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In this paper, we attempt to shed light on whether Japanese households are rational or if their behavior is influenced by culture and social norms by examining their saving and bequest behavior. To summarize our main findings, we find that Japan’s household saving rate showed great volatility, was often low and even negative and was high only during the 25-year period from around 1960 until the mid-1980s (if we exclude the war years) and that we can explain the high level of, and trends over time in, Japan’s household saving rate via various socioeconomic and policy variables. This seems to suggest that the Japanese are not a saving-loving people and that their saving behavior is not governed by culture and social norms. Moreover, the bequest behavior of the Japanese suggests that they are less altruistic toward their children and less reliant on their children than other peoples, suggesting that the alleged social norm of strong family ties in Japan is largely a myth, and that the Japanese do not appear to be appreciably more concerned about the continuation of the family line or the family business than other peoples, suggesting that the influence of the “ie” (family) system is apparently not so pervasive either. However, we argue that these findings do not necessarily mean that culture and social norms do not matter.

Attempts within the prior studies to determine whether the disparities in national saving rates can be explained by cultural attributes have been largely unsuccessful, essentially as a result of the formidable problems of measurement of culture, data availability and endogeneity. We first extend the prior research using the six measurable cultural dimensions of Hofstede et al. [(2010). Culture and Organizations: Software of the Mind, Intercultural Cooperation and Its Importance for Survival, 3rd Edition. New York: McGraw Hill], along with the largest panel database currently available, containing 84 countries over the period 1981–2012, on culture-related variables and saving rates, to test our hypothesis that cultural factors can influence private saving behavior in an international context. We then focus our study on three main cultural variables in East Asian countries — Confucianism, Long-term Orientation (LTO) and Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) — and find that they all have significant impacts on private saving rates around the world. Our findings also potentially solve the puzzle of why China, Japan and other East Asian countries save so much and so persistently since we find that the high LTO measures within these regions determine their high levels of private savings, whilst their low UA measures explain the persistence of their high saving rates, even during a period of financial crisis.

This paper addresses a lacuna in the literature concerning how a ruler’s ideas shape their attitudes toward the world and others through their personality. It examines the political ideas of Chinese President Xi Jinping as his references to the self-in-relation rather than his schema to assess and treat alters-in-relation. In addition to allowing political actors to assess the world and engage in policymaking, personality may inspire them to use ideas conversely to prepare themselves for the acceptance of their perceived constituencies. In terms of Xi Jinping’s evolving personality, an initial need to overcome his individual vulnerability by becoming one with the masses has grown into a quest for transcendence that is informed by the following elements: (1) Buddhism while practicing the Party self; (2) the notion of Confucian harmony for the self-cultivation of Party cadres while practicing the national self; and (3) a socialist sensitivity to the material needs of the disadvantaged while practicing the international self. This has been demonstrated through programs that include his anti-corruption campaigns, his Chinese dream of anti-poverty, and his notion of a shared future of humankind. This paper compares the Kyoto School’s use of Buddhism, Mao’s use of Confucianism, and Pol Pot’s use of Maoism. It also discusses how an autocracy can suffer from involution.

As Intellectual Property (IP) protection can nurture innovation, and since innovation is one of the critical sources of economic growth, it has become especially important since China surpassed a certain economic development stage, because China now has a growing number of its own innovations which need to be protected. This paper describes the construction of a new research model with which to explore and examine the impact of potential factors on attitudes towards Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) in China in the context of the creative design industry. The findings of a quantitative study of Chinese design business owners reveal the significant roles of Confucianism, perceived economic loss and perceived effectiveness of IPR law enforcement in shaping their attitudes towards IPR. Our findings support the idea that promoting Confucianism can help to develop an internalised respect for IPR, while sizable penalties for IPR infringement can enhance the effectiveness of IPR protection.

Chinese actions in the South China Sea are often viewed as proof of an assertive China, despite the Chinese claims that their Confucian values make China a peaceful power. This paper analyzes the South China Sea conflict through a prism of strategic culture theory and examines both the Chinese narrative on the conflict as well as the actual Chinese behavior in the area. Confucian norms and values provide a powerful rhetoric device utilized by the Chinese policymakers to legitimize the Chinese behavior to the domestic and to some extent also foreign audiences. However, the actual Chinese behavior rarely exhibits strong influences of Confucianism, suggesting that in actual behavior China acts in accord with realist predictions.

Journalism is a noble profession. The professionals working to bring news and event coverage to the general public in a truthful and transparent manner are doing society a great service. However, when such a great responsibility is abused, and erodes the integrity of the profession, justice is called for. This case details the behavior of Chen Yongzhou, a reporter for a newspaper called New Express, who was accused of and eventually pled guilty to publishing fabricated articles about a company named Zoomlion for bribes.

This paper examines whether financial consumers are able to challenge and reject offers and suggestions from financial advisors. Survey data of Korean financial consumers shows that only 11% of the participants answered that they are completely able to ask the questions they want to ask to financial advisors about financial products and services they are considering, and only 30% answered that they are able to reject offers and suggestions by financial advisors. Many subjects attributed fear of negative evaluation as the reason for not asking questions, i.e., to be seen polite and knowledgeable. Furthermore, controlling for education andage effects, female subjects tend to reject others’ offers and suggestions significantly less than male subjects in financial settings. This could result in suboptimal financialwelfare forwomen. This paper attempts to provide explanations by addressing the notions of fear of negative evaluation and social value constructs of politeness and obedience imposed in Confucian cultures particularly for women, as well as the social value constructs of the ‘good girl’ making it more difficult for women to hold their hands up and say no to others.

In the three decades since the end of the Maoist era, all forms of religion in China have been undergoing restoration, innovation and expansion. Belying Marxist and secularist predictions of religion's inevitable demise, most forms of religion, whether new or traditional, indigenous or foreign, official or illegal, ethnic or universal, communal or individual, and all combinations thereof, have enjoyed increasing popularity. This chapter begins with a discussion of what counts as “religion” in the Chinese context and how it can be measured, and present a brief outline of the historical factors underlying the current situation. It then provides an overview of the PRC's policy toward religion, which constitutes the framework within which (or, more often, outside of which) Chinese religious life is organized. It finally presents the basic evolution since 1979 of Chinese communal religion, the qigong movement, the Confucian revival, Buddhism and Daoism, Islam, and Christianity.