Narrow Results

Here we show that for coupled-map systems, the length of the transient prior to synchronization is both dependent on the coupling strength and dynamics of connections: systems with fixed connections and with no self-coupling display quasi-instantaneous synchronization. Too strong tendency for synchronization would in terms of brain dynamics be expected to be a pathological case. We relate how the time to synchrony depends on coupling strength and connection dynamics to the latency between neuronal stimulation and conscious awareness. We suggest that this latency can be identified with the delay before a threshold level of synchrony is achieved between distinct regions within the brain, as suggested by recent empirical evidence, in which case the latency can easily be understood as the inevitable delay before such synchrony build-ups. This is demonstrated here through the study of simplistic coupled-map models.

In this paper we argue that phenomenology needs to be supported by explicit mechanisms if one is to have computational models of consciousness. Computational work in this area is reviewed and a set of axioms that help to decompose being conscious into manageable concepts is evoked. This leads to a kernel architecture and a digital implementation which is shown to work in examples of visual illusions that are revealing of how the brain supports phenomenology. This model is used to address the unstable phenomenology related to observation of the ambiguous Necker cube.