From Revolution to Revival: Religious Policy in Contemporary China and Albania

Introduction

The Albania–China relationship evolved in line with the specific situations of both nations while keeping an asymmetrical structure. With Stalin’s death and the effort for de-Stalinization, both the Chinese and the Albanians felt threatened. China no longer saw itself as dependent on Moscow; instead, Chinese leader Mao Zedong projected himself as a theorist far more experienced than Khrushchev, pointing to the “purity” and application of Marxist–Leninist philosophy. China proved that it could replace the Soviet Union or challenge the foundations of Soviet dominance in areas that had historically been under Russian control. The Chinese tried to expand their influence not just in Albania but also in other Marxist–Leninist parties that contested the Soviet Union. Moscow did not realize that Soviet–Chinese collaboration could have been far more beneficial than the turmoil it created. Under these circumstances, Albania and China formed a bilateral alliance.

Both countries established diplomatic ties in 1949, but the collaboration did not begin until 1956 when Hoxha visited Beijing for the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). During these politically fluctuating years inside the communist bloc, the Albanian Labor Party (ALP) believed that their political and economic future was at risk. The CPC was an excellent partner, and most importantly, it was willing to cooperate with the Albanian comrades. The formation of an alliance with China occurred in 1964 when the two nations signed the joint Sino-Albanian declaration due to shared policies and ideologies.¹ As the Albanian–Chinese alliance solidified, China saw bilateral cooperation as a model for pulling more developing countries into its orbit by increasing the appeal of Chinese communism.

This study aims to contribute to the body of literature that deals with the historical events and government actions in China and Albania concerning the aftermath of religious policy decisions made during the Cultural Revolution and up to the present day. Glorifying irreligion and attributing backwardness to religion (as happened in both countries) does not equate to a prosperous and free nation. A society’s likelihood of prosperity increases with its level of freedom. It can be argued that politicized and forced irreligion is as dangerous as politicized religion, if not more when it culminates in fundamentalism.² Additionally, the comparative approach adopted in this study allows for a deeper appreciation of the similarities and differences between these two nations while also offering valuable insights into the broader dynamics of international relations during the period analyzed. As a result, this paper serves as a valuable resource for scholars and policymakers looking to understand the complexities of historical and social events and political strategies in a global context.

Cultural Revolutions in China and Albania

On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese society mirrored a feudal mentality, which manifested itself in education, customs, traditions, and art. China’s Cultural Revolution began as an ideological campaign against traditional Chinese culture. As a result of this movement, a new generation appeared, ideologically fresh and ready to defend the “revolutionary” cause against internal and external “enemies.” On May 16, 1966, the Chinese Politburo issued a circular, which sparked the revolution. Mao tried to portray the Cultural Revolution as a people’s movement eager to transform the Communist Party, the economy, local institutions, and culture. Meanwhile, he led China into a decade of ideological chaos, harsh, divisive policies, and a quasi-civil war. Some scholars believe the revolution was caused by the CPC’s complacency due to multiple accomplishments and a desire to speed up progress toward communism. Ten Rong, daughter of then CPC General Secretary Deng Xiaoping, expresses regret at the changes that took place within the Chinese Politburo. According to her memoirs, most of the party leaders had no idea what a terrible storm was about to follow.³ The “Circular of May 16” was a form of punishment for any “reactionary bourgeois thought” in academics, the media, literature, and art. The Chinese press demanded the annihilation of “all demons and poisoned spirits.”⁴ Despite the reform being advocated in defense of communism, it aimed to hit the country’s intelligence. The Red Guards, who cleaned Chinese society of bourgeois and revisionist elements in the name of the party, were one of the tools used to carry out the revolution. Many rebellious youngsters joined Red Guard factions that ran beyond the law and violated traditional institutional systems. “The Red Guard, — according to the communist leader,” would do the political-ideological unmasking of revisionists and traitors.⁵

China’s religious traditions were not left untouched; what had been believed in China for centuries about Confucius’ thought was abandoned. Mao Zedong’s ideas were influenced by Marxist–Leninist ideology and were implemented in fields like culture, science, and philosophy. Mao’s quotes became the Cultural Revolution’s Bible, with translations into various languages and international distribution. Mao gave access to anybody who wanted to transform society or remove the “four archaic practices such as old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits, which, in Maoist thinking, had kept China weak.”⁶ With the installation of revolutionary committees “in 29 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, excluding Taiwan Province, the whole country was turned red.”⁷ All of China’s attention was focused on the realization of the Great Revolution, which was seen as a continuation of the “internal civil war against those with right-wing opportunistic ideas.”⁸

Despite Mao’s ambiguity about how long it took for the Cultural Revolution to achieve its goals, it was hailed as a tremendous historical victory in China. Behar Shtylla, the Albanian ambassador in charge in China, stated in his correspondence at the time that “the Revolution lasted from 1966 to 1969, and it was highlighted in government propaganda that it was still ongoing.”⁹ Mao himself, in his political report, which was approved at the 10th National Congress, predicted that in a few years, another revolution might be needed.¹⁰

As the situation in China got worse, the ALP praised the revolution as a success in “all areas — ideological, political, organizational, and economic.”¹¹ The Albanian attitude toward the Chinese Revolution was motivated by political considerations since the ALP launched what Hoxha referred to as the “Ideological and Cultural Revolution” in the 1960s. Many people were persecuted, tortured, and executed over the course of this Revolution because they were labeled “revisionists,” “bourgeois,” or agents of one or more states. Regardless of whether they agreed with some parts of the Cultural Revolution, Albanian authorities expressed sympathy with all events performed in China. Regardless of how the Cultural Revolution was spread in China and Albania, China’s stance during these years was one of isolation since its worldwide standing had been undermined. Albania profited the most from this situation since adopting this revolution increased its worth in the eyes of Chinese officials because this revolution contributed to fostering ideological sympathy with the Chinese.¹² Although many of the measures implemented were not identical Chinese duplicates, the methods used to carry them out were imitations of Chinese procedures until something changed in Chinese foreign policy, particularly in the 1970s. During these years, the Albanian Communist government predicted the Sino-Albanian split. It was clear that disagreements between both parties were entirely ideological, and they suffered because of China’s shift in priorities.

Impact of the Cultural Revolution on Religious Practices in Both Countries

Mao began a statewide campaign against Confucianism, therefore challenging Confucius’ 2,000-year-old ideology. Revolutionary students and instructors from Beijing marched on Confucius’ native town, pledging to permanently erase the wise old man’s influence in Chinese society by burning ancient books, pulling up memorial markers, and demolishing his grave. The Red Guard attacks destroyed 4,922 of the 6,843 places of cultural and historical importance, as they had been classified. Zhou Enlai’s personal involvement is thought to be the only reason the Forbidden City survived.¹³ According to historical interpretations at that time, Confucius was condemned because he served as an ideological foundation for China’s feudal system. At every stage of Chinese history, each dynasty used its own method of warfare before turning to Confucius’ ideology and pushing the society to regress. Confucius opposed Marxism–Leninism, and his beliefs were idealistic rather than materialistic. Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism all argued that the people produced history. Following this strategy, Confucius’ teachings helped to revive capitalism in China.¹⁴ In response, it was believed that a new socialist culture would emerge in a socialist society. Mao’s statements were regarded as the “Bible” of the Cultural Revolution, supplying the most effective teaching for the masses. During this time, China was actively engaged in disagreements with several socialist states. The cordial ties with the People’s Republic of Albania remained strong.

Due to this collaboration, the same policies were implemented in Albania. Denying religious belief was the most severe form of violating individual liberties and rights. Numerous newspapers discussed the struggle against archaic traditions. The APL’s anti-religious propaganda began early, when the Hoxha government saw it as essential to launch an official persecution of the Catholic Church. This persecution, known as Marxist atheism, culminated with the closing of Jesuit institutions and the imprisonment and execution of bishops and priests.

Religious issues in communist Albania were regulated by the 1949 legislation, following discussions at a meeting of the Political Bureau, which agreed that the law was drafted in adherence with the country’s Constitution. The Romanian religious community legislation and the Albanian law of 1929 served as the foundations for its drafting. This law placed religious institutions under complete governmental supervision, particularly that of the Prime Minister. The legislation demanded the entire allegiance of the clergy to the state and its leaders; alternatively, the law provided the state with complete authority to act against both individual clergy and religious bodies as a group. However, this law went far further, granting the state the authority to prohibit whole religious organizations. Religious communities would continue to endure persecution based on their wealth. On March 27, 1964, it was recommended to take immediate action to limit the features of religious entities to prevent the growth of religious worldviews. Religious organizations had to keep their possessions to a minimum, according to the opinion that land belonged to the person who worked it. All of this was done within the context of the war on religion and atheist–scientific propaganda. Marxism–Leninism was seen as the exclusive tool to understand everything. As a result, politics had to be elevated to the forefront, which required that every phenomenon or product of social life correspond to the dominant ideology. Indeed, Hoxha’s anti-religious campaign proved that religion remained deeply ingrained. The anti-religious stance began before Albania recognized atheism as legitimate. The Central Archive’s classified materials show this reality. The actions that needed to be taken to “draw attention to the processing of the clergy” were detailed in a directive,¹⁵ issued by Mehmet Shehu, in his role as Minister of the Interior, three days following Stalin’s death. Albanian communist ideology accused the clergy of being the enemy of the Albanian people, collaborators with the Nazi-fascist invaders, destroyers of the new order, and opponents of the reforms of the period. Furthermore, using political agitators, the ALP looked to indoctrinate the public with an anti-religious mindset. This propaganda helped to create an anti-religious generation, who carried out a national antireligious campaign in 1967. This action resulted in the physical and institutional elimination of Albania’s clergy and religious institutions. Durrës’ youth sent a letter to the Central Committee, starting the closure of religious institutions and banning the religion. Referring to Hoxha’s order, it was decided that the resolution should be published, tested to see how it would be received by the masses, and then discussed in the Bureau to act further.¹⁶

In communist Albania, anti-religious propaganda was the primary weapon for shaping public opinion and legitimizing religious attacks, propaganda, institutional and physical extermination. These so-called revolutionary projects sprouted everywhere. The revolution of consciousness was considered as an essential part of the socialist revolution. This revolution was portrayed as a crucial initiative for liberating people from religious biases, obsolete beliefs, and outdated habits, by the press. Religious ideology was replaced with communist ideology, which proved to be destructive of human values, particularly about religion. The Chinese press also promoted the Albanian ideological revolution, outlining the growth of revolutionary measures in Albania, justifying these moves with the struggle against old and archaic habits.¹⁷ The fear of societal influence served as justification to fight the clergy. People were religiously sensitive due to the influence of religion in Albania throughout history. This extreme endeavor was justified by Albanian society’s backwardness, particularly in terms of women’s emancipation. Several publications advocated this change as “a false, illusory, and fantastic view of reality” until 1967, when Albania officially became the only atheist state in the world.¹⁸ Maximilian Felby, an Austrian diplomat, claimed years later that during his visit to Albania, he was informed that Catholic priests who had not been murdered or jailed were barred from practicing their profession. “A woman in Shkodër was sentenced to several years in prison because she baptized her children, and another family’s children were taken away and sent to a dormitory because they were baptized.”¹⁹

Political officials in both Albania and China feared that Confucius and the clergy would wield more authority over the ruler. We live in a time when it was announced by Schopenhauer that the fear of death is the beginning of philosophy and the last martyr of religion. The terror might be used to evoke the fear of death, but this fear can also be sheltered either in philosophy or in the practice of religion.²⁰ Both Mao and Hoxha were dictators who found the society they ruled in anarchy; they were forced to battle in a war against the medieval mindset, but they did not guarantee personal authority. This was the main challenge that both dictators handled throughout their respective Cultural Revolutions. Over the years, it appeared that the Cultural Revolution had not met its initiators’ expectations. Mao lost control of the Revolution due to its enormity, unanticipated conditions, and the widespread instability that overtook Chinese society. The Cultural Revolution itself influenced the escalation of violence in China because of the criticism, attacks, and anarchy generated. “It was too late by the time Mao regretted the slander he had intended,” but he had opened Pandora’s box.²¹ The reason that the Cultural Revolution lasted 10 years or more was not due to the success of the first phase of the Revolution but rather to the immense instability that had overtaken China. The confrontations were so violent that in 1968, Mao abolished the Red Guards and engaged loyal folks and military leaders to restore order in local administrations. The same violent situation was created in Albania as well. Even though many projects launched were Chinese imitations, they developed in response to the circumstances of Albanian society. All Chinese endeavors in Albania were relative, rather than identical.²² In the new reality of the breakdown of Albanian–Chinese ties, the Albanian communist leadership said that “the Chinese Cultural Revolution had not reached its goal; Mao withdrew either because he was incapable or because he was afraid of the profound consequences of his own revolution.”²³ The Albanian communist leadership also blamed Cu En Lai for being right-wing and a man of compromises, precisely at the time when the Albanian–Chinese split began.

Post-Revolutionary Era: Religious Revival in Contemporary China and Albania

Following the Cultural Revolution, Albania started to break ranks with China. Diplomatic relations between the two nations were officially broken up in 1978. During this time, Albania developed a form of national communism, however in this case, nationalism was used to enhance communism. In the following years, the Albanian government promoted national themes that were mirrored in literature, art, and folklore, highlighting values, self-sacrifice, and independence. Enver Hoxha emphasized the importance of preserving Albania’s cultural heritage, such as ethnography, ethnic melodies, and dances, to ensure that future generations continue to appreciate and celebrate their unique traditions.²⁴ The Skanderbeg era was covered with the same zeal, drawing parallels between the struggle against the Turks and the war against “revisionism and imperialism$.$” Enver Hoxha tried to create a cultural environment dominated by ideological propaganda that glorified nationalism. Language, literature, history, geography, and folklore were created not only to help people understand their past, but also to spread a form of nationalism that instilled xenophobia, isolationism, Slavic phobia, ethnic compactness, and linguistic uniformity.²⁵

There are several opinions on Enver Hoxha’s nationalist policy in Albania. During the 1980s, researchers such as Griffith and Tonnes believed that Albanian nationalism was anti-Slavic, citing the breakdown of relations with the Yugoslavs and later with the Russians. Hoxha’s policy was founded on nationalist goals, and “the roots of Enverism are found in Albanian nationalism.”²⁶ Both authors believe that this Hoxha’s stance is backed up by several initiatives on Albanian nation’s antiquity, the glorification of the Renaissance, atheism, and the nationalist idea that “Albanianism is the only Albanians religion.” In our judgment, Hoxha was more concerned with his political survival than the anti-Slavic nationalist movement. ALP is regarded as a child of the Yugoslav Communist Party and Hoxha is recognized as Stalin’s most committed follower, enthusiastically implementing the same Stalinist changes in Albanian society. On the other hand, the revival of an Albanian National Renaissance slogan was not done for nationalistic reasons. On the contrary, the people needed to be given another chance to believe because the religion, which was crucial part of Albanian identity, was forbidden. As a result, we argue that interactions with the Slavs were severed owing to the breakdown of ideological ties between countries, rather than nationalist grounds. The Sino-Albanian alliance required the same linkages. The Chinese Cultural Revolution convinced E. Hoxha that authority must be kept via force, bloodshed, and frequent purges.

Meanwhile in China, the consequences of the Chinese Cultural Revolution were serious. Following Mao’s death, the second and third generations of executives, who had been victims of the revolution, were rehabilitated. Deng Xiaoping claimed that the revolution had damaged the Communist Party as an institution and temporarily undermined its legitimacy. Mao’s effort to tackle the problem with a big strike nearly destroyed Chinese society. The Cultural Revolution, although in vain, set the stage for Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in the late 1970s and 1980s. China faced significant changes in the political, economic, and social spheres. Its foreign policy reorientation needed some important economic changes.²⁷ Since reform and opening up, the government’s stance toward religion and its role in Chinese social life and diplomacy has shifted considerably. Religion, according to Beijing, was no longer a prohibited topic marked by misconception, suspicion, and hostility.²⁸ Traditional religious practices resurfaced. New Confucian engagements have come into being in the interval between the evolving post-communist “structure of experience” and the suddenly enlarged “horizon of expectation” made possible by the development and opening up of Chinese society. In March 1982, the CPC officially abandoned its decade-long total ban on religion by issuing an official document titled: ”The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during Our Country’s Socialist Period.”²⁹ The CPC reconsidered its religious policy reopening a lot of churches, temples, and mosques. By 1984, 1,600 Protestant churches and 14,000 Muslim mosques had been reopened.³⁰ This recognition provided a legal framework for the practice of these religions (including Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism) albeit under state supervision and control. These years saw a “Confucian renaissance” in East Asia, with the focus of rediscovering the famous “Asian values.”³¹ New Confucianism unexpectedly appeared as a questionable, if not acceptable, alternative. The CPC showed interest in reviving Confucianism founding the China Confucius Foundation in 1984 and promoting Confucius’ birthday celebrations. In 1986, a huge research project on New Confucianism was launched in Peking. Involving 47 researchers and 16 institutions, this project would lead to, among others, the publication in 1996 of 16 volumes of anthologies of works by the most representative authors of the movement. Since then, a young generation of philosophers is taking positions that are no longer purely theoretical and which call for political commitment.³²

Since then, there has been a huge debate about the revival of Confucianism and New Confucianism as well. Some scholars such as John Makeham, tried to interpret Confucian discourse through historical and political lenses. He asserted that new Confucianism began in the 1980’s, while Confucian revivalism was a conservative cultural phenomenon that took on various forms throughout the twentieth century. Makeham defines Confucian revivalism as a strictly cultural force, while New Confucianism is a unique, self-identifying philosophical movement that began in the mainland and Taiwan. These New Confucians focus on particular issues within Confucianism, such as moral metaphysics, in addition to societal problems.³³ Therefore, the Confucian revival must be seen as a movement influenced by globalization. Another researcher, Wm. Theodore de Bary, a Neo-Confucian scholar, argues that the Confucian revival must be seen as based on local tradition, connected to East Asia, and adapted to the larger world. De Barry calls for a system where local traditions define globalization and modernization, coining the term “glocalization” to express the synthesis of local and global.³⁴

The transformation of Confucianism throughout the 20th century reflects the negotiation with globalization and modernity. The Confucian revival shows the ability of traditional culture to take part in global discourse and is part of a dialogue between cultural tradition and modernity throughout China’s recent history. The relationship between statist and non-statist Confucian intellectuals is a historical trend in the Confucian revival, showing that Confucianism is not only being revived in ideals but also in the historical role of the Confucian intellectual in contemporary China.³⁵

The same situation was manifested in Albania as well. Albania’s transition from communism to democracy was a complex process influenced by key events such as the death of Enver Hoxha in 1985, economic hardships and political reforms started by ALP under Ramiz Alia. The country faced a stagnant economy, shortages of goods, and a lack of technological development, leading to demands for change.

The call for political pluralism and democratic reforms gained momentum, and opposition groups began to appear. Responding to public demands, the Albanian authorities legalized opposition political parties in 1990. This marked a significant departure from the one-party rule that had characterized the country for decades. In December 1990, Albania saw the first organized protests calling for democratic reforms and political pluralism. The first multiparty elections were held in March 1992 and ended up with the victory of the Democratic Party. These elections marked a critical shift toward a more democratic political system. The transition from communism to democracy involved the establishment of new political institutions according to the new constitution. Albania was transformed from a centralized, one-party state to a multiparty democracy. This period was marked by challenges and achievements because of the complexities of political, socioeconomic and religious transition. Albania saw a significant shift in the country’s attitude toward religion, marking a departure from the strict atheistic policies of the communist era. The constitution adopted in 1991 guarantees freedom of religion, allowing citizens to practice their faith without fear of persecution. As religious freedom was set up, there was a reemergence of religious practices across the country. Mosques, churches, and other religious institutions that had been destroyed during the communist era became active again. Religious leaders, including Muslim clerics, Christian priests, and others, returned to public life. Many religious figures who faced persecution under the communist regime could resume their roles in guiding their communities. Mosques and churches that had been damaged or destroyed during the communist era underwent reconstruction. The government, religious communities, and international organizations often collaborated in these efforts. Albania, historically known for its religious diversity, saw the reemergence of a multi-religious landscape. Islam, Christianity (both Catholicism and Orthodoxy), and other religious traditions coexisted in a more open and tolerant environment. The Albanian government officially endorsed a policy of religious tolerance and recognized the importance of religious diversity in the country. While the government remained secular, it affirmed the right of individuals to practice their faith freely. Despite the overall shift toward religious tolerance, there were occasional tensions and challenges, often related to property restitution issues or disputes over religious sites that had been confiscated during the communist era. At the end, the country embraced religious freedom and saw the revival of religious institutions and practices. Nowadays, one of the biggest challenges is the coexistence between religious practices and the global perspectives related to them.

Contemporary Religious Landscape in China and Albania

Cultural changes in China are very capricious, with political and economic changes potentially pushing certain cultural currents beneath the surface. The nation’s confidence and pride have grown because of the continuous economic prosperity, and this can be seen in the arts, mass media, literature, and research. China’s quick economic development has resulted in a wide range of societal issues. Leading the joint peaceful efforts of emerging economies, Beijing is pushing for incremental rather than radical reforms of the international order and global governance in a more just and rational direction, based on greater openness of and interconnectivity among all nations.³⁶ China’s approach emphasizes cooperation and consensus-building by promoting a multipolar world and advocating for the inclusion of developing countries in decision-making processes. Additionally, China’s incremental approach in domestic policy is clear in its economic reforms and social development initiatives. After 35 years of reform and opening up, China has steadily increased its national power and made ongoing progress in its political, social, and economic systems. With such changes, China’s diplomacy is increasingly intertwined with domestic political processes, more proper foreign strategies and a solid basis of understanding and support for the domestic public.³⁷ Similarly, in religious policy, China’s incremental approach is seen in its efforts to regulate and manage religious activities. The government has implemented policies that aim to strike a balance between religious freedom and social stability, recognizing the importance of religion in people’s lives while also ensuring that it does not undermine the country’s social cohesion and harmony. If political ideology is the critical element in a culture that dominates political life, religion is then at the core of the culture that shapes everyday life.³⁸ Some researchers are discussing three major cultural streams in China today that will likely have important impacts on domestic social life and international relations: the persistence of the ideological orthodoxy of Marxism–Leninism–Maoism (MLM), the advance of socio-political liberalism, and the rise of Confucian fundamentalism. If these three major cultural streams are compared, referring to Yang Fenggang’s thought, CPC has replaced class struggle with the doctrine of “constructing a harmonious society.” This revision is part of the party’s efforts to develop and strengthen MLM, with the CPC considering re-labeling some religions as cultural forces for social stability or progress. While socio-political liberalism is still internal to MLM, with liberal-oriented officials and theorists appearing within the party. However, outside the CPC, it has been widely accepted by educated Chinese and the intelligentsia. Furthermore, in the 21st century, a social movement has begun to revive Confucianism as a religion in China, with advocates including academic scholars, college students, economic and social entrepreneurs, and government officials.

Some other scholars argue that Confucianism should be the main body of Chinese culture, with everything else subordinate. Evidence of this movement is seen in government-sponsored public celebrations of Confucius’s birthday, Confucius statues, temple restorations, Confucian scripture-reading classes, etc. The Ministry of Culture unveiled the 11th Five-Year Plan “Outline of Cultural Development” in September 2006, which set out relevant policy details. In specific chapters, the Outline describes development aims for “protection of national culture” and “international cultural exchanges” as well.³⁹ Recently, many members of the public have appeared to be supportive of the resurgence of Confucianism. The rise of a social movement to revive Confucianism as a religion in China is a significant development. The use of Confucian terms and concepts has increased in the speeches of top leaders and recent policy initiatives. Though the combination of a market economy, an authoritarian polity, and a traditionalist culture may seem strange, it is possible. Such an amalgamation means that an alternative mode of modernization is becoming a reality after so many years of scholastic deliberations in fantasy.⁴⁰ Confucianism has played a significant role in shaping Chinese society and governance for centuries. Despite facing periods of suppression and criticism, Confucian values and teachings have managed to adapt and remain relevant in China’s ever-changing landscape.

Nowadays, Confucianism continues to influence various aspects of Chinese life, from education and family structure to the country’s approach to government and social harmony. Such an approach is backed up by several surveys conducted in China. For instance, in 2023, the Pew Research Center, even without conducting its own survey, realized a comprehensive analysis of latest trends in religion in China, relying on data from various other sources, including surveys run by Chinese universities. Surveys show that religion plays a much bigger role in China when the definition is widened to include spirituality, customs, and superstitions. The discrepancy is partly due to linguistics, as the closest translation of the English word “religion” in Chinese is zong jiao, which refers primarily to organized forms of religion with professional clergy and institutional or governmental oversight. But there is another reason it is hard to pin down the number of people in China who are religious. It is a conceptual problem: Western definitions of religion and measures of religious participation — such as attendance at congregational worship services — fit the monotheistic religions of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism but are less suited to traditional beliefs and practices in East Asia.⁴¹ Many Chinese people engage in beliefs and rituals from multiple religious traditions. Chinese surveys do not ask respondents to state how often they do this, but a Pew Research Center analysis of data from the 2018 China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) shows that combinations are quite common.

The CPC is officially atheist, and its members are not allowed to join any religion. The party’s attitude aligns with the Marxist view that religion is a temporary historical phenomenon that will disappear as societies advance. Although this stance has not changed in the seven decades since the state’s founding, policies on the ground have constantly evolved. For example, the current constitution of the People’s Republic of China, adopted in 1982, states that ordinary Chinese citizens enjoy “freedom of religious beliefs.” In 1995, China’s leadership labeled 15 religious groups, including 12 with Christian roots, as “evil cults” and banned them.⁴² While the government cracked down on these new religious groups, the state policy on five recognized religions shifted slightly, becoming relatively lenient as political leaders emphasized pushing them to adapt to the socialist society. In 2004, the State Council issued “Regulations on Religious Affairs,”⁴³ allowing local religious bureaus to regulate religious affairs. According to this Regulation, guidelines for religious persons, places, and activities were outlined. It stated that local religious bureaus have legal and administrative responsibility over religious issues, such as shutting unregistered churches and seizing property. Furthermore, the text stipulated severe penalties for anyone involved in illegal religious activity. In 2015, it was proposed that religious affairs were crucial to the CPC and the central government. The “Sinicization of Religion” was first used at the Central United Front Work Conference, marking a significant shift in national religious policy. The relationship between national security and the unification of the motherland should be incorporated into socialist religious theory with Chinese characteristics. This policy was confirmed at the April 2016 National Conference on Religious Work, urging all religious groups in China to adapt to socialism by integrating their doctrines, customs, and morality with Chinese culture.

The Chinese people nowadays have a complex relationship with religious affairs. While traditional Chinese religions like Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism still hold considerable influence, there has been a resurgence in interest in Christianity and Islam as well. Moreover, there is also a growing population of atheists and agnostics who do not identify with any religious beliefs. The most recent Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) was conducted between June and September 2021, during the COVID-19 pandemic. Under China’s “zero-COVID” policy, the 2021 estimates of religious affiliation differ from earlier waves. For example, in the 2021 CGSS, 0.2% of Chinese adults identified with folk religion (worshiping various kinds of spirits but also believing in supernatural forces such as destiny), compared with 2.7% in 2018. Meanwhile, the scale of Chinese with no religious belief (zong jiao xinyang) was 3 percentage points higher in 2021 than in 2018 (93% vs. 90%). This report provides valuable national-level information on Chinese religious affiliations, even though Chinese respondents reveal low identification with organized religion but affirm specific spiritual or religious beliefs and practices. As China has become more connected to the global community, there has been increased exposure to different belief systems and philosophies. Additionally, the government’s policy of religious freedom has allowed for a greater expression of individual beliefs. Overall, the complex relationship between the Chinese people and religious affairs displays the country’s evolving cultural landscape and the freedom for individuals to explore and define their own spiritual identities. This diversity in religious identification reflects the changing values and attitudes of the Chinese people in modern times.

The situation in Albania displayed different since in 1990s because of the significant shift from the strict atheistic policies of the communist era to a more tolerant approach to religion. The country officially abandoned state atheism, allowing citizens to practice their faith without fear of persecution. As a result, religious institutions like mosques and churches reemerged, allowing people to openly practice their faith. Reconstruction of damaged or repurposed mosques and churches underwent, often collaborating with the government, religious communities, and international organizations. Albania’s religious diversity reemerged, with Islam, Christianity, and other traditions coexisting in a more open and tolerant environment. The Albanian government officially endorsed a policy of religious tolerance, recognizing the importance of religious diversity in the country. However, post-communist Albania is a case study of importing religion into a formerly atheistic country lacking qualified clergy, religious institutions, and strong religious beliefs. Although people were free to profess their beliefs, the many who gathered in mosques and churches knew little about the religion of their ancestors that now was supposed to be their own religion. Many of them had never seen a Bible, Quran, or Torah in their lives. In these conditions, the revival of religion was accompanied by an intensive proselytism of foreign missionaries trying to fill the religious vacuum left after the fall of communism.⁴⁴

Throughout history, Albanians have successfully coexisted peacefully and understandingly across religious boundaries. Every level of social structure, from the most rural to the most metropolitan, is nonetheless affected by it. Albanian civilization has developed with religious tolerance, which may even be considered an identity marker for the people of Albania. The Albanians are unimpressed by this aspect of the theological debate and do not consider it to be a compelling reason to get involved in a conflict with one another. Albanians have very distinct perspectives in this area, even going as far as to be at odds with other global populations. They are often less tolerant than Europeans when it comes to interpersonal relationships, the workplace, and day-to-day living, but they are more understanding and tolerant when it comes to adherents of other religions. Interreligious tolerance, understanding and interfaith harmony constitute one the three most prominent values of Albania.⁴⁵ Albania’s religious landscape is diverse, and the country is often cited as an example of religious tolerance in the region.

Regarding to Albanian Constitution there is no official religion, recognizing the equality of all religious groups. The Constitution specifies the obligation of the government to uphold and defend religious harmony. The Sunni Albanian Muslim Community (AMC), Bektashi Muslim community, Roman Catholic Church, Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (AOC), and the Evangelical Brotherhood of Albania (VUSH), an evangelical Protestant umbrella organization have agreements with the government. Official recognition, property restitution, tax exemptions on revenue, gifts, and religious property, and the exemption from producing accounting records for religious activities are all codified in the agreements. The AMC and Bektashi communities, the Catholic Church, and the AOC are the four religious’ communities with whom the government had agreements at the time. According to the law, the five religious groups can run schools and construct and oversee religious cemeteries on their own property. The legislation forbids teaching of a particular religion in public schools, which are secular institutions. The teaching of comparative religions or the history of religions in a humanities curriculum is allowed by law. Religious education may be provided at private schools. The Committee on Religion reports that 113 educational institutions, including universities, elementary and secondary schools, preschools, kindergartens, vocational schools, and orphanages, are overseen by the religious communities of Catholics, Muslims, AOC, and VUSH. These institutions are required by law to hold licenses from the Ministry of Education and Sport, and nonreligious courses must adhere to national education requirements. Most of them offer religion classes as electives rather than as required courses. AMC runs four madrassahs that offer religious instruction alongside the state-mandated curriculum, while AOC runs one religious high school in Gjirokastër and the Resurrection of Christ theological academy.⁴⁶

There is a gap of statistical data regarding to the religious groups in Albania. The population census started in 2023, but Albanian Statistics Institute (INSTAT) has not yet formalized the data on religious beliefs. Therefore, the final religious data from INSTAT for the year 2013 are as follows: 78% of Albanians are Sunni Muslims, 8% are Orthodox, 9% are Catholics, 1.7% are members of the Bektashi Community, 0.2% are Other, and 2.1% are stated no religion.⁴⁷

Meanwhile, the 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom (see Figure 1) in Albania estimates that Sunni Muslims constitute approximately 57% of the population, Roman Catholics 10%, members of the AOC 7%, and members of the Bektashi Order (an Islamic Sufi order) 2% (referring to 2011 census Albania).⁴⁸

As transnational religious currents appear and behavior becomes more standardized due to globalization, national identity is a topic of discussion in religious discourse. There are hints these days that younger Muslims are coming to accept a post-nationalist understanding of Islamic identity. Various professionals, government workers, and graduates of international colleges in nations that embrace pan-Islamism are among the many Muslims who oppose Albania’s traditional Islam and the secularization of the state. They uphold the notion of an “original” form of identity and religion, which alludes to Albania’s five centuries of Ottoman occupation. In 2005, the Albanian Muslim Forum was founded as an adversarial group within the Muslim Community, despite its advocacy of Islamic values both domestically and internationally. This forum’s main goals are to highlight and combat racism and Islamophobia and to promote causes that have an impact on both the country’s Muslim and non-Muslim communities. It is not recognized by the state as the representative of the Muslim community in Albania. Albania has not been immune to the growth of Islamic fundamentalism, either. Authorities in Kosovo detained 19 persons in November 2016 on suspicion of organizing a terrorist assault during Albania vs. Israel, a FIFA World Cup qualifying match. When police investigated the event, they discovered explosives and proof that two Kosovo-Albanians, who are known members of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), oversaw the scheme.⁴⁹ According to government statistics in 2015, 114 Albanian citizens were known to be fighting with the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Another study is conducted by the Institute for Democracy and Media (IDM) in the same year. The study reveals that limited employment and discrimination, especially in rural areas, can drive radicalization in Albania. Nearly half of respondents feel deprived and frustrated, and 51% believe their religious community is not adequately represented in politics and state institutions. Political drivers include the belief that the political system in Albania is unfair and must be changed. Cultural drivers include threats to religious traditions and dignity. However, according to the Country Reports on Terrorism 2022 for Albania, during 2022 were successfully repatriated and reintegrated 13 nationals from displaced persons camps in Syria. This was the second repatriation in a 12-month period conducted by the Albanian authorities, for a total of 38 repatriated women and children.⁵⁰

But among the most noteworthy characteristics of the Albanian people is their religious concord. This kind of approach is proven by well-meaning relationships and mutual respect among various religious groupings. In the end, the recognition of the supernatural is the foundation of all major monotheistic faiths. Worshiping God and love for others are the foundations of religious teachings. Moral teachings on peace, respect for life and understanding are found in all monotheistic religions practiced in our country.⁵¹ Therefore, Albania is considered a land of tolerance, mutual respect, and inter-religious dialogue; it is a model of peaceful coexistence capable of countering the hatred and extremism that are rife across the world. In 2014, the Pope these points when he visited Albania. His remarks, which also mention the “globalization of solidarity” and the opposition to religious fanaticism, convey a more general message to the globe. Pope Francis chose Albania for his first European trip, focusing on three reasons: the heroic martyrdom of Catholics and Orthodox and Muslim sufferings during the persecutions of the communist regime, the “spirit of communion” between revived Albanian religious communities, and the role of youth in building a different future based on love, freedom, justice, and peace.⁵² In Albania, or other places where Albanians live, there is no division on religious differences. Albanian religious leaders come together for each other’s celebrations and support each other’s work for the reconciliation of the population and interreligious tolerance and dialogue. This was the case when four religious leaders stood together⁵³ as a symbol of unity and condemnation against the senseless violence in Paris 2017’s march. Their presence at the rally highlighted the importance of religious tolerance and the rejection of extremism within Albania. By taking a united stand, they sent a powerful message of peace and harmony, highlighting that their faiths should never be distorted to justify acts of terror.

The “Albanian phenomenon,” which gained significance not only as a cultural and historical issue but also as a valuable experience for humanity and a chance for evocation and encouragement in international settings, quickly came to be treated as the “Albania case.” Journalist Máire Rowland characterizes Tirana’s Kavaja Street as a microcosm of the country’s renowned religious tolerance. Congregants of the three neighboring churches — the Orthodox, Catholic, and mosque — live, work, and socialize together.⁵⁴

Conclusion

From the Cultural Revolution to the present, China and Albania’s religious landscapes have seen dramatic alterations affected by political, economic, and cultural reasons. In China, the advent of communism under Mao Zedong resulted in the suppression and persecution of religious practices, including temple closures, destruction of sacred relics, and restrictions on religious freedom. Similarly, Albania’s communist leadership, led by Enver Hoxha, declared Albania as the world’s first atheist state, prohibiting religious activity and destroying religious institutions. Both Mao and Hoxha utilized propaganda and brutality to suppress opposition and keep control. However, in recent years, there has been a renaissance of religious ideas and activities, with the Chinese government taking a more tolerant approach to religion. Albania is now primarily Muslim, with religious acceptance and practice on the rise. This move in both China and Albania reflects a larger trend in which countries are rethinking their relationship with religion. In an increasingly globalized and linked world, individuals need spiritual guidance and a feeling of community, which religion may bring. During periods of political and economic upheaval, religious institutions often play a crucial role in providing stability and a sense of identity for individuals and communities. Cultural changes in Albania and China are intricately tied to political and economic factors throughout the history. The shift toward a more market-oriented economy in the late 20th century brought about significant changes in the country’s cultural landscape. Additionally, China’s political ideologies and policies have also shaped its cultural practices, such as the promotion of traditional Chinese values and the restriction of certain foreign influences. Overall, the intertwining of political and economic influences has played a pivotal role in shaping China’s cultural evolution. This newly found confidence has led to a resurgence of traditional Chinese cultural practices and a reevaluation of China’s place in the world. As China continues to grow as a global economic power, its cultural influence is also expanding, gaining popularity worldwide. Meanwhile, Albania shifts toward a new system during 1990s. As a result, Albania’s government began promoting religious freedom and tolerance, allowing individuals to freely practice their chosen faiths. So, religious institutions began to flourish once again, with churches, mosques, and temples being reopened and rebuilt. People were able to openly express their religious beliefs and take part in religious rituals, fostering a sense of community and spiritual fulfillment. Economic developments influenced religious concerns as well, as increasing religious freedom drew international investors and visitors. The government realized the economic potential of religious tourism and began investing in the repair and preservation of holy sites. This not only produced jobs and improved the local economy, but it also increased the cultural and historical importance of Albania’s religious legacy. Furthermore, religious institutions played a key role in providing charity services and social aid to people in need, which helped the country’s overall economic and social growth.

The dynamic relationship between politics, economics, and religion continues to shape the religious landscapes of both countries, highlighting the enduring significance of faith in a rapidly changing world. For instance, religion in China is deeply rooted in history and has influenced various aspects of society, including politics, education, and culture. With a diverse range of religious practices such as Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, and Christianity, the people of China find solace and guidance in their spiritual beliefs. Additionally, religious institutions and practices often serve as platforms for social welfare and community engagement, further strengthening the bonds within society. Even though there is no official religion in China, there are three major cultural streams, which play a significant role in shaping the religious landscape of China. The revival of Confucianism is supported by different scholars and people as well, as a recognized and respected faith. However, this revival faces resistance from both the Chinese government, which prefers a secular approach, and some religious groups who view Confucianism as a philosophy rather than a religion. Nonetheless, the revival movement continues to gain traction and has sparked important discussions about the role of Confucianism in contemporary China. Despite these debates, the revival of Confucianism remains a dynamic force in shaping the future of Chinese culture and society. Similarly, in Albania, the relationship between religion and culture is more than just historical or symbolic; it influences every area of social life. As Albania navigates the complications of modernity and globalization, the long-standing relationship between religion and culture continues to provide the Albanian people with strength, resilience, and identity.

Notes