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Globalization enhances efficiency and economic growth and expands the domain of personal contact and communication. Nonetheless, globalization has also evoked discontent because of claimed social injustice. The relation between globalization and social justice therefore merits attention, in order to identify whether justifications for discontent are present and, if there are reasons for discontent, to establish whether globalization should be blamed.
In this paper, we attempt to shed light on whether Japanese households are rational or if their behavior is influenced by culture and social norms by examining their saving and bequest behavior. To summarize our main findings, we find that Japan’s household saving rate showed great volatility, was often low and even negative and was high only during the 25-year period from around 1960 until the mid-1980s (if we exclude the war years) and that we can explain the high level of, and trends over time in, Japan’s household saving rate via various socioeconomic and policy variables. This seems to suggest that the Japanese are not a saving-loving people and that their saving behavior is not governed by culture and social norms. Moreover, the bequest behavior of the Japanese suggests that they are less altruistic toward their children and less reliant on their children than other peoples, suggesting that the alleged social norm of strong family ties in Japan is largely a myth, and that the Japanese do not appear to be appreciably more concerned about the continuation of the family line or the family business than other peoples, suggesting that the influence of the “ie” (family) system is apparently not so pervasive either. However, we argue that these findings do not necessarily mean that culture and social norms do not matter.
It is a basic consensus that culture affects savings, but the empirical evidence is inadequate. This paper investigates the relationship between culture and savings by using the Hofstede cultural indices, and macro data across 48 countries over the period 1990–2013. The results show that country-fixed effects are highly significant, even if traditional variables are controlled for. We discover that culture can explain much of these individual effects and thus is very important in explaining differences in savings across countries. We use the method of Relative Importance Analysis (RIA) to measure the relative importance of the various cultural dimensions in affecting saving rates. We find that culture-related variables are among the most important saving determinants, along with other variables more commonly used in the economics literature, such as economic growth, social security, and demographics.
Large populations can gain from economies of scale but lose internal trust due to diluted information. This creates an optimal group size. However, trusting strangers who claim to be members invites outsiders to disguise as insiders and abuse extended trust. Thus, if cultural diversity can raise the imitation cost it can promote cooperation. Even so, however, scale economies are lost when the population subdivides and the cultural boundaries may have to be enforced to prevent assimilation. The model is consistent with norms against inter-cultural marriage and episodic boundary-reinforcing conflict where formal institutions for contract enforcement are weak.
Prior studies on the relationship between culture and discretionary disclosure fail to account for concurrent managerial incentives to reveal private information to the capital market. Our study extends the literature by investigating whether these managerial incentives offset the cultural influence on managers’ discretionary disclosure decisions. To this end, we exploit a setting in which managers have the discretion to influence both the quantity and quality of disclosure and can thereby either conceal or reveal private information. For a sample of European firms, we find that despite incentives to reveal private information, managers’ culturally determined preference for secrecy leads them to provide a low quantity as well as a lower quality of disclosure. Our results are robust to several sensitivity checks and demonstrate the relative importance of cultural influence on discretionary disclosure decisions.
This study tests the effect of unbalanced power distance (PD) (i.e., Hofstede’s cultural dimensions PD index) and individual stock price crash risk. We examine the stock price behavior of listed firms in 37 countries from 2004 to 2016 and use multivariate analyses to document that societal PD is important in explaining firms’ propensity to release accounting information. This propensity suggests a psychological tendency regarding timing management, particularly for bad news. As countries with large PD prefer to keep things under control, the result is fewer unexpected stock price crashes during the long windows between election events. However, because large-PD countries focus their markets on maintaining temporary peace before and during periods of political events (i.e., national elections), crash risk increases after the political event window. Consistent with these predictions, we find that in large-PD countries, companies generally have less incentive to hide negative information and thus generate stock price crashes. This situation is substantially changed during the postpolitical windows, when firms and ways of spreading information are more controlled by the government. Our findings suggest that formal mechanisms alone are insufficient to explain the behaviors of corporate disclosure that are entangled with informal instruments.
Synopsis
The research problem
This paper explores the association between postmaterialistic culture and corporate tax-avoidance behavior.
Motivation
Although corporate tax avoidance is prevalent, the degree of tax avoidance varies across countries. Previous studies have suggested that national culture is associated with the level of tax avoidance (e.g., corruption culture in [DeBacker, J., Heim, B. T., & Tran, A. (2015). Importing corruption culture from overseas: Evidence from corporate tax evasion in the United States. Journal of Financial Economics, 117(1), 122–138. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.11.009], and societal trust in [Kanagaretnam, K., Lee, J., Lim, C. Y., & Lobo, G. J. (2018). Societal trust and corporate tax avoidance. Review of Accounting Studies, 23(4), 1588–1628. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-018-9466-y], among others). Unlike prior studies focusing on longstanding cultural factors, this paper examined the association between corporate tax avoidance and an important current culture trend, i.e., postmaterialistic culture.
The test hypotheses
There is no association between postmaterialistic culture and corporate tax avoidance.
Target population
Various stakeholders that care about corporate tax avoidance including the government, policymakers, investors, auditors, and firm managers.
Adopted methodology
Linear Probability Model and Ordinary Least Squares regressions.
Analyses
We examined the association between postmaterialistic culture and corporate tax-avoidance behavior. We used a proprietary dataset of China tax audits spanning the 2011–2014 period and tested the moderating effect of tax enforcement. We also examined the external validity of our results using a cross-country sample from 21 countries over the 1993–2014 period.
Findings
Using a proprietary dataset of China tax audits, we found that firms owned by investors from countries with higher postmaterialism values were less likely to engage in tax-avoidance behavior in China. In addition, we found some evidence that the negative association between postmaterialism and tax avoidance is more pronounced when tax enforcement is stronger, indicating that national culture and formal institutions act as complements. To check the external validity of our main results, we further used a cross-country sample from 21 countries over 22 years. The evidence from the cross-country sample was consistent with the findings obtained from the China tax audits setting.
Synopsis
The research problem
In this study, we investigated the relationship between future-time reference (FTR) in languages and goodwill impairment.
Motivation
Previous studies on goodwill have focused mainly on firms’ economic and reporting incentives in single-country settings using economic theories. There have been recent calls for more research on goodwill accounting across countries (d’Arcy and Tarca, 2018), and greater use of behavioral theories in goodwill accounting studies (Amel-Zadeh et al., 2021). In response, we applied the linguistic relativity hypothesis to a new and highly significant area of future-oriented behavior (impairment decision) to explain cross-country variations in goodwill impairment reporting.
The test hypotheses
We hypothesized that firms in countries that use weak-FTR languages have higher levels of (and greater quality) goodwill impairment than those in countries that use strong-FTR languages.
Target population
We used a sample of 15,179 firm-year observations taken from firms reporting under IFRS across 21 countries for the fiscal years 2005–2018.
Adopted methodology
We used Tobit regressions, logit regressions, mixed-effects modeling, and propensity score-matching analyses for robustness.
Analyses
We tested the relationship between FTR in languages and (a) goodwill impairment decisions, (b) goodwill impairment amounts, and (c) abnormal goodwill impairments. We repeated our main analyses using several subsamples, different measures of FTR, and alternative regression specifications.
Findings
In line with the linguistic relativity hypothesis, our findings indicate that managers who speak weak-FTR languages are more willing to bear the costs of their impairment decisions in the present and are less motivated to shift current impairment into future accounting periods. In contrast, speakers of strong-FTR languages tend to delay the recognition of current impairments to future periods to reduce their anxiety about the negative effects of current impairment decisions. Findings from further analyses indicate that firms in weak-FTR countries report lower abnormal goodwill impairment, thereby bringing impairment levels closer to their normal optimal levels. Our inferences are robust to alternative samples, different measures of FTR, and alternative model specifications.
We propose that businesses, government, and not-for-profit entities could benefit from a better understanding of organizational behavior through the lens of a contemporary global culture model. Human resourcing and partnering decisions could be improved by using global culture to ensure a better organizational-fit as well as to reduce the risk of destructive relationship dependencies. For an extreme-limits example, a company could inadvertently hire a terrorist or a social loafer seeking to steal competitive intelligence. A big data approach supported by a socio-cultural framework could help in hypothesis testing which is essential for advancing the body of knowledge in organizational behavior. This paper will make a scholarly contribution by identifying literature relevant to collecting and analyzing organizational big data that could explain beneficial socio-cultural behavior. This paper will explore how sources of qualitative big data could be collected and then analyzed to measure organizational-fit factors relevant for decision-making.
This paper uses the Wenchi District as a case study to generate a nuanced understanding of the interactive process between decentralized government structures and traditional authority in the context of Ghana's highly touted democratic achievements within the African continent. Qualitative methods involving focus group discussions of 159 males and 98 females aged between 18 to 72 years in 8 communities were used to facilitate insightful discussions and reflections. The focus group discussions (FGDs) were complemented with key informant interviews (n = 8) and direct observations. Using grounded theory, the results reveal that the interaction between traditional authorities and government decentralized institutions within Ghana's emerging democracy are characterized by competition for power and legitimacy. This has led to mistrust and the inability to take advantage of the potentially synergistic effects between the two systems of local governance for accelerated development. Furthermore, the findings reveal that a predominant culture of fear of authority within different hierarchical levels, is stifling genuine participation, further reinforcing a lack of accountability by authorities from both sides. We conclude that if decentralization policies are to be effective in Ghana, it may be imperative for government to strive for more open governance processes that are capable of blending the traditional systems with the emerging democratic dispensation depending on the context.
Empirical research on the effects of culture on national entrepreneurship rates has been inconclusive, leading to contradicting theories to explain these mixed results. Results have also been sensitive to which covariates are in the empirical analysis. Given that culture might affect entrepreneurship directly and indirectly through institutions, we model the Direct and Total Effects of culture on entrepreneurship accounting for possible endogeneity effects. We use recent innovations in econometrics that are robust to model selection errors to estimate the direct and Total Effects of culture on entrepreneurship across countries. Using GLOBE’s nine dimensions of culture on an expanded sample size, we find that Future Orientation, Gender Egalitarianism, Assertiveness, and Institutional Collectivism have robust positive Total Effects on national entrepreneurship. In contrast, Uncertainty Avoidance has a robust negative Total Effect on entrepreneurship. We also find that the Total Effect is greater than the Direct Effect for Assertiveness, Institutional Collectivism, and Uncertainty Avoidance and smaller than the Total Effect for the remaining—Performance Orientation, Future Orientation, Humane Orientation, In-Group Collectivism, Gender Egalitarianism, Power Distance. This suggests strong institutions that serve as a catalyst that engenders entrepreneurship in high Assertiveness, high Institutional, and high Uncertainty Avoidance cultures. Conversely, in high-Performance Orientation, Future Orientation, Humane Orientation, In-Group Collectivism, Gender Egalitarianism, and Power Distance countries, strong institutions can sometimes impose significant compliance burdens that dampen the natural cultural proclivity that supports institutions and entrepreneurship.
The aim of this study is to assess the effect of culture on the performance of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs). Using financial ratios relating to both the financial and social objectives of microfinance as performance measures and six variables from Hofstede’s cultural dimensions as culture measures, we assess the role of culture in determining MFI performance. Our final dataset comprises 503 MFIs from 44 countries over the period 2012–2018, extracted from the Mix Market database. A random effects model is used in the empirical analysis, followed by instrumental variables to cater for endogeneity. Our findings indicate that microfinance achieves better financial performance and is more self-sufficient in high power distance and in individualistic cultures. Meanwhile, microfinance achieves better social performance in more masculine and more indulgent cultures. Our results are robust upon inclusion of further controls for institution-specific characteristics, and macroeconomic and formal institution environment variables. Our findings provide further evidence to support the existence of a trade-off in microfinance. We thus argue that the extent of public support for microfinance should not only be a function of the broad objectives of funding parties, but should additionally depend on the cultural environment in which an MFI operates.
Sociocultural development and international relation are virtually incessant interconnectivities at different levels of human society which lead to the creation of different civilizations and its interactions. Therefore, the so-called “PAH-BRI” is believed to be a possible new form of socioeconomic cooperation. If so, the current trade disputes and future Sino-American relationship could be reconstructed effectively within the “‘f-shaped’ PAH-BRI” formula. Furthermore, entering the “#3.0”, it is expected that any form of the “PAH-BRI”-like projects is not easy for any single power or its bloc to manipulate mainly for its own interests, ethno-centrism and egoism. Any promising arrangement between any two parties should always leave a room for the third party to come or to drop out.
This paper examines the extent to which cultural proximity influences, and is influenced by, bilateral trade flows. Variables measuring common language or religion, commonly considered to be measures of cultural proximity, have been found to be highly significant in explaining the volume of trade between countries, but these measures have the distinct disadvantage of being static; they do not change over time. In fact, however, culture does change, possibly in response to exposure to the foreign goods, methods, and ideas brought across borders by trade; the cultural "distance" between two countries can therefore be seen to fall or rise over time. In this paper, responses to World Values Survey questions regarding trust, respect, control, and obedience are used to create a measure of cultural distance. I use this cultural distance variable in gravity regressions and show that more culturally-distant countries trade less, but that more traditional measures of culture are more significant in explaining trade. I then explore the determinants of cultural distance, finding that exports reduce cultural distance.
This article investigates the role of political institutions and culture in creating an efficient financial infrastructure for a country. It further delves into this relationship and addresses the question: do both types of institutions mentioned above affect financial development of a country, jointly? Our findings support the established notion in the literature that institutions matter for financial development. We show both these types of institutions – political institutions and culture – jointly promote financial development. Further, our result stresses that these two types of institutions behave as complements – the presence of efficient political institutions augment the effectiveness of culture and, thus, financial development is enhanced. Our results are robust to various proxies of institutions and alternate estimation models.
This paper addresses the effect of international trade on cultural outcomes from both economic and anthropological perspectives. Definitions of culture are informed by anthropology and then incorporated into a standard economic trade models in two distinct ways. In the “cultural affinity from work” model, workers receive a non-pecuniary cultural benefit from work in a particular industry. In the “cultural externality” model, consumers of a product receive utility from other consumer’s consumption of a domestic good. We show that resistance to change due to cultural concerns can reduce the national benefits from trade liberalization. Complete movements to free trade will have a positive national welfare impact in the cultural affinity case, whereas it may lower national welfare in the cultural externality case. We also show that a loss of cultural benefits is more likely to occur when culture is an externality.
We argue that using the aggregate of the Euclidian distance of different dimensions of culture to measure the impact of culture on bilateral trade patterns as is conventional in the literature is flawed. Using recent innovations in gravity model estimations and adopting the GLOBE team dimensions of culture, we confirm that the aggregate measure of culture imposes arbitrary functional forms, wrongly assumes symmetry in the effect of culture on bilateral trade, generalizes the effect of culture on trade and lacks policy relevancy. Our novel approach also allows us to determine which aspects of culture promote trade and which aspects do not.
The chapter portrays the GCC region starting with its history. It overviews the evolution of the region and particularly the establishment of the GCC. Furthermore, it depicts the overall economic profile of the region and its socioeconomic development since its inception. It ends with the content description of the whole book.
This chapter aims to illustrate the different environmental factors and their impact on entrepreneurship in Qatar. Despite its economic prosperity and governmental efforts to foster entrepreneurship Qatar still has not achieved its full potential in this regard. The analysis of the situation of entrepreneurship in Qatar shows no insurmountable difficulties at the macro-level. The problems are rather due to culture generated personality traits that are common among Qatari people. In fact, the fear of failure and the aversion towards risk and stress are negatively impacting entrepreneurial intentions among the population. The example of Qatar shows that a favourable economic situation does not necessarily promote entrepreneurship. The Qatari government is making huge efforts to optimise the legal and economic situation in order to reduce business risk and facilitate start-ups. However, it still has to invest more in human development in order to make Qatari people aware of the opportunities that their country is offering for innovative business ideas.
This article jointly analyses a behavioural and a cultural concept to explain household debt portfolio choice. The behavioural approach explores the role of time preferences on household debt maturity in a theoretical model and a numerical analysis. We derive a positive relationship between the long-term discount factor δ and the optimal maturity of household loans. The cultural approach examines whether national culture is a reasonable predictor for household debt maturity. We show that culture is an important factor for households’ borrowing decisions and has even more predictive power than time preferences. Countries with higher scores on the Hofstede dimension of long-term orientation tend to have shorter household debt maturity. Time preferences incur a primarily mediating role, because the effect of national culture on the borrowing decision is reduced, as the long-term discount factor δ increases.