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The past few years have witnessed a growing appeal, both from home and from abroad, that China should reform its diplomatic system and proactively embrace the historic transformation of its relationship with the world. Especially since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2012, China's diplomatic system has undergone multiple changes within its basic framework. From the perspective of institutional dynamics, the system is shifting from emphasizing the role of serving the country's development to the role of serving the Chinese Dream, that is, the great renewal of the Chinese nation, putting more weight on top-level design, strategic coordination, and multi-dimensional diplomacy. These changes are determined by China's changing role in the world as well as the intrinsic demands of China's social development. In the future, it is expected that China's diplomatic system will maintain such a course of transformation, so as to reach a new balance between the existing international system and China's domestic governance system.

This article attempts to cast an analytic light on China’s “One Belt and One Road” (OBOR) initiative and investigates the prospects for a new China-led Eurasian integration discourse as an alternative to the U.S.-led Euro-Atlanticism. To this end, it compares China’s development-oriented strategy in Europe with the security-driven Atlanticist model and examines how the new governance framework relates to present-day international relations. It holds that the Eurasia-centered OBOR signifies a paradigm that is fundamentally different from the Atlanticist strategy that has come to define the European geopolitical landscape since the end of World War II. The OBOR aims to de-emphasize security arrangements and ensure sustainable development and prosperity by introducing an omnidirectional connectivity and cooperation agenda in the Eurasian strategic context. It is recognized, however, that although the new Eurasian discourse of inclusive development does not aim to directly challenge the United States’ highly-institutionalized security presence in Europe, mindful of its larger paradigmatic implications, the United States is likely to view the OBOR unfavorably and seek to reinforce material and ideational fundamentals of the Atlantic alliance.

There are two prevailing arguments among international observers about China’s role in the Middle East. One is that China has been a “security free-rider;” the other is that China is fundamentally a business-seeker. Yet neither of the two is well-grounded. If viewed comprehensively rather than in terms of military engagement alone, China’s contribution to stability and security of the region is enormous, and its role in the Middle East can be described as a combination of a major economic partner, a low-profile mediator and a modest but important provider of security public goods. As China has proposed various new concepts and initiatives as guidelines of its foreign policy, its future policy toward the Middle East can be best understood through its increasing efforts to promote the “Belt and Road” initiative, to develop a new-type major-power relationship, and to uphold justice and pursue shared interests with all related countries. With ever more Chinese engagement in the region, China’s Middle East policy is expected to be delivered in a more comprehensive way. However, China is not likely to seek dominant presence in the region in the foreseeable future.

In recent years, China has embraced the idea of soft power with ever more keen interest. Today, soft power is Beijing’s key strategy in international politics, albeit not in the way the concept is understood and applied in the West. However, this strategy can hardly be said to have yielded fruit in Africa despite China’s growing visibility and presence over the last two decades. This article aims at probing this issue by examining how China’s soft power is manifested in Tanzania. In an attempt to show that soft power is not entirely a new practice in international politics, the article first applies a historical perspective to illustrate that it has been part and parcel of Chinese diplomacy, long before the term was coined by Joseph Nye in 1990. The article then analyzes Chinese activities in Tanzania and how they have shaped perceptions of Tanzanians of China in the era of globalization. These activities are structured in line with three traditional sources of soft power as postulated by Nye, namely culture, political values and foreign policy. As a supplement to Nye’s definition, however, elements of hard power are also included in the article, such as the use of economic inducements to produce, bolster and wield soft power. In general, China has made headway in its soft power ambitions by gaining positive reviews in Tanzania. While the current achievement is crucial as an initial step, there is still a long way to go for China in consolidating its soft power. Although China has earned admiration in some quarters of Tanzanian society, it is still premature to assume that in the long run Beijing will continue to enjoy increasing soft power in the country. Indeed, in some cases, such admiration only exists in verbal recognition. In the meantime, activities that damage China’s image have further complicated matters and undermined China’s soft power in Tanzania.

China is in dire need of energy resources to sustain its economic growth. In recent years, China has been turning more to Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Middle East, as well as Sudan in North Africa, as trading partners to secure its energy supply. This article explores China’s energy strategy in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region through case studies of China’s energy diplomacy with Saudi Arabia and Iran. It argues that China’s energy strategy is very much driven by the “Beijing Consensus” that features respect for others’ sovereignty, emphasis on sustainability, equality, and quality-of-life, as well as incremental change to past institutions and practices. China has applied an equity ownership strategy to gain more control over oil flows as a shield against price fluctuations and to reduce the possibility of supply interruption; however, civil unrest and conflicts in the MENA region threaten to disrupt China’s energy supply channels, which implies that China should work harder for regional peace in order to achieve sustainable energy supply.

There has been an increasingly heated debate over the origins and prospects of China’s global activism since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) held in late 2012. Some in the West view China’s proactive diplomatic posture as evidence of a rising power’s geostrategic ambition to become the next world hegemon. This article traces the intellectual pedigree and policy relevance of the concept of a “community of shared future for mankind” highlighted in President Xi Jinping’s work report to the 19th CPC National Congress in October 2017. Based on a sober assessment of global trends, and drawing inspiration from traditional Chinese wisdom and the Western civilization, this concept represents China’s vision of a more just, secure, and prosperous world in which China sees itself as an earnest builder of world peace, an important contributor to global development, and a staunch defender of international order. Concurrently, it also marks a transition of Chinese strategic posture from a “hide-and-bide” one to a global activist one. Under this vision, China’s diplomacy has taken on a new look over the past few years. Looking into the future, China is expected to play a more active role in leading international efforts to enhance global governance and exploring new models of cooperation for world development, while attempting to shoulder greater responsibilities as a major emerging power.

Since the inception of the “going global” strategy two decades ago, China has attached increasing importance to agricultural diplomacy. International agricultural cooperation has become both an end and a means of China’s diplomacy, as well as an integral part of China’s “grand diplomacy.” China’s agricultural diplomacy has many features, including: the central government playing a leading role; ministerial agencies undertaking specific programs; local governments being responsible for implementation; and enterprises acting as active participants. All these contribute to China’s overall diplomacy and help maintain food security of the target countries and promote the overseas interests of Chinese enterprises. Through various practices, China’s agricultural diplomacy has been working well with the mutual reinforcement of bilateral and multilateral approaches; and interactions among diversified diplomatic entities are encouraged. China’s agricultural diplomacy has enriched the meaning of “major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” and constitutes an important means for China to participate in global governance and to align with the development plans of target countries. Since China’s agricultural diplomacy is still faced with multiple challenges, it is imperative for China to improve related mechanisms, explore new ways of agricultural cooperation in third countries, and formulate new patterns for agricultural diplomacy along the “Belt and Road.”

After years of war and chaos, the situation in Syria has stabilized with the active intervention of external forces, providing necessary conditions for national reconstruction. Security reconstruction, economic recovery, and political reconciliation will be the three key areas in post-civil war rebuilding. As an important node country along the Belt and Road Initiative, Syria’s urgent need for reconstruction makes it possible for China to play a larger role. Deeper Chinese involvement in postwar reconstruction will not only help restore political and economic order in a war-torn country and its neighborhood, but also improve Beijing’s image as a responsible stakeholder. At the same time, Beijing may find a bumpy road ahead as great power rivalry, Syria’s factional politics and weak economic foundation, and regional terrorism will pose significant challenges. While economic reconstruction should be the focus of Beijing’s efforts, China should also not lose sight of the role it can play in facilitating national political reconciliation in Syria.

The vision of mankind as a community with a shared future is the most important initiative Beijing has put forward in the past decade, a blueprint through which China intends to work with the rest of the international community to address the most pressing global challenges and advance the long-term interests of mankind. In launching this initiative Beijing also hopes to burnish its international image as a responsible great power contributing its wisdom and strength. This article lays out four major areas where Beijing has made consistent efforts in building such a community: peace and security, prosperity and growth, culture and civilization, and green development and environmental protection.

Outside powers have diverse visions of international peace in the Middle East. The first is the “peace through strength” hypothesis, arguing that a “security deficit” is the root cause of conflict. Proponents of the hypothesis argue for building networks of military bases and strategic alliances, conducting, if necessary, regime changes and military strikes in an anti-terror campaign, a mode of security governance. The second features “peace through democracy,” emphasizing that a “democracy deficit” results in conflict. Leaders of democracies are more prudent in power usage so that they refrain themselves from launching aggression, a model of democratic governance. The third is the “peace through development” approach, arguing that a “development deficit” is the root cause of conflict. China favors “peace through development,” advocating a development-focused peace initiative to address the peace-development-security nexus in the Middle East. China offers developmental aid and human resources training to the target countries in order to improve their capacity with key infrastructure and livelihood projects as the centerpiece. Beijing places a high premium on infrastructure inter-connectivity between the Middle Eastern countries and attempts to builds these countries into a community of interest for regional peace by way of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Beijing’s recent peace initiatives in the Middle East have drawn growing scrutiny and generated heated debate over its role in the Global South. Learning from the West’s hitherto mixed record in the regional peace process, China attempts to improve the effectiveness of regional peace diplomacy by focusing on three important ingredients, namely, neutrality, leverage, and timing. While Beijing’s neutrality stems from the long-held principle of inviolability of sovereignty and territorial integrity, its leverage draws from extensive and robust economic ties with regional stakeholders. Moreover, Beijing offers its good offices at a time when both the Iranians and Saudis have become conflict-weary, believing that continued tensions go against their own interests. Recent breakthroughs in peace diplomacy may raise local actors’ expectations to such levels that Beijing may find difficult to meet because China still defines its role as one of a facilitator, not a security guarantor.