Partiality of China’s Foreign Aid Policy Reform: A Cognitive Approach
Abstract
This paper examines the partiality of the Xi administration’s foreign aid policy (FAP) reform. China has established the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) to reform its foreign aid management system while continuing the loan-for-oil model within the framework of South–South Cooperation. By applying the cognitive theory of international regimes, this paper explores the reform and continuity of China’s FAP. It finds that although national interests drive China’s foreign aid, the reform of China’s FAP is the result of idea learning. China’s learning of ideas from developed donor countries explains its FAP reform, as evidenced by the establishment of CIDCA. In contrast, its adherence to domestic ideas explains the continuity of the loan-for-oil model. The ideas of recipient countries serve as secondary learning sources for China, but China only made appropriate policy adjustments based on their feedback.
Introduction
Foreign aid (FA) has been a vital policy tool in China’s diplomacy since its founding in 1949. China’s FA encompasses the provision of material, financial, technological, personnel, and management assistance by official government agencies to reduce poverty and improve social conditions in developing countries under the framework of South–South Cooperation. Since President Xi Jinping took office, China has elevated the role of FA in its diplomacy, emphasizing that it should serve the overall planning of Chinese diplomacy, particularly the Community with a Shared Future for Mankind (CSFM) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).1 Under this circumstance, China’s FA expenditure has seen a significant increase. From 2013 to 2018, China provided 270.2 billion yuan for FA, surpassing the total FA spending before 2009.2
Furthermore, the Xi administration has undertaken significant reforms in China’s foreign aid policy (FAP). In 2018, the Chinese government established China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) to replace the Department of Foreign Aid (DFA) of the Ministry of Commerce of China (MOFCOM) as the sole statutory body for managing China’s FA. CIDCA was established as an independent deputy ministerial-level agency, marking the first time an independent body was designated to oversee China’s FA. Its establishment and elevated status reflect the Xi administration’s emphasis on FA and its readiness for reform.
However, the Xi administration’s reform also demonstrates continuity, as seen in China’s loan-for-oil model. It is an oil trade arrangement where China offers loans to oil-exporting countries, which then supply oil to China as repayment.3 China views this model as a form of South–South Cooperation, given that the loans are concessional, featuring lower-than-market interest rates and extended grace periods.4 Notably, these loans are often linked to infrastructure projects undertaken by Chinese companies or used to purchase equipment, industrial products, and services from China. This model was initially applied in Angola in 2004 and then extended to other oil-rich countries. Critics argue that China’s approach does not differ significantly from that of Western powers, both focusing primarily on resources and trade profits.5 Despite these criticisms, the Xi administration has not reformed the model.
The cases of CIDCA and the loan-for-oil model suggest that the Xi administration’s FAP reform is partial: policy reform and continuity coexist. Why has the Xi administration’s FAP reform shown partiality, reforming the FA management system while maintaining the loan-for-oil model? This question forms the core of this paper’s research. Therefore, this paper aims to explain the partiality of the Xi administration’s FAP reform by analyzing the reasons behind its policy reform and continuity. It is based on the cognitive theory of international regimes (hereafter, cognitive theory). It constructs a comprehensive yet parsimonious framework for analyzing China’s FAP, focusing on the CIDCA and the loan-for-oil model cases.
This paper is organized into six sections. Following the introduction, the second section reviews the literature on CIDCA and the loan-for-oil model, identifying shortcomings of this research. The third section constructs a theoretical framework based on cognitive theory to analyze China’s FAP. The next two sections apply this framework to explain the partiality in the Xi administration’s FAP reform, using CIDCA and the loan-for-oil as case studies. The final section concludes.
Underexplored Research on the Partiality of China’s FAP Reform
Existing research is underexplored and inadequate in explaining the partiality of the Xi administration’s FAP reforms. Few studies have recognized the partiality of China’s FAP reform. Most studies analyze the reform or continuity of an individual Chinese FAP but do not construct a unified theoretical framework to explain both reform and continuity during the Xi era. Wu Yue and Zhang Muhui analyze China’s motivations for establishing CIDCA and its impact on China’s FA.6 Daniel C. O’Neill used China–Kazakhstan cooperation as a case study to explain China’s rationale for expanding the loan-for-oil model.7 However, given the Xi administration’s emphasis on aligning FA with China’s diplomatic strategy, both policy reform and continuity should reflect a unified logic in aid policy formulation. Studies focusing on individual policies cannot fully explain the partiality of policy reform.
Furthermore, even studies that focus on specific aid policies often take a fragmented analytical approach. For example, Marina Rudyak and Jacob Mardell believed that the problems within the FA management system prompted Beijing to reform the system and establish CIDCA.8 Wu Yue used President Xi Jinping’s personal characteristics of emphasizing institutional reform to explain that CIDCA was born in the Xi era rather than his predecessor, President Hu Jintao.9 Zhao Jianzhi and Jing Yijia believed that the establishment of CIDCA was driven by the path dependence of the governance of China’s FA management system.10 However, a significant limitation of these studies is that most of them focus solely on China’s motivations for reforming its FA management through the establishment of CIDCA without addressing why China opted to create an independent agency to oversee aid management. Additionally, these studies do not explore the influence of China’s interactions with other donor and recipient countries on its aid policy reform. In international development cooperation regimes, donor and recipient countries are not isolated actors. When China participates in international development cooperation and provides FA, China’s engagement with them can affect its aid policy.
The existing literature on China’s loan-for-oil model mainly analyzes why China adopted this model. First, most studies suggest that this model is based on the economic complementarity between China and recipient countries, where China leverages its capital and industrial manufacturing advantages in exchange for the recipient countries’ oil supply. Meanwhile, these recipient countries use their energy resource endowments to gain China’s financial support and access to Chinese industrial products, equipment, and services.11 Second, other studies emphasize the political and diplomatic motivations underlying the model. For example, Janet Xuanli Liao argued that China employed this model to strengthen its political ties with Central Asia and extend its regional influence.12 Third, some studies focus on China’s internal energy security needs. Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press believed that China’s reliance on imported oil, which exposed it to security vulnerabilities, drove the adoption of this model.13 Moreover, some studies believed this model was driven by a confluence of China’s economic, political, diplomatic, and energy interests.14 However, despite different analytical perspectives, these studies focus on the motives behind China’s adoption of the loan-for-oil model but do not analyze why China has insisted on this model, centered on oil trade and expanded industrial products, equipment, and infrastructure trade since the early 21st century. They also do not explain why China has persisted with this model despite external criticisms. More importantly, they overlook the influence of China’s domestic experience on the model’s formation. Research indicates that China’s domestic development and aid-providing experience have informed its aid policy.15 Given China’s over 70 years of experience in providing aid, its domestic experience is crucial for understanding the continuity of its aid policy.
Not only that but also a common shortcoming in the aforementioned research is the weakness or lack of a theoretical foundation. Most studies fail to use international relations or foreign policy theories to explain China’s specific policies, let alone develop a comprehensive and generalizable theoretical framework to analyze the partiality of China’s FAP reform under the Xi administration. The lack of theoretical foundation has confined existing studies on China’s FAP reform or continuity to case-by-case descriptions and empirical analysis. Given these problems, this paper uses cognitive theory to develop a comprehensive and generalizable theoretical framework. Then, it examines the partiality of the reform in addressing the limitations of this research.
A Cognitive Approach to China’s FAP
Cognitive theory, a subfield within the study of international relations, approaches the concept of international regime. Cognition refers to the ideas that states learn, which drive their demand for cooperation and contribute to the formation of international regimes.16 Cognitive theory aligns with Joseph S. Nye’s definition of “complex learning,” which involves recognizing conflicts among means and goals within causally complex situations, leading to new priorities and trade-offs.17 In other words, cognitive theory holds that states learn and assess the causal relationships between goals and methods. However, learning is not one-way; states act as both active agents and recipients in the learning process. Thus, learning is an interactive process where states develop an understanding of the causal relationships between their means and goals. If states discover misalignment between their means and goals, they will adjust their strategies accordingly.
The “ideas” that states learn are central to cognitive theory. Here, “ideas” refer to the causal beliefs that guide actors in international politics.18 Causal beliefs guide the choice of means to achieve goals.19 This is consistent with Lancaster’s view that causal beliefs determine which policies lead to effective development in the analysis of aid policies.20 It can be seen that Lancaster also uses the concept of means and goals to understand causal beliefs, with FAP as the means and effective development as the goal. In brief, cognitive theory believes that “ideas” guide state behaviors by establishing causal patterns.21 Thus, cognitive theory regards “ideas” as the intervening variable between state interests and policy outcomes.22 In light of this, “ideas” bridge the gap between state interests and actual behaviors (see Figure 1).
Fig. 1. Cognitive Theory Framework: State Interests, Ideas, and Outcomes.
Source: Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, “Integrating Theories of International Regimes,” p. 26.
Although cognitive theory holds that states learn new “ideas” and adjust their behavior and policies accordingly, it overlooks the inherent “ideas” already present within the state. Even after learning new “ideas,” a state may not necessarily revise its policies and behaviors to align them. Learning, occurring both “between and within communities of practice,” is a driving force of cognitive evolution.23 A state’s domestic experiences and models may resist changes to policies and behaviors based on new “ideas” learned externally. Thus, domestic ideas should be incorporated into the cognitive theory framework in Figure 1, which can better reflect the interaction rather than the one-sided adoption of external ideas. Yu Bowen further argues that states will evaluate whether these new ideas suit them. The state will compare new ideas with domestic ideas and prioritize the domestic experience and models, importing when domestic experience is unavailable.24 Three reasons explain the state’s preference for indigenous “ideas.” First, the state is uncertain whether foreign ideas can effectively address its problems; second, the unfamiliarity with foreign ideas complicates their effective implementation; third, introducing and practicing foreign ideas may require new institutional building and personnel training, which may complicate the domestic bureaucracy processes.25 Thus, if domestic ideas are available, they will constitute a powerful domestic counter-force to foreign ideas. Therefore, it is necessary to revise the framework shown in Figure 1. Both foreign and domestic ideas serve as intervening variables influencing state policies and behaviors, with domestic ideas prioritized over foreign ones to achieve national interests (see Figure 2).
Fig. 2. Revised Cognitive Theory Framework.
Source: Author’s own.
In Figure 2, the domestic ideas refer to China’s own development and aid-giving experience and models, while foreign ideas encompass the non-Chinese approach. China’s primary sources of foreign ideas come from the aid models of developed donor countries from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which dominates the international development assistance regime. China began engaging with this regime after its reform and opening up in the late 1970s. Therefore, developed donor countries are China’s primary learning resources. Moreover, since President Xi took office, China has collaborated with developed donor countries in development cooperation,26 and the Chinese government also claimed in the 2021 FA white paper that China is willing to leverage its comparative advantages with developed countries and actively learn from their successful experiences and effective practices in development assistance.27
However, recipient countries’ ideas should be addressed because their feedback on FA and development cooperation offers valuable secondary learning resources for donor countries. From the donor countries’ perspective, the more a development project understands the local community, the greater the benefits for local people.28 From the recipient countries’ perspective, they are not passive recipients; their attitudes and cooperation may affect aid projects’ materialization and implementation progress.29 China has long emphasized that its FA respects the ideas of other developing countries.30 Hence, this paper considers recipient countries’ ideas as well. If the recipient’s ideas align with China’s domestic or foreign ideas, China’s FAP will adopt those ideas. Otherwise, China’s FAP will make policy adjustments to its domestic ideas or foreign ideas according to the recipients’ ideas. From the above, Figure 3 presents the theoretical framework for China’s FAP, which this paper will use to analyze the partiality of the Xi administration’s FAP reform, with CIDCA and the loan-for-oil model as case studies.
Fig. 3. Cognitive Approach to China’s FAP.
Source: Author’s own.
CIDCA: Foreign Ideas and Policy Reform
Interests and Motivations
After President Xi took office, China proposed CSFM and BRI. China’s diplomatic blueprint has required it to take on greater international responsibilities and contribute more to global governance.31 The Xi administration emphasizes that China’s international development cooperation stems from its responsibility as a great power to provide global public goods.32 However, the previous FA management system faced fragmented management and inter-ministerial competition. MOFCOM was responsible for drafting FAP and regulations, formulating aid plans, and approving and managing aid projects. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) balanced MOFCOM by ensuring that FA aligned with China’s diplomatic goals.33
In theory, MOFCOM and MFA could have checked and balanced each other and coordinated to optimize aid management. However, in practice, this arrangement exposed three drawbacks. First, MOFCOM had more influence than MFA,34 which made China’s FA more commercially oriented. MOFCOM’s primary responsibility was overseeing China’s commercial and trade affairs, with FA management being a secondary concern. MOFCOM focused more on China’s commercial interests than on diplomatic strategies and targets. Consequently, MOFCOM acted as a steward for Chinese enterprises, using FA to facilitate access to overseas markets for Chinese products and services.
Second, the previous FA management system lacked effective and independent evaluation and supervision. Theoretically, MOFCOM was responsible for supervising and inspecting the safety, quality, progress, and use of funds of Chinese FA projects.35 However, it was also tasked with implementing some aid projects. Thus, MOFCOM’s dual role as both player and referee led to a lack of independent oversight and evaluation. This situation fostered corruption within FA management. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Chinese Communist Party investigated MOFCOM in 2014. It detected supervision deficiencies, corruption risks, and significant issues in budget management, bidding procedures, and expenditure in FA management.36
Third, the ministries involved in the FA management fail to collaborate and communicate as designed, leading to a lack of transparency. MOFCOM and MFA had competition because the former regarded FA as a tool to pursue commercial interests while the latter was only interested in politically influential business affairs.37 Their quarrel over FA hindered effective inter-ministry coordination and led to isolated information silos.38 The absence of an independent statistical department further discouraged the competing ministries from sharing detailed FA data.
These problems are not conducive to China’s interests in assuming international responsibilities as a responsible great power. Over-commercialization undermined the altruistic nature of China’s FA, corruption leads to inefficiency and low quality of aid projects, and non-transparency draws international criticism. These problems prompted the Xi administration to reform China’s FA management system. However, China lacks domestic ideas for the reform because economic and trade ministries and agencies have managed China’s FA since the 1950s.39 Before the establishment of CIDCA, China had never created an independent and specialized FA management agency. Consequently, China turns to foreign ideas to fill the gap left by the absence of domestic ideas.
Idea Learning
The critical lesson China has learned from developed donor countries is the necessity of establishing an independent and specialized FA management agency. There have long been pro-reform voices in China calling for establishing a centralized leadership since the 2000s, as DAC donor countries did.40 First, an independent management agency is expected to end inter-ministerial competition and poor coordination. Most developed donors have established such agencies, with typical cases including the United States Agency for International Development, the French Development Agency, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, and the Canadian Agency for International Development. Zhao Pei argues that such agencies help clarify rights and responsibilities, streamline organizational management, and ensure timely responses to FA tasks.41 As a significant global donor, China must establish a development cooperation bureau. Second, an independent FA management agency can help reduce over-commercialization and align Chinese aid with China’s diplomacy. Most developed donor countries house their FA departments within foreign affairs ministries, which facilitates FA integration with foreign policy.42 Huang Meibo and Liu Ailan believed that economic incentives drove aid in the early stages of a donor’s development, with non-economic factors gaining importance as the economy grows.43 As such, developed donors now prioritize diplomatic functions over economic interests in FA. For this reason, several professors from China Agricultural University, a leading university in FA research institution, advocated for an independent aid agency to align China’s FA with its diplomatic strategies and separate the commercial interests.44
Third, China has also learned that an independent agency for supervision and evaluation is necessary. Chinese officials and scholars engaged in the China-DAC Study Group, a mutual learning platform that promoted the Chinese FA experience while undergoing peer evaluation on Chinese FA from DAC donors. Through this platform, MOFOCM officials acknowledged that the significance of evaluation lies in maintaining oversight over the inputs, activities, outputs, effects, and impact of aid projects, which aligns with the DAC standards.45 More significantly, after observing DAC donors’ aid projects, Chinese officials concluded that most DAC donor countries had established independent evaluation agencies, highlighting the importance of evaluation. In contrast, China has not yet established such an evaluation management division.46 In December 2014, Yu Zirong, then Deputy Director of DFA, admitted that China’s FA management had a weak evaluation component, but Western practices offered valuable lessons.47
Fourth, China is aware of the importance of aid transparency through its engagement in the international development assistance regime. China participated in the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011 and endorsed the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, which significantly increased the requirements for aid transparency. Nevertheless, Chinese aid has long faced international criticism for its lack of transparency. In 2020, MOFCOM’s aid transparency index ranked last among the 47 aid-providing units.48 In this context, Chinese reform advocates believe that an international development cooperation agency would improve aid statistics and prompt the Chinese government to adopt the DAC statistic standards, enabling comparison with other donors’ FA data.49
At the same time, recipient countries provided feedback to China regarding the problems stemming from China’s previous FA management system. They expressed discontent with the lack of transparency in Chinese aid, requiring access to aid data to ensure alignment with their national strategy, timely feedback on aid projects, and monitoring aid projects to prevent corruption and illegal activities. Recipient countries also mentioned the difficulty of obtaining information from China. When Beijing did not disclose data, they had to turn to the Economic and Commercial Counselor’s Office (ECC) representing the MOFCOM at Chinese embassies. However, the ECC did not prioritize FA, as its main task was to facilitate Chinese trade and investment under the guidance of MOFCOM. Additionally, recipient countries encountered difficulties in obtaining information from local embassies governed by MFA due to the competition between MFA and MOFCOM.50 In such cases, they had to rely on their own records and urged China to fulfill its international commitments, as it signed the Busan agreement about aid transparency.51
Over-commercialization is another focal point that recipient countries criticize Chinese aid. Chinese aid projects often require the use of Chinese products and services. Typically, aid projects funded by Chinese concessional loans provided by the Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) mandate that at least 50% of procurement should be sourced from China,52 as EXIM Bank, a partner of MOFCOM, also valued commercial benefits in its concessional loans.53 In contrast, 37% of the number of contracts for aid projects were awarded by DAC donors to their domestic suppliers from 2019 to 2020. Some recipient countries criticized China’s aid for its commercial nature, which ignores corporate social responsibility, harms the local social environment, and lacks community engagement.54 From this perspective, the overly commercialized assistance facilitated by MOFCOM challenged China’s FA and national image. As Huang Meibo and Liu Ailan noted, China must reduce the commercial aspects of its FA to address criticism from the local communities in recipient countries.55
Policy Choice
Both developed donor and recipient countries have consistently urged China to establish a specialized FA management agency. In 2017, President Xi called for reforms to improve oversight of aid funds and projects and optimize the strategic layout of FA.56 Consequently, CIDCA was founded in 2018 under the Chinese State Council, reporting to the foreign minister. This development has diminished MOFCOM’s power over FA.
The commercial focus of Chinese aid is expected to decline, allowing it to better support China’s diplomatic goals and international responsibilities as a great power. At the 2018 Beijing Summit of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, President Xi highlighted a shift in China’s aid strategy, emphasizing giving more and taking less in its development cooperation with African countries.57 Figure 4 shows a slowdown or negative growth in China’s loans to low- and middle-income countries during the Xi administration, particularly in Africa and Eurasia. The COVID-19 pandemic offered China an opportunity to shift its perception of its FA from being overly commercialized. By the end of December 2021, China has supplied over two billion COVID-19 vaccines to more than 120 countries and international organizations, establishing itself as the world’s largest vaccine donor.58
Fig. 4. Growth Rate of China’s Loan Stocks (Excluding High-Income Countries).
Source: World Bank International Debt Statistics. Complied by the author.
CIDCA has brought China an independent FA supervision agency directly affiliated with the Chinese State Council, ensuring its objectivity and reducing influence from aid-implementing agencies. It has set up the Department of Supervision and Evaluation to monitor project implementation and conduct comprehensive evaluations.59 Moreover, the Chinese government has enhanced CIDCA’s supervision and control functions, including pre-implementation review, approval, fund allocation, ongoing supervision, and post-implementation evaluation.60 Additionally, CIDCA has independently engaged in dialogues with international counterparts on monitoring and evaluating FA.61 It has initiated a series of international conferences to exchange insights on supervision, evaluation, statistics, and anti-corruption in development assistance and to conduct peer reviews, advancing the establishment of an evaluation system.62
CIDCA is also tasked to deal with aid non-transparency. In 2021, it launched a direct reporting system for FA statistics and arranged training sessions on its use.63 The platform gathers FA data from Chinese enterprises and social organizations, integrating government and civil data to enhance supervision and ensure project quality. Besides, CIDCA has started to address requests for FA data from recipient countries, demonstrating a more open approach than MOFCOM. For instance, officials from Cote d’Ivoire reported that their data request was promptly answered by CIDCA.64 This indicates that CIDCA is actively addressing transparency issues in Chinese aid activities.
Loan-for-Oil: Domestic Ideas and Policy Continuity
Interests and Motivations
China adheres to the loan-for-oil model to ensure a stable oil supply, which is crucial for its economic development and sustainability. Using oil-backed loans, China seeks to build stable and mutually beneficial relationships with recipient countries and increase interdependence through infrastructure and product exports. This approach can help China mitigate economic development risks from oil supply disruptions.
China’s oil vulnerability is reflected in four dimensions. First, China heavily relies on overseas oil imports, with demand predicted to exceed 760 million tons by 2030 and an average dependency on foreign oil rising to 76.19% between 2020 and 2030.65 This increasing demand forces China to expand its overseas sourcing and procurement. Second, China’s oil import sources are concentrated in the Middle East, which accounted for about 50% of its total imports.66 However, due to the complex religious and ethnic issues, terrorism, and armed conflicts in the Middle East, it is not an ideal oil supply region,67 prompting China to diversify its oil import sources. Third, China is concerned with the security of its oil supply chain, as 92% of its seaborne oil imports, including those from the Middle East and Africa, pass through the Strait of Malacca.68 A blockade of this strait would pose substantial security risks to China, necessitating the development of alternative overland pipelines. Fourth, China’s influence on some oil-exporting countries is inadequate compared to the political and military influence of the United States in the Middle East and Europe in North Africa. Therefore, it is crucial for China, as a latecomer to the global oil market, to foster strong ties with oil-exporting countries efficiently.
The Sino-U.S. rivalry has intensified China’s insecurity. The United States can exercise control over oil shipping lanes and weaponize oil to exert sanctions.69 Since the Obama administration, the United States has strengthened its military and political presence in Asia-Pacific, raising China’s concerns about potential oil embargo and shipping lanes blockades. The Xi administration has increasingly prioritized energy security and self-sufficiency. In 2021, President Xi pointed out that the rice bowl of energy must be in our own hands.70 He also required Chinese economic officials to figure out how China could build an independent industrial chain parallel to the West’s existing ones.71 China’s oil vulnerability and growing sense of insecurity motivate China to build solid and long-term relationships with oil-exporting countries across regions to ensure a diversified and stable oil supply. To this end, China begins to provide long-term and low-interest loans to these countries, securing a continuous and reliable oil supply in return. Moreover, China aims to extend its ties with oil-exporting countries into product trade and infrastructure, thereby strengthening interdependence and gradually forming a community of interests.72 Officials from the China Development Bank (CDB), the lender of loan-for-oil deals, said that China’s risks would be lessened when oil-exporting countries were bound to China’s economy.73 Furthermore, enhancing these ties also complicates the United States’ ability to sanction China, particularly when it seeks collaboration with these oil-exporting countries.74
Idea Learning
China’s loan-for-oil model stems from its experience with concessional loans and economic developments, viewing it as a mutually beneficial approach that mitigates its economic risks in recipient countries. China’s approach was informed by its oil-backed trade with Japan in the late 1970s when the two countries signed the Sino-Japanese Long-Term Trade Agreement in 1978 and 1990. These agreements facilitated China exporting oil and coal to Japan in exchange for technology, equipment, and machinery from Japan, capitalizing on the economic complementarity of the two countries. Deng Xiaoping once highlighted the need for China to export more, such as oil and coal, to obtain needed expertise and equipment.75 The energy export-backed deals allowed China to leverage its comparative resource advantages and enabled Japan to secure its loans, addressing China’s limited creditworthiness with foreign investors at that time.76
China’s loan-for-oil model originates from its cooperative experience with Japan.77 China views its concessional loans as satisfying recipients’ funding needs and fostering mutually beneficial economic and trade cooperation, leveraging economic complementarity.78 The Xi administration has made this cooperation a key goal of BRI.79 This approach satisfies recipient countries’ demand for industrial products and infrastructure, making the relationship mutually beneficial. Long-term loans and the trade and investment they drive promote and sustain the interdependence of the two sides. However, China also emphasizes oil exports from recipient countries as a guarantee for its long-term loans. Chen Yuan, then CDB president, stated that Chinese loans would face business risks and uncertainties without oil-backed guarantees.80 Trade and investment with some loan-for-oil partners, especially those with challenging business environments like Sudan, Angola, and Venezuela, are risky, according to the World Bank’s evaluation.81
Second, China’s economic development experience has also contributed to the loan-for-oil model. CDB extensively applied the product-backed development financing approach, known as the Wuhu model, to support local Chinese cities.82 This approach involved local governments using land sale revenues as collateral for loans from the CDB, earmarked for infrastructure projects. First implemented in Wuhu City, Anhui Province, this model was later extended nationwide in 1998.83 Through the Wuhu model, the CDB secured its loans with land sales income while providing financial support for local governments to promote regional development and improve local debt repayment capacity. As such, Li Ruogu, then president of the EXIM Bank, argued that debt could promote exports and economic development in low-income countries if used appropriately, thus strengthening their future debt repayment capacity and achieving debt sustainability.84 Therefore, China has applied the logic of the Wuhu model to its concessional loans to recipient countries,85 lending to developing countries that pledge commodities as collateral to address their financing difficulties.
However, recipient countries have conveyed mixed feedback on China’s loan-for-oil model. On the one hand, China’s concessional loans were consistent with their political and economic interests. Economically, China’s long-term concessional loans eased the financing difficulties of some oil-exporting countries. For example, Angola secured financing through oil deals that enabled Chinese companies to develop its infrastructure and industrial projects.86 Nigeria used Chinese loans to develop manufacturing and agriculture, diversifying its economy.87 Oil-rich countries in Africa and the Middle East leveraged Chinese financing to support their oil industry and enterprise development plans.88 Additionally, some oil-exporting countries, like Ecuador, saw loan-for-oil deals as a source of subcontracting opportunities to local companies.89 Politically, Chinese credit lines served some oil-exporting countries’ geopolitical purposes. For instance, Kazakhstan used loan-for-oil deals to introduce Chinese influence and break Russia’s monopoly.90 Besides, political elites in countries like Venezuela, Brazil, and Ecuador channeled Chinese loans into social sectors to gain electoral advantages or fund political aspirations.91
On the other hand, recipient countries increasingly expressed concerns about the economic and social impacts of the loan-for-oil model rooted in economic complementarity. First, this model did not aid in diversifying their economies. According to the Export Diversification Index shown in Figure 5, the main oil-exporting countries cooperating with China, except Brazil, had high indexes, indicating low export diversification. Furthermore, some countries, including Brazil, Venezuela, Kazakhstan, and Russia, even showed an upward trend from 2000 to 2014. Given this, most of these oil-exporting countries remained dependent on the oil industry. Former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff and some African countries criticized China in this regard.92 Latin American countries also feared falling into de-industrialization due to long-run dependence on resource exports and industrial product imports.93
Fig. 5. The Export Diversification Index.
Source: IMF Export Diversification and Quality. Complied by the author.
The second concern is about the debt sustainability. Figure 6 shows that in 2021, Angola’s debt to China was nearly one-third of its GDP, causing the Angolan government to be wary of its heavy reliance on Chinese loans. For this reason, Angola attempted to diversify its credit sources to reduce China’s economic dominance.94 A 2021 poll of 33 African countries found that 57% of respondents thought their governments borrowed excessively from China, a view held by 75% of Angolans.95 Venezuela’s case also signals to China the risks of heavy borrowing. It defaulted on its debt to China between 2014 and 2015. As a result, China had to accept lower returns than the agreed value and provided Venezuela with a new loan worth five billion dollars to save the partnership.96
Fig. 6. Share of China’s Loan Stocks to the Loan-for-Oil Countries’ GDP in 2021.
Source: World Bank Open Data and International Debt Statistics. Complied by the author.
Policy Choice
The ideas from China’s own experience regarding the loan-for-oil model are not entirely inconsistent with the recipient countries’ feedback. The common interests of the two sides give birth to this model, but criticisms from recipient countries have caused China to work on adjusting it. On the one hand, the Xi administration has continued the loan-for-oil model. Since 2013, China has reached loan-for-oil agreements with Russia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Iran, and Central Asian countries. Besides, the model has been extended to other commodity transactions, including grain purchases from Ukraine and minerals deals with Guinea.
On the other hand, China has been refining the loan-for-oil model. Under the Xi administration, there has been a more proactive approach to addressing the debt problems, with increased caution about new loan projects to ease concerns over debt sustainability. As shown in Table 1, China’s loans to major loan-for-oil countries declined during President Xi’s second term (2018–2021). Additionally, China has demonstrated greater openness to debt suspension and forgiveness. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, it has participated in the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), restructuring debts for several countries and accounting for 63% of debt suspensions under the initiative. Because of this, for example, Angola saved 5.2 billion dollars from China.97 Furthermore, China has attached growing importance to the risk evaluation for its loan projects, employing macroeconomic risk metrics to assess project risks in Venezuela and requiring that the loans be directed toward the country’s oil industry to boost oil production and repayment capacity.98
| Angola | Brazil | Ecuador | Ghana | Iran | Kazakhstan | Nigeria | Sudan | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2001–2012 | 59.7% | 50.2% | 2840.4% | 45.6% | 2.5% | / | 63.6% | 5.5% |
| 2013–2017 | 30.3% | 18.4% | 25.9% | 10.3% | −38.7% | 251.8% | 19.4% | −2.7% |
| 2018–2021 | 2.1% | −18.9% | −10.1% | −4.8% | −20.1% | 18.1% | 17.6% | −4.8% |
Last, China has acknowledged recipient countries’ concerns about oil dependency and de-industrialization. President Xi has also expressed China’s commitment to supporting economic diversification in developing countries.99 Yang Jiechi, former Director of the General Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, indicated that China would help African countries achieve diversified development.100 Accordingly, China’s investment in resource-rich regions has become more diversified. Data from the China–Africa Business Council indicates that, from 2015 to 2020, the proportion of China’s investment in Africa’s construction, manufacturing, and financial services has gradually increased.101 In contrast, a notable decline in resource investment was observed in Latin America, where China increased its direct investment in manufacturing and services sectors during the Xi era (see Figure 7).102
Fig. 7. Sector Distribution of China’s FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Source: Latin America and the Caribbean Network on China, Ejemplares Del Monitor de La OFDI de China En América Latina [Copies of the OFDI Monitor of China in Latin America]. Compiled by the author.
Conclusion
This paper examines the partiality of the Xi administration’s FAP reform. Using cognitive theory, it establishes a theoretical framework that incorporates China’s domestic ideas as well as those from developed donor countries and recipient countries. Through a detailed analysis of the establishment of CIDCA and the continuation of the loan-for-oil model, this paper offers a comprehensive explanation of the reform and continuity within the Xi administration’s FAP. It finds that while national interests drive China’s FAP, the FAP reform reflects China’s learning of foreign ideas. The CIDCA case illustrates that lacking pertinent domestic ideas for addressing problems in the previous FA management system, China sought and adopted ideas from developed donor countries. In contrast, for the loan-for-oil model, China relied on its own experience, which it found practical for South–South Cooperation with oil-exporting countries. In this scenario, China favored its domestic ideas. Thus, the Xi administration prioritized domestic ideas over those from developed donors in its FAP reform. Recipient countries’ ideas are seen as secondary learning sources. Despite criticisms, China adjusted the loan-for-oil model operationally but did not suspend it, instead expanding its application to other commodity transactions.
The findings of this study suggest that when analyzing China’s FAP, China’s domestic experiences and models should be taken into consideration. Although China has engaged with developed donor countries, foreign ideas supplement rather than replace domestic ones. Future research should avoid a binary oppositional view and not overestimate the impact of interactions with developed donor countries on China’s FAP. Furthermore, while China considers feedback from recipient countries, it makes adjustments to its FAP in line with national interests rather than overhauling it based on recipient countries’ ideas. Given these insights, future research should conduct a more detailed analysis of China’s FAP from the perspective of interactions among China, developed donor countries, and recipient countries.
Notes
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