Situational Allyship, Forced Interaction, or Quasi-Military Alliance? Explaining the Growing Ties between Russia and China Since 2014

Introduction

Strategic defense cooperation between Russia and China began in 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Both sides recognized the significance of counterbalancing the increasing influence of the United States in Eurasia and the Asia–Pacific region. The export of Russian weapons to China during the 1990s and 2000s played a crucial role in the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Strategic defense partnerships were developed during the presidencies of Boris Yeltsin (1991–2000) and Jiang Zemin (1993–2003). These partnerships intensified during the first and second administrations of Vladimir Putin (2000–2008). The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and Russia signed in July 2001, and the final settlement of the Sino–Russian border in 2004 created an atmosphere of bilateral trust.¹ This allowed for limited military technology transfer from Russia to China, resulting in a new level of military cooperation.²

Bilateral defense cooperation has significantly increased since 2014, when relations between Russia and the European Union (EU) began to deteriorate due to the conflict over Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the start of the Russian invasion of the Ukrainian Donbas in April 2014 created a geopolitical rivalry and mistrust between the EU and the United States on one side and Russia and its Central Asian allies on the other. Unprecedented geopolitical competition between Western countries and Russia damaged trading and economic relations between the EU and Russia, reduced the number of European investment projects, and lowered European technology transfer. Consequently, military cooperation between the Russian Federation and NATO was postponed. The intensification of defense cooperation between Russia and other post-Soviet states that are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) on one side, and China and Iran on the other, resulted from strategic rivalry between Russia and NATO. Furthermore, increased defense cooperation is motivated by the strong personal relationship between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. Both leaders view each other as crucial partners in the international arena, aiding each other in maintaining their respective domestic economic and political stability.³

Literature on Sino–Russian defense cooperation during the Xi Jinping administration generally deals with particular aspects of these ties. Most notably, Polish-British scholar Marcin Kaczmarski points out that anti-American ideological foundations and fears of foreign meddling bring Vladimir Putin’s and Xi Jinping’s elites closer to each other, resulting in unprecedented defense cooperation, including sensitive technology exchange and joint development of missile defense systems.⁴ Polish political scientist Michal Lubina, Russian sinologists Alexander Gabuev and Vasiliy Kashin underline the pragmatic approach of Sino–Russian relations in general, and strategic defense cooperation in particular, describing the evolution of bilateral security ties from 1991 to nowadays. They emphasize that bilateral military ties might result in the potential formation of an anti-Western military union in the foreseeable future.⁵ Chinese–Australian scholar Bobo Lo has for his part studied how the rapid development of the Sino–Russian defense partnership affects the security of the NATO countries and Japan.⁶ Russian scholars Alexander Lukin⁷ and Sergei Lousianin⁸ illustrate the evolution of Sino–Russian relations from the end of the 1980s to 2017, paying most of the attention to the development of bilateral military cooperation. Mr. Lukin views Sino–Russian defense integration as an irreversible process that benefits both sides equally. French historian Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix describes the development of the Sino–Russian naval partnership during the last ten years.⁹ German scholars Sarah Kirchberger, Svenja Sinjen, and Nils Wörmer describe the development of Sino–Russian relations from 2014 to 2022, underlying the idea that the intensification of military cooperation between the two Eurasian powers is the result of the growing political trust of their authoritarian leaders.¹⁰ Dmitry Gorenburg, Elizabeth Wishnick, Paul Schwartz, and other authors describe the effects of joint Sino–Russian military exercises for both armies. These authors underline the growing imbalance of power between China and Russia.¹¹

This paper aims to build on existing research to explore how Sino–Russian defense cooperation played out in different spheres of bilateral strategic interaction, and the impact it had on the security architecture in Eurasia and the Asian–Pacific region, especially in the light of the geopolitical conflict between Russia and the Western countries over Ukraine. It is based on a variety of materials, including official documents of the governments and the Ministries of Defense of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, documents of the U.S. Congress and government, analytical reports of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, declarations of BRICS, NATO, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summits, as well as on documents of state-owned Russian and Chinese military enterprises. A series of analytical reports issued by important international think tanks have also been included. The examination encompasses crucial bilateral pacts, official declarations from the leaders of both nations, significant agreements on arms sales, and various forms of cooperation in the field of military technology. It also analyses important bilateral activities such as the exchange of military personnel for education and training, joint military exercises and operations, and other pertinent military interactions.¹² The paper focuses on the main spheres of bilateral military interaction and their role in the development of Sino–Russian defense integration: arms sales and technology transfer from 2014 to 2021, joint military exercises/maneuvers from 2014 to 2021, geopolitical cooperation, and bilateral military cooperation since the beginning of the full-scale Russian–Ukrainian war. The most accurate assessment of the stage and trajectory of the development of the military alliance between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China in the period from 2014 to 2023 has been carried out. The main emphasis is on the systematic measurement of the level of cooperation and bilateral defense integration during this period.

Arms Sales and Military Technology Transfers (2014–2021)

Arms trade has been a significant aspect of the relationship between China and Russia since the 1990s. During Boris Yeltsin’s presidency, China became the largest purchaser of Russian weapons. At that time, Russian military technology was more advanced than China’s, which led the Chinese government to request full-scale Russian assistance in modernizing the PLA. Based on data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), approximately 80% of China’s major conventional weapons imports came from Russia between 1991 and 2013. During this period, the Chinese government accounted for around 33–35% of Russia’s annual weapons exports. The rapid economic and technological development of the People’s Republic during the first decade of the 21st century reduced China’s dependency on Russian military technologies. However, the Chinese defense sector still relies on importing high-tech Russian military equipment, including helicopters, aircraft, air fighter engines, air defense systems, and submarines.¹³

The Chinese defense budget today is the world’s second-largest, providing Chinese scientists with ample funds for developing modern military equipment. During the past decade, Russian defense budgets have been approximately 30–35% of the size of Chinese budgets.¹⁴ Russian specialists have been able to access larger financial funds through cooperation with Chinese military engineers and scientists. The intensified cooperation between Russian and Chinese scientists has resulted in the development of modern military equipment from 2012 to 2015. The Chinese military has developed new equipment, including the KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft, Y-8J maritime patrol aircraft, Y-8GX8 electronic reconnaissance aircraft, CJ-10A cruise missiles, Dongfeng-16 short-range missiles, and anti-ship ballistic missiles Dongfeng-21D, with the assistance of Russian scientists.¹⁵

However, prior to the Ukrainian crisis of 2014, the Russian government had declined to sell its most advanced weaponry systems or provide its largest Eastern neighbor with the latest military technologies. Russian politicians, including former President Dmitry Medvedev (2008–2012), Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia in parliament from 1994 to 2022, and Dmitry Rogozin, former Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the defense industry from 2011 to 2018, have had expressed concerns about the potential for the Chinese army to use Russian weapons against the Russian Federation in the future to conquer the Russian Far East region. However, most of the concerns were eliminated after the development of the geopolitical conflict between Russia and the United States in 2014–2019.¹⁶

During Xi Jinping’s era, bilateral defense cooperation intensified, as was highlighted by the significant Russian arms sales in 2015. The Russian Prime Minister at the time, Dmitry Medvedev, agreed to sell 24 Su-35C combat aircraft and the S-400 air defense system to the PLA. Talks between China and Russia regarding this deal had begun in 2010. However, the Russian government and experts took significant time to analyze the potential risks of transferring highly advanced technology to China, considering the national security and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.¹⁷ The 2015 contract between the Russian and Chinese governments had a market value of approximately 5 billion dollars, making it one of the largest in the history of the Sino–Russian arms trade. Between 2015 and 2018, this bilateral agreement was implemented. The acquisition of six divisions of S-400 air defense systems enabled the PLA to address many vulnerable gaps in long-range air defense, particularly in areas near the borders of Japan and the Philippines. If the S-400 missile system were installed in Shandong province, the Chinese army would have the capability to fully control the airspace over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, a disputed territory between Japan and China. Additionally, the acquisition of advanced Russian systems may enable Chinese engineers to replicate certain details from them. This would bring Chinese air defense production technologies to a completely new level. The procurement of Su-35C aircraft enhanced Chinese air military capabilities beyond its borders, enabling the PLA air force to rival the U.S. and Japanese air forces stationed in the Asia–Pacific region. Additionally, it added geostrategic pressure on Taiwan, bolstering Beijing’s military capabilities to regain control over the island. For instance, if at least two divisions of S-400 were installed in Fujian province, the PLA would be able to control the airspace of Taiwan and surrounding territories. The technical characteristics of the S-400 missile system meet this objective. Fujian province is a secure location since Taiwanese or Philippine artillery or missile systems lack the technical capacity to destroy it. This will significantly increase the chances of Beijing’s victory in cross-strait crisis scenarios.¹⁸

In November 2018, the Chinese government signed an agreement with the Kazan helicopter plant to purchase 21 Kazan Ansat helicopters. The military version of this helicopter had an average price of approximately 3.3–4 million dollars in 2018–2019. As a result, the estimated value of this contract was 80 million dollars. The helicopters were delivered to the PLA during 2019–2020, significantly increasing the mobility of Chinese military units located near Taiwan.¹⁹ A year later, the Chinese government signed another bilateral contract to purchase 100 Mi-171 transport helicopters. All of these helicopters were manufactured at the Ulan-Ude aircraft plant in Buryatia. The estimated market value of this agreement is 2 billion dollars. Over the past decade, the ground forces of the PLA have rapidly acquired helicopter equipment. Each of the 13 army groups must have its helicopter brigade, in addition to individual helicopter brigades and rapidly growing marine aviation.²⁰ Overall, the transfer of Russian combat and transport helicopters to China highlights the Chinese engineers’ lag in this area. Russian companies not only sell various types of helicopters to the PLA but also provide full-scale technological support and maintenance for the machines. This field is one of the few areas in which the Chinese military still relies on Russian specialists.²¹

Bilateral technological cooperation is not restricted to arms sales. Russian specialists have been providing full-scale assistance to their Chinese colleagues since 2013 in creating a missile attack warning system that records the launch and flight paths of ballistic missiles. The system is composed of several main components, including the space echelon, ground echelon, control, and data processing systems. Most of the details of this strategic cooperation are considered state secrets by both governments. Analyzing Vladimir Putin’s and Dmitry Medvedev’s remarks about this topic, it is evident that some Russian companies related to the state-owned defense conglomerate “Rostec” developed specialized software to manage the Chinese missile attack warning system. In addition, the Russian side provides valuable components such as space satellites and radars.²²

The intense cooperation between China and Russia in the field of missile defense holds great political significance. Until now, only the United States and Russia have had their missile attack warning systems. Missile defense systems are among the most complex and advanced types of military equipment, and cooperation in such sensitive areas demonstrates a high level of mutual trust. It is important to note that the implementation of automatic data exchange between Russian and Chinese missile attack warning systems significantly increases the rapid response capabilities of both countries.²³

There are concerns about the limitations in trade between Russia and China, despite recent progress in revitalizing their arms transfers. Russian defense companies continue to sell scaled-down export versions of their most advanced weapon systems to China. This strategy is due to Russian concerns about Chinese reverse engineering practices, which have not diminished. In its 2019 annual analytical report, state-owned defense conglomerate “Rostec” documented over 500 instances of Chinese intellectual property theft from Russia between 2002 and 2019. Furthermore, members of the Russian political elite are increasingly worried about China’s growing presence in the global arms market. Chinese producers are competing with Russian arms companies in the conventional arms market in Africa and Latin America, which was previously dominated by the United States and Russia. Taking into account all these concerns, the Russian government has not yet agreed to provide China with Russian RD-180 rocket engines, which would significantly boost the development of space technologies and transcontinental ballistic missiles in China. Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin’s government has repeatedly declined China’s expressed interest in purchasing Iskander missiles. The Russian government aims to maintain a higher level of military industry development than that of China for as long as possible.²⁴

The period from 2014 to 2021 witnessed a rise in bilateral military-technical cooperation, leading to an unparalleled level of technological interdependence between Russia and China. Russia transferred its latest and most sensitive military technologies to China, indicating the beginning of the establishment of a de facto Sino–Russian military alliance. Only military allies or geopolitical partners can share the latest technology to produce advanced weapons systems, including fifth-generation fighters, submarines, missile defense systems, and rocket engines. It is important to note that both countries have achieved the highest level of scientific and technological cooperation, resulting in the joint development of advanced strike weapon systems. The defense industries of both countries were integrated as a result of the development of bilateral trust between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.

Joint Military Exercises/Maneuvers and Geopolitical Collaboration (2014–2021)

The development of mutual trust and understanding between Russian and Chinese political elites was a lengthy process that began in the 1990s. However, this process intensified significantly when Vladimir Putin and Nikolai Patrushev, the head of the Russian National Security Council, came to power in 2000. Both Russian leaders viewed China as the main geopolitical partner and a potential future ally. Consequently, they began working on developing a mechanism for stable geopolitical cooperation between the leaders of Russia and China. An example of this process is the establishment of annual bilateral security consultations between the head of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Yang Jiechi in 2005–2022, Wang Yi since 2023) and Nikolai Patrushev, which began in 2005. It is important to note that the consultations mentioned represent China’s initial attempt to establish a consistent mechanism for discussing military and defense matters with a foreign power. The consultations have been held annually, focusing on a variety of topics: arms sales, joint military exercises, NATO Enlargement to the East, the Taiwan issue, military technology exchanges, the conflict in Donbas (2014–2022), nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the war in Syria, the development of multipolarity, and the Russian–Ukrainian war. This mechanism demonstrates the increasing development of a high level of mutual trust, which has resulted in the intensification of joint military exercises and maneuvers.²⁵

Since 2014, Russia and China have significantly increased their military cooperation, particularly in joint military exercises and maneuvers. They held joint exercises called “Maritime Cooperation” in 2014, 2015, and 2016, practicing joint actions in ship defense at anchorage, convoying ships, and releasing a captured vessel, as well as actions in detection, target identification, and air defense. The “Maritime Cooperation” exercises have increased the integration of the fleets of both countries, resulting in a faster exchange of technology.²⁶

In August 2014, Russia and China participated in a joint military exercise called “Peaceful Mission” organized by the SCO. Later, both armies jointly participated in other SCO-led exercises: “Cooperation-2016” in September 2016 and “Peaceful Cooperation-2017” in September 2017. The purpose of these exercises was to conduct peacekeeping operations, combat terrorism, and ensure the security of Central Asian countries. These trainings included various drills such as joint operations to establish control over territory, demining, evacuation of civilians, and humanitarian aid. Tactical exercises were conducted to enhance the interaction and coordination skills between the military units of the PLA and the armed forces of the CSTO member countries. The participants of the exercises carried out joint operations with the aim of enhancing border control effectiveness and establishing regular channels for exchanging strategic intelligence information. Additionally, the participants conducted joint training focused on tactics and strategy and learned how to use modern offensive weapons such as strategic bombers and missile systems.²⁷

Both countries have embarked on a strategic endeavor to formulate military cooperation plans, with the then-Russian Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu, purportedly taking the lead in this initiative. The first Sino–Russian four-year roadmap was established in 2017 for the 2017–2020 interval. The roadmap included plans for bilateral and multilateral military exercises, military technology exchanges, and schedules for common air and naval patrols of the bordering areas. Mr. Shoigu emphasized that the frequent interactions between Russian and Chinese officials underscore a constructive dialogue encompassing a wide array of regional concerns. These include the status of Taiwan, the North Korean nuclear program, the disputed areas in the South China Sea, and global security concerns such as the war in Syria, NATO Enlargement to the East, and anti-terrorist actions in Central Asia and Afghanistan coordinated by SCO defense institutions. The adoption of this document indicates the integration of the armed forces of both countries into a common defense space, reviving speculations about the formation of a military alliance between China and Russia.²⁸

In September 2018, Chinese soldiers participated in the Vostok-2018 strategic military exercises for the first time. The Vostok exercises are regular military drills held by the chief commanders of Russian military forces in the East Siberia and Far East regions, including the surrounding bodies of water such as the Sea of Okhotsk, Bering Sea, Sea of Japan, East China Sea, and the Pacific Ocean. These yearly exercises involve collaboration among all branches of the Russian military. For the first time in the history of Sino-Russian military relations, a complete motorized rifle brigade of the PLA participated in these maneuvers. This allowed Russian officers to gain insight into Chinese combined forces’ modern military tactics, demonstrating the increasing level of trust between the military leaderships of the PLA and the Russian army and the achievement of another level of bilateral military cooperation.²⁹ PLA officers were trained to use some of the latest Russian weaponry systems, including the S-400 air defense systems. Furthermore, military personnel from both nations have begun to develop expertise in strategic coordination between the infantry, artillery, strike aircraft, and naval forces of the two countries. This sends a clear message to the United States and its allies and partners in the Asia–Pacific region, particularly Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia.

In 2019, Chinese military leaders sent 1,600 military personnel and more than 300 pieces of equipment to the “Center-2019” strategic command and staff exercises, which took place in the Orenburg region. The military exercises were conducted as part of the strategic cooperation within the SCO. Later, the Chinese military participated in the “Caucasus-2020” strategic exercises. Both joint exercises demonstrated the readiness of Russian military commanders to share their tactical knowledge of planning rapid offensive attacks with the PLA. The Ministries of Defense of the Russian Federation and China noted that these events are aimed at strengthening comprehensive strategic interaction, and partnership, and deepening practical cooperation in the military sphere between Russia, China, Iran, and the Central Asian states. At the same time, Beijing and Moscow have repeatedly emphasized that the exchange of military experience between the SCO members and partners is not directed against third countries.³⁰

Both countries intensified military cooperation and integration with other SCO and BRICS partners to counterbalance growing U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific region, especially with Iran and South Africa. As a result of this, the first-ever trilateral naval exercises among the South African, Russian, and Chinese fleets, took place in the Indian Ocean in November 2019. Exercise Mosi aimed to improve interoperability and maritime security, demonstrating the three countries’ commitment to collaborate against maritime security concerns, including terrorism and piracy. China and Russia followed up in December 2019 by launching a trilateral maritime drill with Iran, also a crucial security partner. The navy drill known as the Marine Security Belt was held in the Gulf of Oman. Both military maneuvers emphasized surface gunnery exercises, helicopter cross-deck landings, boarding operations, and disaster control drills.³¹

It should be noted that Russian and Chinese defense ministries have agreed to extend the Notification agreement for ballistic missile launches for the next 10 years. The previous bilateral agreement was signed in October 2009 and was extended in December 2020. The extension of this treaty demonstrates that both armies do not consider each other a threat, highlighting the increasing level of mutual strategic trust and defense coordination. Both countries have agreed to notify each other about any ballistic missile tests, including nuclear weapons tests, and to coordinate such events.³²

The Russian armed forces were personally invited by Xi Jinping to participate in the “Northern/Interaction-2021” exercise. This exercise was held in August 2021 in the northwestern part of China. This event marked the first time that China invited representatives of foreign armies to participate in its annual strategic exercises on its territory. This shows that defense relations between China and Russia have reached a new level, indicating the start of a joint military strategy between the two countries.³³

The coordination of Sino–Russian military interaction at all levels has accelerated the formation of a military alliance between the two countries. In November 2021, a subsequent roadmap was formally agreed upon and approved through a video conference led by Russian and Chinese defense ministers. The video conference was attended by other Chinese and Russian top military officials. This roadmap demonstrates the highest level of strategic coordination that ever existed between the Russian Federation and China. According to the Chinese defense ministry, the 2021–2025 roadmap was intended to strengthen strategic alignment and facilitate collaborative military actions, including joint air-sea patrols and exercises. Both ministers have decided to expand a shared anti-missile defense system in the East Asia region to counter the increasing nuclear capabilities of the United States. Additionally, both sides decided to strengthen military cooperation with North Korea to counter intensified defense cooperation between Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the United States. As part of the agreement, the Chinese defense ministry has agreed to increase the range of Chinese equipment exported to the Russian Federation. This includes components for electronic intelligence equipment, space geolocation equipment, drones, special optics, and certain types of alloys that Russian companies require for building aircraft.³⁴

Sino–Russian geostrategic cooperation encompasses various spheres, including military education. Since the 1990s, the Russian government has welcomed Chinese students to study at Russian military colleges and universities. This includes not only technical specialists involved in servicing Russian weaponry systems but also command personnel. Chinese military specialists have studied and analyzed Russian military tactics and the strategic approach of different divisions of the Russian army. According to Sergey Shoigu, more than 3,600 Chinese military specialists studied at Russian military colleges and universities from the 1990s until 2017. These activities have intensified the integration of both armies into a common defense space.³⁵

The military integration of the PLA and the Russian army occurred in three main stages: (1) limited interaction; (2) the beginning of full-scale integration; and (3) the formation of a de facto military union. From 2014 to 2016, the two strongest armies of Eurasia engaged in joint exercises twice a year, involving infantry, artillery military units, and fleets of both armies. Cooperation between top military leaders of Russia and China enlarged and intensified throughout 2014–2017 and became regular in 2018–2021. The integration of defense efforts began in early 2017 and continued until the start of the Russian–Ukrainian conflict. The leadership of both armies collaborated to coordinate military plans, exercises, and maneuvers, with a focus on learning the tactics employed by both sides. Joint military exercises became much more frequent and larger, involving all branches of the armed forces and the most technically equipped units of both armies.

As a result of this, the military influence of China and the Russian Federation has been increasing, particularly in the Asia–Pacific region. Other members/associate members of the SCO and BRICS, such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, South Africa, and Iran, have welcomed this development, as demonstrated by their participation in trilateral and multilateral military exercises. China and Russia became better positioned to compete for influence in the Asia–Pacific region with the United States and its allies.

Sino–Russian Military Cooperation Since the Beginning of the Russian–Ukrainian War

Since February 2022, bilateral defense cooperation has reached a new level, although the Chinese leadership has refrained from transferring large quantities of weapons like fighter jets and ballistic missiles to Russia. The Chinese government has been maintaining and expanding economic and trade link with Russia by increasing imports of oil, gasoline, natural gas, agricultural products, furniture, diamonds, and other Russian goods to keep the Russian economy functioning. Additionally, Beijing has increased its exports of semiconductors, chips, microchips, and supercomputers to provide advanced technology to the Russian military industry. Russian military plants heavily rely on imported advanced electronic components from China and Hong Kong to manufacture ballistic missiles, missile defense systems, fighter planes, K-52 helicopters, attack drones, marine drones, tank control systems, electronic warfare systems, and more. Due to the sanctions and limitations imposed on the Russian government after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian producers were unable to acquire components for the listed types of weapons and military equipment from Western countries. China exports Western-made components for military use to Russia, in addition to Chinese-made electronics. The majority of Russia’s dual-use technology imports from China are Western-made components. Additionally, China serves as the main intermediary for Russian procurement of semiconductors produced abroad.³⁶

In 2022, the export of Chinese excavators to Russia increased by eleven times. Russia has used China-manufactured digging and dirt-moving equipment to enforce its military positions in the occupied area of Ukraine. These machines were primarily used to construct the Surovikin Line, a complex set of fortifications in the Zaporizhia and Donetsk provinces. The purpose of the fortifications is to protect Russian military units from counteroffensive operations by the Ukrainian army. Russia’s war industry will likely continue producing military vehicles due to a significant increase in vehicle imports, particularly super heavy trucks, to sustain combat strength for defense in depth. Furthermore, Russian military logistics can maintain the flow of supplies and equipment to the front with the help of these Chinese trucks.³⁷

The Russian defense industry was able to double its tank production in 2022–2023 compared to the pre-war period. This was due to increased imports of Chinese tank parts, especially ball bearings. For example, Russian imports of ball bearings from China increased by 3.5 times in 2022. However, Chinese exports of the same product to Kyrgyzstan increased by 30 times during the same period. The ball bearings imported into Kyrgyzstan are probably promptly re-exported to Russia, possibly to manipulate trade totals or to evade future penalties.³⁸

Taken together, these elements have enabled Russia to mount a powerful and robust defense against Ukraine’s counteroffensive. Without these resources, it is uncertain whether Russia could have sustained its defense in the occupied territory in 2023. However, according to the Director of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Science, Professor Sergei Lousianin, the Russian army currently requires the enlargement of existing Chinese assistance, including expanding the supply of components for radar and navigation equipment and certain elements used in the production of military drones. Additionally, the exchange of satellite communications data and other Sino–Russian space cooperation needs to be significantly intensified as well. As noted by Sergei Lousianin, increasing this type of assistance would quickly shift the strategic situation in the theater of the Russian–Ukrainian war in favor of the Russian Federation.³⁹

Both governments increased their scientific and technical cooperation, with a focus on transferring critical military technologies. For instance, the development of Chinese operational-tactical aviation in the current decade is closely related to their cooperation with the Russian defense ministry. The development of PLA’s operational-tactical aviation requires new turbojet engines with increased power and efficiency. However, the production of these engines is hindered by two factors. First, Chinese enterprises lack the rare earth metals necessary for the production of these engines. Second, there is a shortage of qualified materials scientists in China capable of developing the required alloys.⁴⁰

The development of fifth- and sixth-generation air fighters, as well as the modernization of existing fighters such as the Chengdu J-20 and Chengdu J-20A, is a key priority in the new warfare strategy of the PLA. Consequently, the developers of the newest Chinese strategic aviation have decided to purchase engines, specifically the Al-41F1C and A1-41F2 models, for their air fighters from Russia. These engines are currently used to manufacture the Sukhoi Su-57, the newest Russian fighter aircraft.⁴¹ Additionally, Russian military specialists are providing full-scale assistance in the modernization of anti-missile defense systems in Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, and other Chinese cities and regions. Without implementing these key points of the strategy, it will be impossible for Beijing to reintegrate Taiwan by using force and to handle long-term conflict with Washington.

However, the export of Russian weapons to China has significantly decreased during 2022–2023 due to the growing demand for military equipment from the Russian army. The Russian–Ukrainian war is lasting longer than expected by Vladimir Putin and top military commanders. As a result, the Russian government must decrease weapons exports, especially arms exports to China, to satisfy the urgent needs of its army.

PLA and the Russian army have increased their military exchanges, and joint exercises are now taking place more frequently. The top commanders of both armies have achieved a new level of strategic cooperation and coordination, which is typical of close military allies, demonstrating the complete trust of the two countries’ military leadership in each other. In 2022 bilateral defense cooperation reached its highest level, China and the Russian Federation held six joint military exercises — four bilateral military exercises and drills and two international exercises — in which both countries played a dominant role. It is important to note that this is the highest number of joint military exercises in the past two decades. It underscores a direct message to the United States and Japan about the growing geopolitical cooperation between two Eurasian giants, the main purpose of which is to balance NATO’s eastward expansion and the growing U.S. military alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. In January 2022, the Iranian navy conducted a joint naval exercise with both nations in the Indian Ocean, known as Security Belt-2022. Later, in September 2022, Chinese soldiers took part in the Vostok-2022 joint exercises. Vostok-2022 involved 50,000 soldiers and officers from Russia, 2,000 soldiers and officers from China, India, and ten other countries, mostly SCO members or partners: Armenia, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Syria, and Tajikistan. 5,000 weapons and units of military equipment, including T-90 and T-82 tanks, armored combat vehicles, self-propelled artillery guns, K-52 helicopters, 140 fighter aircraft, 60 warships, and boats, were used during the training. U.S. military observers and analysts Emily Ferris and Veerle Nouwens noted the highest level of joint coordination in planning, command, and control between the PLA and the Russian Army. It was the first time that the Chinese Infantry, Air Force, and Navy jointly participated in Russian military exercises on the territory of the Russian Far East and in the waters of the Sea of Japan.⁴²

In addition, the two countries conducted joint naval and air patrols in the Sea of Japan, the Western and Northern Pacific twice in the specified period: in September and in November 2022. According to a professor of Russia’s Far Eastern Federal University, Artyom Lukin, “Despite remaining largely a symbolic exercise, joint patrols do show an incremental increase in the level of interoperability between the two air forces.”⁴³ Later, in December 2022, the fleets of the two countries conducted joint naval exercises in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan. During the maneuvers, participants practiced a range of tasks including anti-submarine operations, naval combat, air and sea convoying of ships, protection, and defense of ship groups when moored at an unprotected roadstead.⁴⁴

The intensive military cooperation has not lost any of its momentum in 2023 either. In February 2023, a joint naval exercise between China, Russia, and South Africa, codenamed Mosi-2, was held in the Indian Ocean. This exercise involved eight ships and vessels: three Chinese, two Russian, and three South African. Then, in March, Russia, Iran, and China held naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman called Security Belt-2023. The Chinese military specialists wanted to learn from the Russian officers the tactics of countering land attacks on their navy, which the Russian navy had experienced many times during the Russian-Ukrainian war.⁴⁵

In June 2023, the Russian and Chinese Air Forces organized their sixth joint air patrol since 2019 over the waters of the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, and the western Pacific Ocean.⁴⁶ Then, in July 2023, anti-submarine and naval combat drills were conducted jointly in the Aquatory of the Sea of Japan. It was the first time that the Air Force and the Navy of the Russian Federation jointly took part in a bilateral exercise led by the PLA. During the “North/Interaction — 2023” exercise, sailors from the Russian and Chinese navies practiced destroying a model floating sea mine with a large-caliber machine gun aboard the Admiral Tributs anti-submarine ship. They also practiced repelling an attack from a high-speed, small target.⁴⁷

The Chinese armed forces have practically had no real combat experience in recent years. That is why the Chinese military and political-military command uses every opportunity to “compensate” for this by the participation of the national armed forces in bilateral Sino–Russian and multilateral military exercises and in operations to protect the waters of the world’s oceans. One of the PLA’s top priorities at the moment is understanding how, as demonstrated on the battlefield in Ukraine in 2022–2023, the Russian military outclassed the American military in spectrum warfare.⁴⁸ The intensified defense cooperation between the PLA and the Russian armed forces in 2022–2023 allowed some analysts to conclude the beginning of the formation of a de facto military alliance between the two nations. According to Professor Artyom Lukin, “Given the current trends, it can’t be ruled out that by the late 2020s or early 2030s the Pacific will see the emergence of a de facto, or perhaps even de jure, Sino–Russian military alliance.”⁴⁹

Chinese diplomacy also provided support to Russia in the international arena, as Beijing has refrained from openly condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the systematic violation of human rights in the occupied territories of Ukraine. The Chinese foreign minister has repeatedly stated the United States and Europe shared some of the blame for the current Ukraine crisis as a result of NATO’s continued expansion after the end of the Cold War. Some Chinese policy analysts position Russia as a victim of the expansionism of the United States and its allies in Eastern Europe. During the November 2023 Biden-Xi summit, the Chinese president emphasized the importance of peace talks and the development of an agreement regarding the cease-fire in the Russian–Ukrainian conflict. The necessity of the Russian army leaving East and South Ukraine, however, was not addressed by Xi Jinping, as the Chinese government maintained that Beijing is not a party to the conflict and should not dictate terms for any solution to the crisis.⁵⁰

In short, the period from 2022 to 2023 saw a significant consolidation of Sino–Russian relations, particularly in defense cooperation. Both nations’ strategic calculus led to a deepening of military collaboration, as evidenced by extensive joint exercises, technological exchanges, and mutual support in the face of outstanding geopolitical challenges. China’s decision to support Russia’s defense capabilities during the Russian–Ukrainian war through economic assistance, technological transfers, and diplomatic backing reflects a broader alignment of interests aimed at countering perceived Western encroachment and maintaining regional stability in the Asia–Pacific region. During the counteroffensive operation of the Ukrainian army that began in June 2023, Chinese technological support proved crucial for the Russian army. It allowed the Russian defense industry to continue massive military buildup to satisfy the needs of Russian military units in Ukraine, thus preventing a deficit of components used to manufacture modern warfare. It is important to note that a lack of these components could severely hinder or even render military operations in Ukraine impossible. Chief commanders of both armies reached unprecedented levels of trust and coordination, which led to the highest-ever interdependence and the development of a common defense policy toward the United States, Japan, and NATO countries.

Conclusion

Defense cooperation between the Russian Federation and China, which began in the 1990s, intensified significantly after 2014. The main reason for this was the intensification of the geopolitical conflict between Russia and NATO countries over Ukraine. In addition, the rapid development of personal relations between Xi Jinping, on the one hand, and Russian leaders Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev, and Nikolai Patrushev, on the other, also positively influenced Sino–Russian geopolitical cooperation.

The events of early 2013–2015, which included the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, the US, Japan, and the EU sanctions against Russian defense companies, and the bilateral agreement regarding the construction of the “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline, had a significant impact on the formation of the Sino–Russian military alliance. Amidst growing geopolitical tensions between Russia-NATO, China, and China–Japan, Russia and China have found common interests and strategic goals that have accelerated their security cooperation. The annexation of Crimea by Russia and the aggravation of separatist processes in Ukraine’s Donbas have caused negative reactions from the leadership of the United States, the European Union, and Japan. This has stimulated Moscow to search for alternative geostrategic partners. As a result, comprehensive military cooperation between Russia and China intensified in 2014–2016. This included the signing of additional agreements on military-technical cooperation, exchange of experience, and regular joint military exercises, which have become an integral part of their joint activities.

Much attention was paid to the development of bilateral action mechanisms to counterbalance the growing influence of the United States in the Asia–Pacific region. Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping worked on intensifying bilateral defense cooperation using the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Organization of Collective Security Treaty, and the BRICS platforms. Intensification of Russian arms sales and technology transfer from Russia to China marked the period from 2015 to 2019. The PLA received some of the latest Russian weapons systems, including S-400 missile systems, SU-35 aircraft fighters, various types of Mi helicopters, military submarines, etc. In addition, Russian specialists helped their Chinese colleagues develop new Chinese aircraft fighters, helicopters, military submarines, anti-missile defense systems, artillery systems, etc. The transfer of advanced technologies and weapons has improved the combat effectiveness of the Chinese armed forces, accelerating the integration of both armies into a common defense space.

The biggest stress test for Sino–Russian defense cooperation was the beginning of the Russian–Ukrainian war in February 2022. The U.S. political elite, including Joe Biden and Anthony Blinken, expected that the war and the active pressure of Western sanctions against Russia would make the Chinese leadership distance itself from Russia and reduce the level of Sino–Russian defense cooperation and the level of bilateral political coordination. However, the strategic military cooperation between China and Russia has withstood external pressure and has even grown stronger, leading to the acceleration of the formation of the bilateral military alliance. Since February 2022, Sino–Russian strategic military cooperation has changed its nature. Bilateral military maneuvers and exercises have become more frequent, resulting in the intensification of bilateral defense coordination and integration. The two militaries began to share sensitive military information more frequently, including technologies for the development of fifth-generation fighter aircraft, missile defense systems, military submarines, etc. The intelligence services of both countries worked together to counterbalance the efforts of the Ukrainian army and its NATO allies during the counteroffensive operation conducted by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 2023. In addition, various Chinese companies significantly increased trade with Russia, supplying the allies with semiconductors, processors, computer boards, and navigators needed for the production of ballistic missiles, drones, and smart bombs. Chinese companies increased sales of equipment necessary for the production of various types of dual-purpose electronics. This allowed Russian defense companies to accelerate the production of advanced weapon systems to meet the needs of the Russian army. Chinese economic assistance helped reduce the financial deficits of the Russian federal and regional budgets. This allowed the government led by Mikhail Mishustin to increase funding for Russian military units in Ukraine.

These actions led to unprecedented trust between the political elites of Russia and China. Leaders from both countries began coordinating their defense policies and regularly exchanging sensitive information about military planning and capabilities. Between 2014 and 2022, Russia and China officially organized 38 joint military exercises, compared to only ten in the previous decade. This demonstrates the evolution of Sino–Russian defense cooperation from a limited interaction focused on maintaining regional security to the formation of a de facto military alliance. The increase in military exchanges and joint maneuvers, as well as diplomatic cooperation on international platforms such as the UN, G-20, BRICS, and SCO, indicate the continued development of a de facto military alliance in 2022–2023. This has led to speculation about the possibility of a more formalized Sino–Russian defense partnership in the foreseeable future. The strategic imperative that drives the Sino–Russian defense partnership is underscored by the multi-faceted nature of their cooperation in the military, economic, and diplomatic spheres. Sino–Russian partnerships have become a significant force in international affairs, challenging the dominance of traditional Western powers such as the United States and other G-7 countries and reshaping the geopolitical landscape of Europe and the Asia–Pacific region. This is evident from the extensive military exercises and mutual diplomatic support during global crises. The trajectory of the Sino–Russian military alliance is expected to continue to shape regional dynamics and influence global power dynamics. Therefore, it is important to carefully consider the implications of these relations for international stability and security. Moscow is more eager than Beijing to play the leading role in coordinating and directing resistance to U.S. influence. Nevertheless, it lacks the economic might to make such collaboration a viable option for governments of Eastern European and Asia–Pacific countries. Although China has considerable resources at its disposal, its primary concern at this point seems to be to avoid a potential exacerbation of the already strained Sino–American relationship.

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