China’s Energy Security Strategy in Central Asia: A BRI and Green Energy Perspective (2019–2024)

Introduction

China, the world’s largest energy producer, faces increasing pressure to ensure a secure, environmentally compatible, and cost-effective energy supply.¹ The country’s ambitious transition toward a low-carbon economy is fraught with technological hurdles, economic costs, and geopolitical constraints. China’s transportation of resources has traditionally depended on maritime routes. However, maritime vulnerabilities, such as in the Malacca Strait, have sparked concerns over potential supply disruptions.² This vulnerability, often called the “Malacca Dilemma”, highlighted the strategic imperative for China to diversify its energy supplies and transportation routes.³ Therefore, China launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, a multifaceted strategy that aims to enhance economic ties and infrastructure development across Eurasia. One of BRI’s objectives is to strengthen China’s energy and commercial security by providing alternative routes for energy and goods through land-based transportation networks stretching to Europe (the belt) and maritime routes (the road).⁴ Due to environmental considerations, BRI evolved into a Green BRI in 2019, focusing on renewable energy and sustainable development efforts.

Central Asia, with its abundant oil and gas reserves and substantial renewable energy potential, plays a significant role in China’s energy security strategy. The extensive border of Central Asia with China makes it a vital sphere of influence. The BRI holds significant importance in Central Asia’s energy security strategy by facilitating infrastructure projects and investments that enhance energy cooperation and resource access. These investments focused on natural resource extraction, processing, and secure transportation.⁵ Furthermore, the BRI, particularly through its Green version, emphasizes clean energy, green hydrogen, and electricity corridors. The investments made by China under the BRI include building energy generation infrastructure, enhancing distribution networks, and promoting renewable and green energy projects.⁶ However, the BRI’s dual focus on renewable and non-renewable energy projects presents challenges and opportunities in balancing immediate energy security needs with long-term sustainability goals.⁷ The dynamics of energy cooperation between China and Central Asia are influenced by a complex interplay of economic, political, and environmental factors.

Energy security has been a central theme in international relations and policy studies, particularly concerning the geopolitics of energy supply and demand. Scholars have explored various dimensions of China’s energy security, including the reliability of energy supplies, the geopolitical risks associated with energy trade routes, the importance of regional energy cooperation under BRI and Green BRI, and the opportunities and risks associated with these initiatives.⁸ Scholars have extensively studied Energy Security Theory and Complex Interdependence Theory independently, but no existing research has integrated these theories into a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis. This represents a significant gap in the literature, particularly given the potential of such an integrated approach to offer a more comprehensive understanding of energy security challenges in a highly interconnected world. Therefore, this study was conducted to offer a comprehensive understanding through two integrated theories from 2019 to 2024 while extensively focusing on Green BRI evolution. This study also highlights both renewable and non-renewable projects under the BRI in Central Asia, underscores the continued significance of non-renewable projects, and proposes a nuanced understanding that China cannot halt its oil and gas exploration in the near future to meet its energy needs. To bridge the research gap, this study aims to provide answers to the following questions: How does China’s energy security strategy influence its cooperation with Central Asian countries in both renewable and non-renewable energy projects? What role does the BRI, including the Green BRI, play in facilitating energy cooperation between China and Central Asia? What are the SWOTs associated with China–Central Asia energy cooperation under the BRI?

This study employs a qualitative research approach, incorporating primary and secondary sources to comprehensively examine China’s energy security strategy and China–Central Asia energy cooperation. Primary sources include governmental reports, official statements, and statistical data from China and Central Asian countries, providing direct insights into the BRI policies, agreements, and projects. These primary sources are critical for understanding the involved nations’ official stance and strategic goals. Secondary sources consist of scholarly articles, books, and credible reports from international organizations, which offer analysis, interpretation, and context to the primary data. The integration of primary and secondary data will enable a comprehensive SWOT analysis of the cooperation under the BRI, highlighting the strategic SWOT of this international energy collaboration.

Theoretical Framework: Energy Securitization and Complex Interdependence

Securitization in international relations refers to a process that frames a problem as an immediate existential threat, necessitating emergency measures and rational acts that go beyond the usual boundaries of the political process.⁹ Energy Securitization Theory, based on the Copenhagen School of International Relations, characterizes that states frame energy supply and infrastructure as critical national security issues to justify extraordinary measures.¹⁰

The process of securitization involves three stages: non-securitization, politicization, and securitization, where energy issues transition from non-threatening to recognized threats requiring government intervention.¹¹ This dynamic is influenced by various actors, including states and international systems that reflect the complexity of energy security in a polyarchic world. Moreover, the theory highlights the variability of Energy Securitization across different contexts, as seen in case studies of energy exporters like Russia and Australia, where domestic and international factors shape energy policies and conflicts.¹² Thus, Energy Securitization Theory provides a nuanced framework for understanding the interplay between energy, security, and international relations.

For China, energy security is paramount, given its reliance on external energy supplies and the strategic vulnerabilities associated with critical maritime routes like the Malacca Strait. Energy Securitization involves securing and diversifying energy sources, with the BRI serving as a central mechanism for achieving these goals.¹³ The theory also identifies several key variables critical to understanding China’s approach to energy security. First, energy supply diversification is central to mitigating the risks associated with over-reliance on specific energy sources or suppliers.¹⁴ This strategy involves developing multiple energy supply routes and tapping into various energy resources across different regions, thereby reducing vulnerability to supply disruptions. Second, strategic infrastructure investment is crucial, as it involves constructing and enhancing energy infrastructure, particularly in Central Asia, to secure long-term energy supplies.¹⁵ Lastly, geopolitical vulnerability is a significant concern, particularly regarding the Malacca Dilemma, where regional conflicts or political instability could compromise key maritime supply routes.¹⁶

By focusing on these variables, the Energy Securitization Theory provides insights into China’s strategic imperatives and security concerns, particularly how energy supply diversification and strategic infrastructure investments are leveraged to mitigate geopolitical vulnerabilities.¹⁷ This theoretical perspective will guide the analysis of China’s investments in energy infrastructure within Central Asia under the BRI, encompassing renewable and non-renewable projects.

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s Complex Interdependence Theory challenges traditional realist perspectives by highlighting the complex patterns of interaction between states, including economic, environmental, and energy ties.¹⁸ The theory posits that these interdependencies create mutual benefits and influence state behavior, often reducing the likelihood of conflict.¹⁹ The theory emphasizes the increasing linkages between states in the energy domain, such as through trade agreements, joint projects, and shared infrastructure. As states become more dependent on each other for energy supply, demand, and technology, this mutual reliance can lead to cooperation and conflict.²⁰ Moreover, non-state actors such as transnational corporations, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations significantly impact energy relations between states.

Economic interdependence is one of the key variables within Complex Interdependence Theory, which highlights the mutual economic benefits derived from cooperation, particularly in the energy sector. This interdependence fosters a stable and predictable environment for both China and Central Asian countries, promoting long-term cooperation.²¹ Environmental cooperation is another critical variable, referring to the collaborative efforts between China and Central Asia to address environmental challenges through energy projects, such as the development of renewable energy.²² Political stability is a significant outcome of interdependence, as the mutual dependencies fostered by the BRI reduce the likelihood of conflict and promote regional stability.²³

By integrating Energy Securitization Theory and Complex Interdependence Theory, this theoretical framework offers a holistic approach to analyzing China’s energy security strategy in Central Asia and China–Central Asia energy cooperation for mutual gains. The Energy Securitization Theory offers valuable analytical perspectives on China’s strategic priorities and security considerations, while the Complex Interdependence Theory elucidates the reciprocal advantages and interdependencies that emerge from these engagements. This comprehensive framework depicted in Figure 1 is instrumental in addressing the research questions posed in this study, allowing for a systematic analysis of how China’s energy security outreach influences its cooperation with Central Asia, particularly through the BRI.

The Dragon’s Dilemma: Securing Energy for a Resource-Hungry China

China’s continued development and prosperity hinge on a stable and reliable energy supply for its 1.3 billion people, a growing economy, and ambitious goals for social advancement. China’s rapid industrialization and deep integration into the global marketplace have amplified this need. As a result, China has become increasingly active in securing energy resources both domestically and internationally.²⁴ Figure 2 projects growth in China’s energy mix generation until 2030.²⁵

Reliable energy supplies, particularly for imported oil, remain a concern for Chinese energy policymakers. This insecurity, heightened by the 2021 energy crisis, fuels the Chinese push to challenge U.S. naval dominance in crucial shipping lanes. To counter perceived American control over important chokepoints, maritime piracy, and stakeholder states, China is expanding its naval reach and investing heavily in new energy technologies. These efforts aim to secure a clean energy future for China and potentially reshape global energy markets.²⁶ The consumption of coal, oil, natural gas, renewables, and nuclear has evolved since 2000 (Figure 3).²⁷

China’s economic model is heavily reliant on energy. Its industries, particularly steel, aluminum, and construction, are major energy consumers, contributing significantly to economic growth and high carbon emissions. This dependence on energy-intensive industries makes China the world’s biggest energy user, consuming approximately 25% of global energy in 2021.²⁸

China’s economic reliance on energy and its dependence on imported fossil fuels ignites deep anxieties about energy security. For Chinese leaders, energy security translates to a guaranteed, uninterrupted flow of energy resources at reasonable prices. In response to these energy security concerns, General Secretary Xi Jinping outlined the “Four Transformations and One Cooperation” strategy in 2014. This multi-pronged approach aims to curb unnecessary energy use, diversify domestic energy sources, invest in new technologies, and strengthen domestic energy regulations. “One Cooperation” features international cooperation prominently but with a strong emphasis on prioritizing China’s domestic needs.²⁹

China’s heavy reliance on imported fossil fuels, particularly coal, oil, and natural gas, creates a strategic vulnerability. This dependence contradicts the stated goal of Chinese leaders: to achieve energy self-sufficiency. In 2018, China relied on imports for a staggering 73% and 41% of its oil and natural gas needs, respectively. Experts like Michal Meidan of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies highlight the risks of such dependence, leaving China susceptible to actions by foreign powers that could disrupt vital energy supplies.³⁰ To address this risk, China has pursued a two-pronged strategy: increasing domestic production and diversifying its energy mix. However, it is unlikely that China will achieve either objective fully. The country’s increasing demand for natural gas and oil is predicted to continue growing into the 2040s and 2030s, respectively, leaving insufficient time to achieve self-sufficiency. Efforts to boost domestic gas production are falling short, and oil production has declined by 2% over the past decade despite significant investment in exploration and development.³¹

A report released by the U.S. Energy Information Administration in 2023 indicated that China’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth slowed to 3% in 2022 due to the COVID-19 lockdown, which affected energy demand. In 2021, China maintained its position as the world’s top energy producer and consumer. Coal consumption stood at 58%, natural gas at 8%, petroleum and other liquids at 19%, nuclear at 3%, and renewable energy at 12%, lower than in 2020.³²

However, China’s international energy frequently draws scrutiny. Some of these efforts, such as securing resource-rich but politically troubled regions through questionable loans, have raised concerns about coercion. Moreover, China’s reliance on imported fossil fuels leaves its economy highly susceptible to global price fluctuations. Government efforts to control domestic energy prices create market distortions, as exemplified by the 2021 energy crisis. These distortions not only exacerbate China’s energy insecurity but also contribute to global supply chain disruptions and inflation. China’s status as the world’s leading importer of crude oil and coal underscores its vulnerability, especially in the event of potential military conflicts in the Middle East and or other regions that could disrupt access to vital resources. The significant measures China undertakes to mitigate these risks highlight the leadership’s deep concern about securing a stable energy future. However, institutional and technical barriers hinder the full transition from coal to renewable energy sources. In 2020, fossil fuels likely accounted for more than 60% of China’s energy mix, impeding its efforts to reduce its carbon footprint.

However, according to an official report issued by the government of the People’s Republic of China (2022), China’s oil imports were 73.6% in 2020 and dropped to 72% in 2021.³³ In a report by Enerdata (2023), crude oil imports fell in 2022 to 48.0 million metric tons. Natural gas imports fell by 9.9% (109.25 metric tons) in 2022 as compared to 121.26 in 2021.³⁴ Despite having sufficient energy resources, China faces difficulties meeting its energy needs due to a variety of factors:

Coal Dependency

China heavily relies on coal for electricity generation, accounting for one out of every four tons of coal used globally. While efforts are being made to reduce coal consumption and improve air quality by switching to cleaner fuels like natural gas, the country’s coal fleet remains young, efficient, and much more significant than its gas-fired fleet.³⁵ In the past 10 years, coal’s share of total energy use fell from 68.5% to 56%.³⁶ While China’s pursuit of energy diversification has seen the proportion of coal decline in its energy mix over the past decade, coal consumption remains stubbornly high despite an average annual increase of nearly 1% between 2011 and 2021.³⁷

Natural Gas Demand

In the past decade, China’s natural gas consumption has quadrupled, making it the world’s third-largest consumer and the largest importer. The country aims to boost the share of natural gas in its total energy consumption to 15% by 2030. However, a widening gap between domestic production and demand requires increased imports through pipelines and the liquefied natural gas trade.³⁸

China’s natural gas consumption has increased for two main reasons. First, to tackle severe air pollution, particularly in Beijing, authorities switched from coal to cleaner-burning natural gas. Second, a harsh winter in 2017 exposed vulnerabilities in the power grid, prompting a shift towards a more diversified energy mix with a greater role for natural gas. These factors and a similar winter in 2022–2023 have highlighted the importance of natural gas for China’s energy security.³⁹ Natural gas consumption is surging, outpacing pre-pandemic levels. In 2023, natural gas consumption was 394.53 billion cubic meters, a 7.6% increase compared to 2022.⁴⁰ By 2021, China had emerged as the world’s top importer of conventional and liquefied natural gas.⁴¹ Fueled by both rising demand and government initiatives promoting natural gas over coal in homes and factories, China’s liquified natural gas needs are poised for significant growth, making it a strong player in the global energy market through 2024.⁴²

Oil and Petroleum

China’s oil resources are substantial, with proven oil reserves of 25,132,122,000 barrels, ranking 14th in the world and accounting for about 1.5% of the world’s total oil reserves.⁴³ However, these resources are insufficient to meet Beijing’s growing energy needs. In 2022, China’s oil consumption amounted to 14.3 million barrels per day, down from 14.9 million barrels daily in the prior year.⁴⁴ Despite efforts to increase domestic oil production, China remains heavily reliant on imported oil, with crude imports constituting 72% of the country’s total oil consumption in 2021. Although China’s domestic oil production has been rising, with crude output increasing by 2.4% year-on-year to 199 million tons in 2021, this growth is insufficient to keep pace with the country’s demand.⁴⁵

(Green) BRI and Chinese Energy Security Strategy

China’s vulnerability to disruptions in seaborne energy imports, particularly from critical chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea, underpins its energy security strategy. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, China has adopted a multifaceted approach that includes diversifying energy sources, investing in infrastructure, and fostering strategic partnerships with critical energy-producing regions such as Central Asia. Central Asia has abundant renewable and non-renewable resources, as depicted in Figure 4.⁴⁶

Non-Renewable Energy Projects in Central Asia

China’s energy security concerns have significantly influenced its cooperation with Central Asian countries in the non-renewable energy sector. In Kazakhstan, China’s strategic partnership is pivotal in developing oil and gas resources. The Atyrau–Alashankou pipeline exemplifies China’s focus on securing reliable sources of oil, which directly supports its energy security goals.⁴⁷

In Turkmenistan, the Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline network highlights China’s objectives to secure a stable natural gas supply. As Turkmenistan is China’s largest natural gas supplier, its role is pivotal in fulfilling China’s energy needs, highlighting the impact of China’s energy security strategy on securing non-renewable resources.⁴⁸ Additionally, China’s investments in Uzbekistan’s oil and gas infrastructure, including power plants and refineries, further demonstrate its strategy of securing energy supplies from Central Asia.⁴⁹

Advancement of Renewable Energy Initiatives Under Green BRI

China’s Green BRI represents a transformative approach to global infrastructure development, emphasizing sustainable and environment-friendly projects that align with global climate objectives. This strategic approach also aligns with China’s energy needs because Central Asia is an abundant source of renewable resources. There are several reasons for the shift from non-renewable to renewable. First, the declining costs of solar and wind technologies, when compared to the more capital-intensive large hydropower projects, have significantly influenced energy investment decisions in recent years.⁵⁰ Second, solar and wind energy have become increasingly attractive options due to their reduced installation and operational costs, which have outpaced the financial viability of large-scale hydropower, especially in regions where hydro resources are vulnerable to climate change’s adverse effects. Lastly, the impact of climate change, including altered precipitation patterns and reduced water availability, has further diminished the reliability and long-term sustainability of hydropower projects in affected regions.⁵¹ Concurrently, there has been a growing dissatisfaction with China’s debt-financing practices, particularly in developing countries that have become increasingly wary of the financial burdens associated with large-scale infrastructure loans.⁵² This has led Chinese banks to adopt more conservative lending policies, reflecting a shift towards more sustainable and less financially risky investment strategies.⁵³ This transition underscores the changing energy financing landscape, favoring renewable technologies like solar and wind for their lower costs, reduced environmental impacts, and alignment with global climate goals. This initiative has been particularly impactful in Central Asia, where China has facilitated significant investments in renewable energy projects, thereby contributing to the diversification of its energy portfolio and reducing its carbon footprint.⁵⁴

China and Uzbekistan signed a landmark 6-billion-dollar agreement in 2023 to develop a range of renewable energy projects, including photovoltaic, wind, and hydropower stations. This agreement, central to the Green BRI, aims to enhance Uzbekistan’s renewable energy capacity and reduce its dependence on fossil fuels. The projects under this agreement are set to utilize advanced technologies and foster collaboration between Chinese and Uzbek energy firms, thus reinforcing the energy partnership between the two nations and supporting the regional transition toward sustainable energy sources.⁵⁵

Another significant project under the Green BRI is the Kapshagay Photovoltaic Power Plant in Kazakhstan. This initiative is particularly notable for its implementation model, described as “100% Made in China, 100% Construction in Kazakhstan”. This approach highlights China’s dedication to localizing its renewable energy projects and guarantees the maintenance of the highest standards of quality and efficiency. The Kapshagay plant, which harnesses solar energy for electricity generation, plays a pivotal role in Kazakhstan’s efforts to reduce its reliance on coal and other fossil fuels, aligning with the country’s long-term sustainability goals.⁵⁶

In addition to traditional renewable energy projects, China is advancing electric vehicle (EV) infrastructure in Central Asia, with significant investments in Uzbekistan. Chinese automakers, such as BYD and Henan Suda, have been instrumental in developing EVs and establishing charging stations across Uzbekistan. These investments form part of a broader strategy to promote clean transportation options in the region, thereby reducing carbon emissions and supporting the global transition to electric mobility. The development of EV infrastructure in Uzbekistan aims not only to enhance the country’s energy security but also to position it as a leader in sustainable urban development.⁵⁷

In Kazakhstan, the Zhanatas 100MW Wind Power Project and the 50MW Wind Farm are critical initiatives that reduce the country’s dependency on coal, thereby contributing to regional development and enhancing energy security for China and Central Asia. The Zhanatas Wind Power Project, developed through a partnership between China Power International Holding and Visor Kazakhstan, stands as one of Central Asia’s most significant wind power projects and is instrumental in reducing carbon emissions and promoting renewable energy.⁵⁸

In a bid to bolster its energy security and transition towards renewable sources, Kyrgyzstan has entered into a growing partnership with China on several large-scale renewable energy projects. One of the key projects is the Kazarman Hydropower Project, which involves the construction of a cascade of hydropower plants on the Naryn River. This ambitious undertaking leverages the expertise of Chinese companies like PowerChina Northwest Engineering Corporation, Green Gold Energy, and China Railway 20 Bureau Group Corporation. The project is expected to play a significant role in boosting Kyrgyzstan’s hydropower generation capacity.⁵⁹ Moreover, Kambarata-1 hydropower station is a joint venture between Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and China. This project aimed to increase energy production and reduce reliance on imported energy.⁶⁰

Solar power is also prominently featured in the China–Kyrgyzstan renewable energy partnership. The Issyk-Kul region plans to construct a 1,000 MW solar power plant. China Railway 20 Bureau Group is a critical player in this project, with the completed plant expected to substantially contribute to Kyrgyzstan’s energy mix.⁶¹ Another notable project is the 400 MW Kara-Talaa Solar Power Plant, currently under development. This project signifies a collaborative effort between Fortis KG LLP, the National Electric Network of Kyrgyzstan OJSC, and the Green Energy Fund.⁶²

China’s BRI in Central Asia extends beyond energy cooperation, encompassing a broad spectrum of infrastructure, industrial, agricultural, environmental, and socio-cultural projects. A cornerstone of the BRI, infrastructure development has seen significant investments in transportation networks, including railways, roads, and ports, facilitating connectivity and trade. China has established industrial parks to streamline logistics further, offering investment opportunities and job creation. Simultaneously, the country has played a strategic role in modernizing agriculture, sharing technological expertise, and investing in large-scale agricultural projects to enhance food security. Recognizing the region’s environmental challenges, China has participated in ecological restoration initiatives and promoted clean energy solutions. China has implemented people-to-people exchange programs, including education and tourism initiatives, to foster deeper cultural and economic ties. These multifaceted endeavors collectively aim to promote regional economic growth, sustainable development, and enhanced cooperation.⁶³

These initiatives collectively underscore the significant role that China’s Green BRI plays in advancing renewable energy and sustainable development in Central Asia. By contributing to the region’s economic growth and supporting global efforts to combat climate change, the Green BRI addresses China’s energy security concerns and aligns with its broader strategic objectives in Central Asia.

SWOT Analysis: China’s Multifaceted Engagement with Central Asian Energy Markets

China’s energy presence in Central Asia under the BRI represents a strategic approach that simultaneously creates SWOT. Central Asia’s vast energy reserves and China’s growing demand for energy resources are critical for Beijing’s energy security strategy. However, this engagement also occurs in a complex geopolitical landscape where other powers, such as Russia, India, and the United States, are actively vying to exert their influence.

Strengths

China’s strategic investment in Central Asia offers significant economic, geopolitical, and energy security benefits for both China and the Central Asian countries involved. These investments have created mutual dependencies and a robust framework for regional cooperation and development, enhancing the stability and prosperity of the region.⁶⁴

One of the most notable impacts of China’s engagement in Central Asia is its economic boost to the region. For instance, the construction of the Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline, which spans 1,833 km across Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan before reaching China, has been transformative. Turkmenistan, in particular, has reaped substantial benefits by becoming one of the leading gas exporters in China. The revenue generated from these gas exports has significantly contributed to Turkmenistan’s GDP, providing a stable financial base for further economic development. Additionally, the pipeline has stimulated job creation and infrastructure development, which are critical for the long-term economic stability of Central Asian states.⁶⁵

Infrastructure development and enhanced regional connectivity are also critical outcomes of China’s involvement in Central Asia. Through the BRI, China has made substantial investments in infrastructure projects across the region, including roads, railways, and energy pipelines. A prime example is the Khorgas Gateway on the Kazakhstan–China border, often referred to as the “New Silk Road”. This logistics hub has become a crucial point for trade connectivity between Central Asia and China, transforming Kazakhstan into a key transit country. The increased trade volumes passing through Khorgas have deeply integrated Kazakhstan into global supply chains, boosting its economy and regional significance.⁶⁶

China’s energy security strategy has also greatly benefited from its investments in Central Asia. The China–Central Asia Gas Pipeline has significantly reduced China’s reliance on maritime energy imports, which are vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions, such as those that could arise in the South China Sea or the Strait of Malacca. By securing a stable natural gas supply from Central Asia, particularly from Turkmenistan, China has diversified its energy sources, ensuring a more reliable and resilient supply chain. This diversification is crucial for sustaining China’s rapid economic growth and minimizing the risks associated with energy supply interruptions.

Moreover, China’s ability to finance large-scale projects and provide technical expertise has significantly strengthened its geopolitical sway in Central Asia. In Kazakhstan, Chinese companies like China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) have invested billions in the exploration and production of oil and gas. This strengthens the economic ties between China and Kazakhstan and gives China considerable influence over the region’s energy policies and decisions. Such influence is vital for China as it seeks to secure long-term energy supplies and maintain stability in its neighboring regions. Finally, strengthening economic ties through shared energy infrastructure and collaboration fosters regional stability and integration. The BRI’s focus on building connectivity across Central Asia reduces the likelihood of conflict by promoting economic interdependence. The development of transnational rail and road networks, which link Central Asia with China, helps integrate these countries into a shared economic framework. This integration is crucial for enhancing regional stability, as economic collaboration through shared infrastructure diminishes the potential for conflict and promotes cooperative relations between Central Asian states and China.⁶⁷

Weaknesses

Despite the substantial economic and geopolitical advantages of China’s engagement in Central Asia, several weaknesses undermine the sustainability and effectiveness of this relationship. Central Asian countries, having extensively borrowed from Chinese financial institutions to fund BRI projects, face a significant debt burden. For instance, countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have taken on considerable debt to finance infrastructure projects, with their debt-to-GDP ratios climbing precariously. This situation could potentially lead to economic dependence on China, thereby providing political leverage. The fear of a “debt trap” has been a source of growing unease in the region, as it could result in Central Asian countries losing control over critical assets or making unfavorable concessions to China in exchange for debt relief. Such a scenario could foster resentment and resistance within these countries, complicating China’s long-term strategic goals.⁶⁸

From the perspective of Complex Interdependence Theory, while mutual dependencies between China and Central Asia have the potential to foster cooperation, they also create the risk of asymmetric relations. In many cases, the economic power imbalance between China and the Central Asian states leads to these countries becoming overly reliant on China. This dependence can limit the ability of Central Asian states to pursue independent foreign policies or diversify their energy partnerships, potentially undermining regional stability. Despite its relatively stronger economy, Kazakhstan faces challenges in balancing its relationships with Russia and China as it becomes increasingly intertwined with Chinese energy projects.⁶⁹ This growing dependence on China restricts Kazakhstan’s strategic flexibility, making it more challenging to maintain a diversified set of international partners, which is crucial for its long-term sovereignty and regional influence.

Another weakness in China’s energy security strategy in Central Asia is its emphasis on large-scale infrastructure projects, which often overlook local needs and sustainability considerations. While these projects aim to enhance regional connectivity and energy security, they sometimes disregard the socio-political and environmental contexts of the host countries. For instance, the construction of pipelines and transportation networks has led to concerns about environmental degradation and the displacement of local communities. In Uzbekistan, the construction of new pipelines has raised issues regarding land use and the displacement of farmers, leading to social unrest and opposition to Chinese projects.⁷⁰ If not adequately addressed, these local grievances could escalate into broader social movements threatening Chinese investments’ stability in the region.

By applying the Energy Securitization Theory, the BRI can be interpreted as a strategic move by China to reduce the potential dangers associated with energy transportation by sea. However, China’s approach may not fully account for the complex socio-political contexts of the Central Asian countries. The focus on energy infrastructure without considering local political dynamics and social implications can lead to challenges in maintaining these projects over the long term. In Turkmenistan, where political stability is fragile, the heavy reliance on Chinese investment has raised concerns about the long-term sustainability of these projects. The authoritarian nature of the Turkmenistan government, combined with economic dependency on China, could lead to internal dissent or policy shifts that might jeopardize ongoing projects and future cooperation.⁷¹ This underscores the need for China to adopt a more nuanced approach that considers the socio-political landscapes of its Central Asian partners, ensuring that its energy security strategy is sustainable and beneficial for all countries involved.

Opportunities

The BRI and its Green version present substantial opportunities for both China and Central Asia, offering benefits beyond mere economic gains, including enhanced energy security, geopolitical influence, and environmental sustainability. These initiatives allow China to diversify its energy sources and develop alternative land-based trade routes, which is critical in reducing its reliance on vulnerable maritime chokepoints such as the Malacca Strait. This strategic shift is particularly significant given China’s increasing energy demands and the geopolitical risks associated with maritime transport. By securing more stable and controlled land routes through Central Asia, China strengthens its energy security and deepens its geopolitical influence in a region historically influenced by other powers, such as Russia.⁷²

Leveraging the Energy Securitization Theory, the BRI can be understood as a strategic effort by China to mitigate the risks inherent in maritime energy transport. The construction of pipelines, railways, and roads across Central Asia creates a secure corridor for the transport of energy resources, thereby reducing China’s exposure to potential disruptions in global maritime routes. The China–Kazakhstan oil pipeline, which allows direct land-based oil transport, significantly reduces China’s dependency on maritime routes through the Strait of Malacca, a known geopolitical chokepoint. This shift secures a more reliable energy supply for China and enhances its bargaining power in global energy markets by diversifying its import routes.⁷³

For Central Asian countries, China’s investments under the BRI offer a unique opportunity to modernize their energy infrastructure and diversify their economies. Historically reliant on Russia for economic and energy partnerships, countries like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan can now leverage Chinese investments to reduce this dependency. The modernization of energy infrastructure, facilitated by Chinese funding and expertise, enables these countries to improve energy efficiency, increase production capacity, and tap into new markets. These efforts have significantly upgraded Kazakhstan’s energy infrastructure with Chinese assistance, allowing it to export more energy to China and neighboring countries. Therefore, this development helps diversify Kazakhstan’s economic base and reduce its reliance on Russia.⁷⁴

The Green BRI further amplifies these opportunities by promoting the transition to more sustainable energy practices in Central Asia. China’s investments in renewable energy projects, such as solar, wind, and hydropower, align with global trends toward sustainability and provide Central Asian countries with the means to diversify their energy sources beyond fossil fuels. For example, China’s involvement in Uzbekistan’s solar energy projects is helping the country reduce its carbon footprint while creating new economic opportunities in the growing renewable energy sector. These initiatives contribute to environmental sustainability and foster new economic linkages between China and Central Asia, as projected by Complex Interdependence Theory.⁷⁵ By investing in green energy, these countries can strengthen regional ties, reduce potential conflicts over scarce resources, and build a more resilient and cooperative regional economy.

Moreover, China’s growing reliance on Central Asian energy resources could lead to more favorable trade terms and increased economic benefits for the region. As China seeks to secure long-term access to these resources, Central Asian countries are in a stronger position to negotiate better terms for their exports, including higher prices and investments in local infrastructure. For example, Turkmenistan, which supplies a significant portion of China’s natural gas, has been able to negotiate higher prices and additional investments in its domestic energy infrastructure, leading to economic growth and improved living standards in the country. These projects not only enhance China’s energy security by diversifying energy sources and securing land-based trade routes, but also bolster its geopolitical influence. Such developments foster regional cooperation and establish Central Asia as a vital partner in China’s long-term energy strategy.

Threats

China’s investments in Central Asia under the BRI face multifaceted threats that stem from the region’s complex geopolitical dynamics and internal challenges. These threats can be broadly categorized into external geopolitical competition and internal instability within Central Asian states, which can potentially undermine China’s long-term energy security and influence in the region.

The presence of other major powers, such as Russia, the United States, and India, creates a competitive geopolitical landscape that complicates China’s energy cooperation in Central Asia. With its deep historical ties and existing energy infrastructure in the region, Russia poses a significant challenge to China’s ambitions. Although recent geopolitical developments suggest a convergence of interests between China and Russia, particularly in response to Western sanctions, the underlying competition for influence in Central Asia remains a potential flashpoint. Russia’s desire to maintain its energy dominance, especially as it faces increasing geopolitical isolation, could lead to a scenario where Moscow seeks to undermine China’s energy projects by leveraging its established networks and infrastructure. This competition could disrupt ongoing and future energy projects, as both powers might seek to secure more favorable terms or even attempt to obstruct each other’s initiatives. The balancing act between cooperation and competition in the China–Russia relationship adds a layer of complexity to China’s energy strategy in Central Asia.⁷⁶

The United States, while less economically involved than China, presents a strategic challenge through its efforts to promote regional security and diversify the supply chain for minerals away from Chinese influence. Washington’s focus on reducing dependency on China for critical minerals, as part of its broader strategy to secure supply chains, could manifest in diplomatic pressures or support for alternative energy routes that bypass China. This is particularly relevant as the U.S. objectives in Central Asia are to diversify its mineral supply chain, not just in fossil fuels but also in wind and solar energy resources.⁷⁷ The U.S.’s growing interest in the region and its diplomatic initiatives could complicate China’s energy security strategy by encouraging Central Asian states to explore alternative partnerships that reduce their reliance on Beijing. This diversification of partnerships, while beneficial for the Central Asian states in avoiding over-reliance on China, represents a direct threat to China’s ability to secure stable and long-term energy supplies from the region.

Although not as economically powerful as China, India is also seeking to expand its influence in Central Asia through its “Connect Central Asia” policy, which focuses on establishing energy and trade links with the region. India’s growing presence adds another layer of complexity to the regional power dynamics as it competes with China for influence. For instance, India’s investments in infrastructure and energy projects, albeit on a smaller scale than China’s, signal its intent to be a significant player in Central Asia. This increased competition could lead to geopolitical tensions, complicating China’s efforts to maintain its dominant position in the region’s energy sector. The presence of multiple powers vying for influence could strain China’s relationships with Central Asian countries, making it more difficult for Beijing to secure favorable terms for its energy projects.⁷⁸

Beyond external geopolitical threats, internal challenges within Central Asian countries also pose significant risks to China’s energy investments. Political instability, corruption, and ethnic tensions are prevalent in many Central Asian states, creating an unpredictable environment for foreign investments. Kyrgyzstan has experienced multiple political upheavals in recent years, raising concerns about the stability and reliability of its partnership with China.⁷⁹ Complex Interdependence Theory suggests that while economic ties can promote stability, they can also create vulnerabilities if the internal conditions of partner states are not conducive to sustained cooperation. Corruption and weak governance in these countries could lead to the misallocation of Chinese investments, reducing their effectiveness and potentially leading to local resentment against Chinese projects. Additionally, ethnic tensions, particularly in multi-ethnic states like Kazakhstan, could spark social unrest, further destabilizing the region and disrupting energy projects.

Another significant threat to China’s energy strategy in Central Asia is its continued reliance on fossil fuels, including oil, gas, and coal, which pose considerable environmental risks. While China is making strides towards greener initiatives under the Green BRI, its ongoing partnerships with fossil fuel projects in Central Asia contradict these efforts. For instance, China’s involvement in constructing and expanding coal-fired power plants and oil and gas pipelines in countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan exacerbates environmental degradation in the region. These projects contribute to air and water pollution, deforestation, and the acceleration of climate change, which could lead to long-term environmental damage and social unrest.⁸⁰

The growing awareness among Central Asian states of the need to navigate external influences carefully also presents a challenge to China’s energy strategy. Central Asian countries are increasingly aware of the risks of over-reliance on a single partner, leading them to adopt more cautious and balanced approaches in their foreign relations. The August 2024 Consultative Meeting of Central Asian leaders highlighted this awareness, with several countries expressing a desire to diversify their international partnerships and reduce dependence on any one power.⁸¹ This cautious engagement could limit the effectiveness of China’s energy strategies in the region, as Central Asian states seek to balance their relationships with multiple global powers, thereby diluting Beijing’s influence.

Conclusion

This research has delved into the intricate dynamics of China’s energy security strategy in Central Asia, particularly through the lens of the BRI and the Green BRI. By applying the theoretical frameworks of Energy Securitization and Complex Interdependence, the study argued that a multifaceted landscape exists where SWOT coexists (see Figure 5).

China’s significant investments in Central Asia’s energy infrastructure have undeniably bolstered its energy supply chain, contributing to its economic development. Central Asian states have benefited from increased economic cooperation, improved infrastructure, and greater market access. The Green BRI also holds the potential for fostering renewable energy cooperation, aligning with global sustainability goals. Nevertheless, China’s strategic posture in energy security is evident, exemplified by Kyrgyzstan’s recent adoption of the Chinese Yuan as the official currency.

However, the research also highlights several critical weaknesses and threats. The potential for economic dependency on China, geopolitical competition, and environmental sustainability issues remain significant concerns. While interdependent, the relationship between China and Central Asia is fraught with complexities that could undermine the long-term stability and success of these energy cooperation initiatives. To maximize the potential of energy cooperation while mitigating risks, policymakers in both China and Central Asia should prioritize joint planning, capacity building, and technology transfer. Diversifying energy sources and strengthening regional cooperation can enhance energy security and resilience. Future research could explore the long-term implications of climate change on energy security in the region, as well as the role of emerging technologies in shaping energy cooperation.

The scope of this research is limited by its temporal focus on the period from 2019 to 2024 and its geographical focus on Central Asia. While the BRI is a central aspect of China’s energy strategy in the region, it is essential to acknowledge that China’s broader energy initiatives also encompass projects under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS frameworks. A more comprehensive analysis that includes these initiatives would provide a fuller understanding of China’s energy strategy.

Future research should expand the temporal and geographical scope to include a broader range of China’s energy initiatives. Additionally, investigating the long-term implications of climate change on energy security in Central Asia would be invaluable. Emerging technologies and their potential to reshape energy cooperation should also be explored. Finally, an in-depth analysis of the evolving geopolitical landscape will be crucial in understanding the future trajectory of China–Central Asia energy relations.

Notes