Narrow Results

This study examines how banks perceive companies’ environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance. Using a sample of Chinese listed corporations for the period 2009–2019, we find that banks value the ESG performance of emerging market companies. The higher a company’s ESG rating, the more likely it is to receive a loan. Moreover, it is easier to obtain long-term bank loans with a lower cost. Compared with state-owned enterprises (SOEs), ESG rating among private companies is more helpful for enterprises to obtain bank loans. Additionally, the positive effect of an ESG rating on obtaining bank loans is stronger in regions with greater banking competition landscape.

The guidelines of various Accounting Standards require every financial institution to measure lifetime expected credit losses (LECLs) on every instrument, and to determine at each reporting date if there has been a significant increase in credit risk since its inception. This paper models LECLs on bank loans given to a firm that has promised to repay debt at multiple points over the lifetime of the contract. The LECL can be written as a sum of ECLs (estimated at reporting date) incurred at debt repayment times. The ECL at any debt repayment time can be written as a product of the probability of default (PD), the expected value of loss given default and the exposure at default. We derive a stochastic dynamical equation for the value of the firm’s asset by incorporating the dynamics of the factors. Also, we show how the LECL and the term structure of the PD can be estimated by solving a Black–Scholes–Merton like partial differential equation. As an illustration, we present the numerical results for the various credit loss indicators of a fictitious firm when the dynamics of the short-term interest rate is characterized by a Cox–Ingersoll–Ross mean-reverting process.

The present study assesses the perceptions of female entrepreneurs in Tanzania regarding the access to bank loans and the difficulties experienced in the process of financing their businesses. Focusing on small-scale businesses, face-to-face interviews were conducted with 75 female entrepreneurs from the Dar es Salaam area. Resorting to double-hurdle estimation models, we conclude that: 1) women who perceive higher discrimination and/or inequality in accessing bank loans, but who also recognize that female entrepreneurs often lack relevant business skills, tend to apply more often for bank loans; 2) women running larger business, operating in the tailoring industry, face fewer difficulties; 3) although highly educated female entrepreneurs apply less for bank loans, formal education acts as a shield to the difficulties faced by women when applying to bank loans; 4) more autonomous and money seeking female entrepreneurs are less likely to report difficulties during the bank loan application process.

Entrepreneurship contributes significantly to economic growth and female entrepreneurs are strongly involved because their economic contribution is steadily increasing. However, research also reveals that female entrepreneurs face more financial barriers when compared to their male counterparts. Therefore, it is of prime importance to understand better female entrepreneurs’ behavior regarding financing. The purpose of this research was to explore gender differences related to financing with an intention to uncover why such differences exist. An empirical study involving a sample of 946 entrepreneurs from Canada and the United States was conducted to examine the issue. Results revealed that female entrepreneurs start their ventures with less capital than males, have a lesser tendency than males to obtain a bank loan and have a perception of being more in debt than their male counterparts are. Moreover, both variables depicting the smaller size of female-owned ventures and the intrinsic motivations expressed by female entrepreneurs acted as explanatory factors for the lower proportion of bank loans in the case of female-owned venture startups.

We provide evidence on the covenant structure of corporate loan agreements. Building on the work of Jensen and Meckling [1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Captial Structure, Journal of the Financial Economics 3, 305–360], Myers [1977, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, Journal of Financial Economics 5, 145–147] and Smith and Warner [1979, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, Journal of Financial Economics 7(2), 117–161]. We summarize and test the implications for what we refer to as the Agency Theory of Covenants (ATC), using a large sample of privately placed corporate debt. Our results are consistent with many of the implications of the ATC, including a negative relation between the promised yield on corporate debt and the presence of covenants. We also find that borrower and lender characteristics, as well as macroeconomic factors, determine covenant structure. Loans are more likely to include protective covenants when the borrower is small, has high growth opportunities or is highly levered. Loans made by investment banks and syndicated loans are also more likely to include protective covenants, as are loans made during recessionary periods or when credit spreads are large. Finally, we show that consistent with the ATC, firms that elect to issue private rather than public debt are smaller, have greater growth opportunities, less long-term debt, fewer tangible assets, more volatile cash flows and include more covenants in their debt agreements. An important byproduct of our analysis is to demonstrate empirically that covenant structure and the yield on corporate debt are determined simultaneously.