Narrow Results

We examine and model dynamics in three areas of social cognition: (1) political transformations within Russia, (2) evaluation of political trends in other countries by Russians, and (3) evaluation of Russian stereotypes concerning women. We try to represent consciousness as vectorfields and trajectories in a cognitive state space. We use psychosemantic techniques that allow definition of the state space and the systematic construction of these vectorfields and trajectories and their portrait from research data. Then we construct models to fit them, using multiple regression methods to obtain linear differential equations. These dynamical models of social cognition fit the data quite well. (1) The political transformations were modeled by a spiral repellor in a two-dimensional space of a democratic–totalitarian factor and social depression–optimism factor. (2) The evaluation of alien political trends included a flow away from a saddle toward more stable and moderate political regimes in a 2D space, of democratic–totalitarian and unstable–stable cognitive dimensions. (3) The gender study showed expectations (attractors) for more liberated, emancipated roles for women in the future.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an ambitious project aiming to transform the economic landscape along its route in the areas of trade, investment, and energy supplies. It makes as its focal point the connectivity between China and Eurasia, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean. South Asia’s location presents China with significant strategic opportunities as Beijing seeks to expand its economic presence in the subcontinent by providing resources in infrastructural development, particularly the construction of seaports. With growing Chinese trade and investment in the region, Beijing is also extending its diplomatic influence into what has long been considered as India’s sphere of influence. With longstanding strategic distrust and unresolved territorial disputes, New Delhi is suspicious of Beijing’s intentions and concerned over the latter’s growing influence into a region it has long considered its sphere of influence. In this context, the BRI has the potential to intensify Sino–Indian rivalry, and the Modi government has indeed explored and launched initiatives to counter Chinese diplomatic activities. It remains a challenge whether and how Asia’s rising powers can reduce their trust deficits and explore areas of cooperation made possible by the BRI, working toward a cooperative, mutually beneficial future for Sino–Indian relations and the region as a whole.

The factors affecting the relationship between China and India can be divided into three categories: structural factors, hard factors, and soft factors. The structural factors are mainly geopolitical factors determined by national strength, geographical features and international status. Hard factors mainly include border conflicts, Tibetan issues, China–Pakistan relations and water disputes, which are difficult to solve and highly sensitive. Soft factors include a trade imbalance, visa issues, different notions of history, strategic differences, and the relationship between the two countries on the international stage. These three kinds of factors are differentiated. Their importance and influence on China–India relations are also changing. Geopolitical factors have begun to play more important role in the bilateral relationship of the two rising countries in the past few years, leading to their strategic competition. This competition has grown despite the fact that the two countries have not yet achieved a status as leaders of world politics. This premature strategic competition will hinder the development of the two countries and will make the “Asian century” hard to realize. For the security and interests of both nations and Asia as a whole, China and India must establish a more stable geopolitical relationship, promote bilateral cooperation in the field of hard and soft factors, and find opportunities for cooperation in new areas and spaces. Finally, China and India need to build a new type of power relations.

As a pivotal region, the Indo-Pacific has become the power center of world geopolitics. China is actively working on strengthening win-win cooperation and inter-connectivity within the region. Toward this goal, it has launched the “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” from which all regional countries can benefit. From the geopolitical perspective, however, the United States has perceived growing challenge from China and is determined to maintain global supremacy by continuing to increase its military presence in the Indo-Pacific and enhancing its quadrilateral strategic cooperation with Japan, Australia and India. After the Obama administration’s “Rebalancing” efforts to sustain U.S. leadership in the Asia-Pacific by strengthening political, security and economic ties with regional countries, the Trump administration puts much emphasis on the security aspect of its Indo-Pacific strategy under the “America First” doctrine, and this is proving to be rather unwelcome among regional countries. As a result, China’s regional influence is expected to continue expanding with the promotion of the BRI and other initiatives to enhance regional integration.

The Beijing Xiangshan Forum (BXF), earlier known as “Xiangshan Forum” is emerging as an important element in China’s diplomatic toolbox. At a time when Asian states, to varying degrees, are receptive to various Chinese initiatives, and Beijing considers itself better resourced to implement its own regional initiatives, the forum is expected to play a larger role in regional military diplomacy and security dialogue. The evolution of the Xiangshan Forum has been a measure of China’s changing self-perception and expanding strategic role in the shifting regional security landscape. As a newly created security forum, the forum can and should coexist with existing regional institutions and complement other stakeholders’ efforts to build an inclusive, robust, and resilient security architecture in the Asia-Pacific.

This paper offers an overview of the size, progress, and impact of the Belt and Road Initiative, based on a relatively comprehensive examination of relevant literature, policy documents, and academic essays to dissect various aspects of mega-project. It delves into the theoretical foundations that underpin the initiative, including theses on economic integration and Beijing’s use of soft power, explores the role of China’s grand strategy in shaping the Belt and Road Initiative, emphasizing the dual objectives of securing sustained domestic growth and expanding Beijing’s global influence. Aimed at advancing both geopolitical and geoeconomic interests, the Belt and Road Initiative is expected to play a larger role in regional infrastructure connectivity and global economic transformation.

The maritime domain has emerged as an emblematic arena for geopolitical maneuvering, economic synergy, and strategic competition in the 21st century. As the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has assumed greater resonance, the maritime component of this corridor, often referred to as the “Maritime Silk Road,” holds the potential to reshape and nurtures the economic and geopolitical landscape in the Indian Ocean region. The blue economy encompasses various sectors, including fisheries, shipping, renewable energy, and trade while plays as a catalyst in the economic prosperity and sustainability of coastal nations. This research aims to explore the multifaceted geopolitical implications of the maritime cooperation between Pakistan and China, with a specific focus on its profound impact on the blue economy. This blue web of strategic nexus has potential in the terms of diplomatic, military, and economic ties, while capable of harnessing cultural, technological, and educational exchanges. Gwadar Port, the gateway to the Arabian Sea, has emerged as a pivotal factor in this equation due to its role in fostering regional and international interconnectivity. However, this is also vulnerable to growing security, environmental, and geopolitical rivalries.

In the intricate tapestry of global geopolitics, China’s ascent as a potential preeminent power in a new world order has become a compelling narrative. This paper explores Beijing’s multifaceted rise by delving into the diplomatic, economic, technological, cultural, and environmental dimensions of the nation’s ascent. China’s adept diplomacy, exemplified by its active participation in international organizations, introduces profound implications for global governance and cooperation. Economically, its transformation from an agrarian society to the world’s second-largest economy redefines the dynamics of international trade and development, epitomized by the far-reaching Belt and Road Initiative. China’s technological prowess, particularly in fields like artificial intelligence and 5G technology, reshapes the landscape of innovation, while the influence of its soft power through cultural exports and educational outreach resonates across borders. The ethical and moral dimensions of global governance are at the forefront of this narrative, with questions of universal values and human rights taking center stage. China’s commitment to environmental sustainability and its role in addressing climate change also have profound implications for global environmental protection. Looking ahead, two potential scenarios, a bipolar world order and a multipolar world order, come into focus, each with its own implications for international relations, trade, technology, and environmental cooperation. In this evolving global narrative, international organizations adapt to accommodate shifting power dynamics, emphasizing the need for equitable representation and multilateral collaboration. Ultimately, the paper underscores the interplay of nations in the recalibration of the global order, urging proactive engagement and foresight in navigating the complex terrain of China’s rise and its impact on the future of international relations.

Leading theorists of major schools of thought in international relations disagree over the root causes of the ongoing war in Ukraine. This paper examines the merits and bases of the theories or explanations provided by each major IR school. It explores the dominant arguments concerning the nature and trajectory of the ongoing war, the prospects for its resolution, and its strategic effects on the international system with a particular emphasis on China. We argue that scholars’ views on these topics are significantly influenced by their theoretical orientations within international relations. Furthermore, strategic thinkers and policymakers, identified as homines theoretici or feminae theoreticae, are themselves deeply influenced by their theoretical understandings of the world, which in turn shape their normative engagement with world affairs. However, the interplay between theoretical perspectives and practical realities hinges on the dynamics of power and objective material conditions on the ground.

The Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe, a small and remote island state, located in the Gulf of Guinea, has long offered little geopolitical and geo-economic interest. This situation is however gradually changing. In fact, since 2016, interest in the country has begun to grow, after the country resumed diplomatic relations with People’s Republic of China (hereafter China) and recognized the “one-China policy”. While the island state and Cabo Verde have followed different development paths in the post-colonial era, both share common features and both have the potential to perform important geopolitical regional roles in the context of the Belt and Road initiative (BRI). This paper discusses São Tomé and Príncipe’s regional engagement in the Gulf of Guinea (GG), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), and in multi-level cooperation in light of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-Speaking Countries (FM) as well as bilateral cooperation. We argue that São Tomé and Príncipe is of geopolitical value to China and that the island state will serve Chinese interests in extending the BRI in the Gulf of Guinea. The microstate of São Tomé and Príncipe has the potential to transform itself to function as the “Qatar of the Gulf of Guinea”, and contribute to regional stability by providing regional services for shipping, banking, finance, high-quality education, tourism and as an engaged partner. This paper presents a methodological theoretical-inductive and constructivist perspective, combining qualitative, quantitative and non-participant observation.

In recent years, a civilizational perspective as a part of geopolitical analysis is deployed to fuel geopolitical concern. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been viewed as a case of the clash of civilizations between the West and China. This paper scrutinizes the civilization-based geopolitical approach and analysis. It tests the “civilizational-clash” thesis beyond the Sinic–West relations through the cases of the Sinic–Islamic and Sinic–Hindu relations. An examination and comparison of different civilizational responses to the BRI helps us to develop a critical perspective to investigate the problems in the BRI, in particular the potential civilizational fault-lines along the BRI route. The paper rejects the simplistic version of civilization-based geopolitical analysis as insufficient, problematic, and even misleading. It has sought to refine and nurture a more sophisticated and rigorous approach to the complex connection between the BRI and civilization.

Since its entry into the WTO in 2001, Chinese expansion in South America has been increasingly evident, mainly in economic and financial terms. However, it is verified that a more active participation has been presenting a duality that generates, concomitantly, benefits and harms for the South American economies. This article seeks to discuss this specific characteristic, presenting the hypothesis of the establishment of a hybrid geoeconomy, defined as the use of economic instruments through a multifarious and asymmetric dualism. Thus, based on an empirical-deductive methodology based on quantitative and qualitative data, the objective is to show that even though the Chinese geoeconomic instruments are a non-imposing strategy, they can result in negative externalities for the South American productive structures and intraregional flows in the long run. This work is divided into three sections, in addition to the present introduction and the final considerations: First, the theoretical-conceptual definition of what is called hybrid geoeconomics will be carried out, based on a discussion of a geopolitical and geoeconomic nature. Subsequently, Chinese economic instruments in South America will be evaluated in quantitative terms, basically using data from trade flows, foreign direct investments and loans, over the period from 2001 to 2016. In the last section, we intend to qualify the debate on China’s hybrid geoeconomics in South American territory, demonstrating its intrinsic characteristics, as well as its objectives, counterparts, protagonists and models. Therefore, it is concluded that the Chinese presence has been changing the geopolitical and geoeconomic map of South America, with positive and negative impacts.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 the world experienced a transformation from bipolarity to unipolarity, where the United States has become the global hegemon. However, the world appears to be evolving into a “multipolar world” where nations such as the BRICS¹ block are likely to have strong economic influence in their respective geopolitical regions. Events currently taking place in Ukraine and Gaza seem to have accelerated this process, where nations such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa are exercising stronger influence in world affairs. According to the literature, several factors have been identified as major drivers of multipolarity, namely, China’s booming economic growth and rapid technological change throughout many parts of the world. These transformations pose challenges and opportunities to “middle sized” nations such as Australia. In order to analyze these, a SWOT analysis methodology was conducted for Australia, which found that Australia has much to gain in an emerging multipolar world, however, it needs to navigate these troubled waters with very astute diplomatic care.

This article argues that India-East Asia relations are likely to enter a new phase in the post-COVID-19 era. The COVID-19 pandemic has hastened the decline of the post-Cold War liberal order that has so far promoted mutual trust and cooperation and underpinned peace and prosperity. This development has enormous implications for East Asia’s international relations. Indeed, significant changes appear to have occurred in the region during the pandemic. On the one hand, the pandemic has accelerated China's growing supremacy, but on the other hand, it has also enhanced its rivalry with all major liberal powers, including the US, India, Japan and Australia. Moreover, the geo-economic front has also witnessed drastic changes as pandemic-induced economic nationalism, economic retaliation, and supply chain restructuring have swept across the region. Hence, it is not premature to proclaim the post-pandemic East Asia will differ from the post-Cold War liberal era. That, in turn, raises important questions: How has the COVID-19 influenced India–East Asia relations? Will the post-COVID-19 era transform India's ties with East Asia? If so, how will this relationship change, and to what extent? This article, and this special issue more broadly, seek to answer these questions. In doing so, we first examine the major geopolitical and geo-economic issues between India and East Asia. Thereafter, we analyze India's relations with South Korea, China, Japan and ASEAN.

This paper analyzes the dynamics of supply chain diversification in a contested East Asia and their implications for India–South Korea cooperation in the post-COVID-19 era. Major powers have sought to restructure supply chain by designing a strategy to reduce their reliance on China-controlled supply chain. The United States–China trade and technological war, Asian regional powers’ escalating conflicts with a rising China, and pandemic-induced supply chain disruptions have played key roles in driving the restructuring process. India and South Korea, Asia’s two major economies, have also re-evaluated their supply chain strategies. As this paper explains, on the one hand, India has been striving to emerge as a supply chain hub for key industries by ending China’s control. On the other hand, South Korea has also been aiming to diversify its supply chain beyond China under the New Southern Policy. Against that backdrop, critical developments concerning supply chain cooperation have occurred between the two countries amid the COVID-19 crisis. The pandemic has not only facilitated the opening of high-level political exchanges on supply chain but also brought tangible outcomes, as Korean companies have become active participants in India’s quest to build an India-centric supply chain. I conclude this study by contending that the two countries are “natural partners” in reshaping the supply chain dynamics in East Asia in the post-COVID-19 era.

The world is witnessing a new technological order as major powers restructure their national strategies to dominate the supply chains of semiconductors, which have emerged as the most critical technology in the post-COVID era. In this context, the origins of the India-US semiconductor alliance represent a significant development. This paper explores the drivers and defining characteristics of this partnership. By combining geo-economic and geopolitical perspectives, the paper explains India's emerging semiconductor strategies and the rationale behind the India-US semiconductor collaboration. Geo-economic factors—such as India's recognition of economic security risks during the pandemic-induced chip shortages, the crucial role of semiconductors in India's future economic growth, and its ambitions to become a chip exporter—have driven the formation of India’s new semiconductor strategy and its quest to strengthen ties with the US. Geopolitical factors, including India's heightened threat perception regarding its dependence on chip imports from China and concerns about China's technological advancements, have further bolstered this technological partnership. The India-US semiconductor alliance in the post-COVID era is defined by three major characteristics: first, unprecedented high-level political commitment to building chip partnerships; second, significant enhancement of chip-related agreements and institutional collaborations between the two countries; and third, the promotion of US semiconductor companies' presence in India. The paper also examines the future prospects of this alliance, emphasizing the substantial convergence between India and the US in the semiconductor sector and identifying key challenges that will shape the future trajectory of this partnership.

The notions of a conflictual Arctic and great-power politics continue to make the headlines. Ideas of the Arctic as an arena for political competition and rivalry are often juxtaposed with the view of the Arctic as a region of harmony and shared interests, featuring a confusing multitude of actors and layers of geopolitical engagement. What are the different national security characteristics of the Arctic region? Why are statements by Arctic states about the region sometimes contradictory? And how might regional relations evolve? This chapter teases out the different, and at times contradictory, dynamics at play in the Circumpolar North along three “levels” of inter-state relations: the international system, the regional (Arctic) level, and bilateral relations. Labeling these as “in”, “through”, and “over,” we showcase why the idea of conflict in the Arctic persists but why this does not necessarily counter an ongoing reality of regional cooperation and stability.

This chapter looks at the connection between Asia and the Arctic from the institutional perspective of the Arctic Council. It assesses the motivations and interests of Asian states in the Arctic Council to study the importance of the Arctic region in their strategic outlooks. Importantly, the chapter looks at the divergences and mutual interests of Asian (and Eurasian) states within themselves vis-à-vis the Arctic region with a focus on India, Japan, Russia and China. A review of such internal Asian dynamics, especially as revisionist threats from China and Russia in the Arctic grow, allows for a grander continental connection of interests and differences between Asia and the Nordic states, with a review of individual bilaterals Asian states share with Nordic countries. The chapter concludes with assessments over how cooperation between Asia and the Nordic states came to be attempted within the parameters of the Arctic Council in a bid to coordinate an engagement strategy to promote their shared interests within the multilateral forum.

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• Theories of Geopolitics and Regions
• Japan: Regionalism Aborted
• The United States: Regionalism Obstructed
• China: Regionalism Resurgent?
• Concluding Remarks
• References

At the end of the 1980s when the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum was inaugurated, it looked like an idea whose time had come. APEC seemed ideally placed to benefit from and facilitate the post-Cold War preoccupation with economic development and integration. Moreover, it held out the prospect of institutionalising and coordinating relations between the ‘miraculous’ economies of East Asia and the ‘Anglo-American’ nations of North America and Australasia. Given the importance of the United States as a security guarantor and export market for much of industrialising Asia, it seemed inevitable that ties between the Western and Eastern sides of the Pacific could only become stronger. Although the exact boundaries and content of the ‘Asia-Pacific’ region were always rather imprecise (Dirlik 1992), in the early 1990s economic, political and strategic ties seemed certain to give concrete expression to a vision that was enthusiastically championed by influential figures in Washington and — especially — Canberra and Tokyo (Funabashi 1995). How times change. A major recalibration of the goals and style of American foreign policy has not only rendered organisations like APEC with its explicit Asia-Pacific identity less important, but it has simultaneously encouraged the development of a more narrowly conceived form of East Asian regionalism that self-consciously excludes the United States…