Narrow Results

The presence of both restricted and unrestricted, US-style, bookbuilt initial public offer (IPOs) in Hong Kong provides an ideal environment to test numerous underpricing models by simultaneously measuring the effects of allocation restrictions on the investment bankers' price discovery, underwriting, and distribution functions. While clawbacks, a set of allocation restrictions favoring retail investors not participating in the roadshow result in diminished and more expensive price discovery, they also reduce the investment bankers' dependence on institutional investors to dispose off IPO shares, resulting in lower underpricing. This favors models that highlight the importance of the underwriting function on underpricing, and shows that allocation restrictions can impact more than just price discovery. In addition, this study shows that individual investors can partially offset the loss of roadshow information caused by clawbacks, countering the idea that investment banks are unable to extract any pricing information from investors outside their list of roadshow regulars.

This study develops a structural model of the initial public offering (IPO) pricing process that enables the estimation of adjustment rates for public and private pricing information gathered during bookbuilding. The estimated upward adjustment rate of public information is only 21%, significantly less than the 28% rate of private information. Adjustment rates decline towards the IPO date, especially for upward adjustments. The findings contradict information acquisition theories that predict a complete adjustment to public information and highlight the inefficiency of the IPO bookbuilding mechanism in handling new information even when information is publicly available and especially when it is favorable.

In some countries, it is common that initial public offerings (IPOs) are preceded by forward ("when-issued") trading of the shares; in the US, such trading is prohibited. We analyze the effect of when-issued trading on the pricing and allocation of IPO shares. We demonstrate that the optimal selling mechanism in the presence of when-issued trading differs qualitatively from the optimal mechanism if such trading is prohibited. Furthermore we show that trading rules in the when-issued market can be designed so that allowing when-issued trading results in an increase in expected issue proceeds.

The initial public offering (IPO) filing volume is positively related to changes in market volatility, especially when market returns are at ‘normal’ levels. This is consistent with the view that filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) gives would-be issuers an ‘option’ on market valuations. Creating this option is attractive not only when market valuations rise but also when volatility increases, and the effect of volatility is more pronounced when market returns are neither high nor low. We therefore identify a distinct type of ‘window of opportunity’ for firms attempting to go public, characterized not particularly by strong stock valuations but by increased volatility in valuations.