The Global South has turned away from Western narratives, supply lines have been disrupted, food security has become a vital consideration and international cooperation to deal with the environmental crisis has atrophied. Arms control agreements have collapsed, arms races have intensified, defense budgets have surged, the risk of nuclear war has increased.

What has, however, been particularly striking is that, despite the collective power of the West, the United States has not succeeded in crushing Russia in the proxy war in Ukraine. Faced with this challenge, the United States finds itself in a bind, unable to exhibit superior resolve and escalate to nuclear level. While it supports Ukraine with conventional weapons, intelligence, funding, and advanced technologies (even longer-range missiles), these tools have proven insufficient to decisively weaken Russia. The reliance on national power metrics that focus primarily on nominal GDP, without considering industrial capacity, natural resource endowments, and engineering capital, appears to have led to an underestimation of Russian capabilities.⁵⁶ As a learned commentator has put it, the manufacturing capabilities of the United States and its European allies have fallen short in providing Ukraine with the necessary matériel, especially artillery, to either stabilize or secure a victory in the war. “The United States no longer has the means to deliver on its foreign-policy promises.”⁵⁷ The West’s overall inability to emerge victorious in its proxy war against a nuclear-armed Russia and the acceleration of Eurasian integration marks a significant turning point in the international system.⁵⁸ The unipolar era has well receded. Hegemonic antagonism has come back with a vengeance.

Notes