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Whether foreign aid promotes or hinders democratic institutions has been debated with opposing views. This paper investigates short- and long-run effects of foreign aid on democratization in post-conflict Cambodia using autoregressive distributed lag bounds testing and Gregory–Hansen structural break testing approach for cointegration over 1980–2015 period. The findings reveal that net bilateral foreign aid per capita, aggregated and classified into purpose-based ‘governance aid’, ‘economic aid’, ‘other aid’ and ‘donor-specific aid’ from the US, EU, France, Australia and Japan, promote long-run democratization. In the short run, only governance and economic aid appear to have a consistent positive effect on democratization.

This paper investigates the environmental consequences of political uncertainty due to terrorism using a panel dataset of 158 economies from 1995 to 2020. The empirical findings show that terrorist activities lead to lower levels of carbon dioxide emissions, with severe terrorist activities having quantitatively larger impacts. This paper further analyzes the heterogeneity of impact across economies from two distinct perspectives, involving disaggregation by the level of democracy and by the political stability of economies. Results suggest that economies with a low democracy level and fragile situation are characterized by a significant impact of terrorism on carbon emissions. However, the impact on democratic and politically stable economies is insignificant.

Sznajd-Weron and Sznajd introduced a model investigating the democratic development in a closed community. This model is based on the USDF-principle ("united we stand, divided we fall"). However, it faces the problem that the system tends either to a dictatorship (i.e., 100% pro or 100% contra) or to a stalemate state (i.e., exactly 50% pro, 50% contra). Based on their model, I will show that a democratic system keeps alive due to the existence of both opportunists and persons in opposition.

We have studied various spatial models of temporal evolution of opinions of a population of agents, located in a finite closed space, in which, at each time step, a given agent adopts, subject to a probability condition, a new opinion which depends upon the opinions of some of its neighbors. Moreover, at each time step each agent moves to a random neighboring location distributed according to a normal distribution with zero mean and a small standard deviation. The purpose of the paper is to find which types of interactions reduce the number of extremists.

In this paper, we investigate the idea whether democracy has a direct effect on economic growth. We use a system GMM framework that allows us to model the dynamic aspects of the growth process and control for the endogenous nature of many explanatory variables. In contrast to the growth effects of institutions, regime stability, openness, geography and macro-economic policy variables, we find that measures of democracy matter little, if at all, for the economic growth process.

In two-party democracies (e.g. US and UK) the two parties often alternate at the government almost periodically. Here, we present a very simple continuous-time model with three state variables (social welfare and size of the lobbies associated with the two parties) that explains this tendency to cyclic behavior. However, the analysis of the model shows that when the lobbies are unbalanced, much more complex behaviors, including chaos, can emerge. The bifurcation structure of the system is interesting: it contains a countable number of codimension-2 points (associated with pseudo-equilibria of a particular Filippov system) which are the roots of Arnold tongues delimited by two border collision bifurcations, and in each one of these tongues the sequence of the parties at the government is a particular periodic sequence.

After undergoing a series of mass demonstrations during the past three decades, including the 2016–2017 candlelight protests that led to the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye, many commentators in South Korea are confident that their country has become a land for what Karl Marx called “free men.” Korean citizens are portrayed as being ready to participate in voluntary political associations and collective actions and to pursue their interests in the public sphere. However, the data are showing the opposite to be true: citizen participation in public-sphere activities has substantially decreased since the mid-2000s, while the government has managed to improve or at least maintain its political responsiveness during the same period. Explaining the unnoticed background to this imbalance, this essay sheds light on the myth of the benefactor state in Korean democracy, arguing that this has emerged because neoliberalism has not only placed an increasing number of people in precarious positions but also neutralized them politically. The Korean government has capitalized on this situation to mythicize itself as a benefactor state that possesses an incomparable administrative capacity to take care of precarious people. By investigating the period of Park’s presidency (2013–2017) and the current rule of President Moon Jae-in (2017–), this essay shows how the myth of the benefactor state has emerged and created a unique cycle of Korean democracy.

Like much of the rest of the world, East Asia (Northeast and Southeast Asia) has recently experienced a democratic “fall” in which several electoral democracies have undergone autocratization. This synchronized with China’s rise through what can be called illiberal realignment as autocratizing regimes in the region have sought increasing material and ideological support from Beijing in the face of Western human rights criticism and occasional (although usually only the threat of ) sanctions. China has viewed this regress as a rejection of “Western-style democracy.” Yet a democratic “spring” which preceded the fall left a legacy of democratic normativity in the region as backsliding regimes continued to seek legitimacy through (however unfair and unfree) elections and (partial) liberalization. Residual democratic normativity combined with geopolitical insecurities have limited the region’s illiberal realignment toward China during this democratic fall.

Public support is a critical factor in the outcome of interstate conflicts, yet, how it operates, interacts with hard power, or influences the overall military outlook remains surprisingly undertheorized. Public support has been particularly salient for such states as Finland and Ukraine that have faced opponents of vastly greater military size, capability, and sophistication. This paper advances an original theory on the strategic utility of public support for conflict through an analysis of the case of Taiwan, a potential current flashpoint for a great power war. This paper assesses trends in Taiwanese public support for resisting a Chinese invasion over time, identifies a major upswing in the public’s willingness to fight, and argues that further coordination by state and societal actors could deter a Chinese attack or at least greatly increase the costs of an invasion and the likelihood of failure.

China is seen as undemocratic, illiberal, and autocratic by many who live outside it, and the terms “democracy” and “China” are often difficult to reconcile. Nonetheless, Beijing has been actively employing the concept of democracy both domestically and on the international stage in recent years. This paper aims to critically examine how Beijing conceptualizes and advocates for democracy at home and abroad. It also endeavors to explore the implications for the country’s domestic and global governance, particularly in relation to the US-centered liberal international order in the context of critical international relations studies. In so doing, this paper will focus methodologically on Beijing’s official documents and state media outlets, presenting an argument that is twofold. First, by promoting its unique form of democracy known as “whole-process people’s democracy,” Beijing domestically intertwines democracy with authoritarianism, hierarchy, and dictatorship. This whole-process people’s democracy appears to function at home as a tool of regime security that is characterized by a rule that is of and for the people but not by the people. Second, China on the international stage has adopted Western-style liberal values to advocate for enhanced democracy in international relations. Through its strategic adoption of these liberal values, Beijing accuses the United States of a hegemonic liberal hypocrisy in international relations while appearing to aspire to a world that is fragmented into essentially different entities.

We use techniques of group decision making and consensus under fuzzy preferences and fuzzy majority developed so as to compare five methods used for determining the degree of causality of eight variables for democratic consolidation. In particular for Q denoting the linguistic variable 'most', we determine the fuzzy Q-core, i.e. the fuzzy subset of the set of causal variables that are not defeated (are undominated or unpreferred) by the methods. We also calculate the Q-consensus winner, i.e. the fuzzy subset of causal variables yielding the extent to which one variable is preferred to another, where 'preferred' here means stronger cause for democratic consolidation. Finally, we use the techniques of fuzzy outranking relations in preference modeling to generate relational systems of fuzzy preferences by the five methods used to determine the degree of causality of the causal variables.

Mineral wealth tends to make countries less democratic and more likely to experience a civil war. Many countries also find it hard to use their natural resource revenues to make high-quality, growth-enhancing investments. I argue that these problems are caused, in part, by the unusual qualities of resource revenues — their great size, their non-tax source, their lack of stability, and their secrecy. While there is no universal formula for changing these four qualities, I present a menu of policies that could make natural resource revenues smaller, smoother and more transparent, and hence easier for governments to invest productively.

This paper explores the effect of multilateral trade liberalization (MTP) on democracy, using a set of 148 countries over the period 1996–2016. In particular, it investigates whether this effect depends on countries’ level of export product concentration. The analysis shows that MTP promotes democracy only when it reaches a certain threshold. Furthermore, MTP promotes democracy in countries that enjoy a high degree of export product diversification, including away from primary products, or in those with low dependence on natural resource rents. These findings have important policy implications.

In the closing decades of the twentieth century, there has been an almost complete intellectual triumph of the twin principles of marketization (understood here as referring to the liberalization of domestic markets and freer international mobility of goods, services, financial capital and perhaps more arguably, labour) and democratization. A paradigm shift of this extent and magnitude would not have occurred in the absence of some broad consensus among policymakers and (sections of) intellectuals around the globe on the desirability of such a change. There seems to be a two-fold causal nexus between marketization and democracy. The first is more direct, stemming from the fact of both systems sharing certain common values and attitudes. But there is also a second more indirect chain from marketization to democracy, which is predicated via three sub-chains (i) from marketization to growth, (ii) from growth to overall material development welfare and (iii) from material development to social welfare and democracy. We examine each of these sub-links in detail with a view to obtaining a greater understanding of the hypothesized role of free markets in promoting democracies. In the later part of the paper, we examine the socio-economic outcomes governing the quality of democracy in a specifically Indian context.

Economists, sociologists, and politicians thought that the era of "the dark ages" and political theology that declined in popularity in the West since the 16th century would not be repeated. They thought that the amount of corruption, and deterioration of economic and social conditions that occurred in that era, taught everyone not to link political questions with values ones. In the light of Arab spring revolution; as they try to shift from an authoritarian to democratic regimes, Egypt today has proven them completely wrong. The paper's target is to answer the following questions; will revolution carry a redistributive political action and fulfil people's objectives or will it end with depressing effects on growth which hinder the country's development process? Why are some countries able to formulate democratic regime, and achieve economic development and growth while others' attempts have been futile? What are vital political settings for these calls to attain a progressive development and growth path? The paper will explore the lessons that can be adopted from South Korea's move to democracy in the late 1970s and try to implement these lessons in the countries that search for democratic processes. Finally the paper concludes with analysis that having a democratic system does not always grantee a boost to economic growth, but good governance does.

This paper examines the case studies of three East Asian entities (Thailand, Myanmar and Hong Kong) battling both the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic as well as socio-political unrest simultaneously. While Thailand/Myanmar and Hong Kong are different in geographical/demographic sizes and the former two are sovereign states while the latter is a Special Administrative Region (SAR), they have similar challenges in experiencing cosmopolitan pro-democracy movements (made up of young activists) pitted against the governments determined to maintain control in what political scientists may characterize as illiberal political systems. While Thailand and Myanmar may be much larger in terms of geographical/demographic sizes, much of the recent political activism occurred in the capital city of Bangkok (a city of about 8 million people) and Yangon (also having about 7 million in population and being the former capital of Myanmar before the military elites had moved the capital to Naypyidaw in anticipation of political unrests). In the case of Myanmar, the demonstration and protests have effectively spread nationwide. Both cities are similar in size to Hong Kong that is with approximately 7 million inhabitants. Both Bangkok and Hong Kong are also cosmopolitan cities with high exposure to global commerce, ideas and tourism while Yangon is a fast-developing urban commercial capital city. In terms of ideologies and political systems, both Bangkok and Hong Kong have nominal liberal democratic systems that have limits imposed on political freedoms while Myanmar was liberalizing and democratizing before the military coup on February 1, 2020. These similarities make them suitable candidates for comparative studies, including analyzing their differences in managing the political challenges.

Recent decades have witnessed an unprecedented expansion of democracy. During the third wave of democratization, as described by Samuel Huntington, democracy spread well beyond its historical boundaries and it is now adopted in all major regions of the world. Yet, not all democracies are equally effectual in delivering good governance and progrowth policies. Why do democratic institutions induce good governance and prosperity only in some economies? This paper presents an overview of the dimensions along which successful and unsuccessful democracies differ. It argues that four socioeconomic variables are of critical importance to create and maintain a well-functioning democracy: (i) social capital, (ii) information, (iii) education, and (iv) equality. History also plays an important role as do the contingencies characterizing the collapse of authoritarian regimes and the emergence of democratic institutions.

The nexus between globalization and democracy has generated fervent discussions in the relevant literature. This paper addresses the globalization-democracy question using the KOF index that allows for the multidimensionality of this process and hence different channels through which globalization can affect democracy. Furthermore, any effect exerted by globalization on democracy may differ depending on a country’s attributes. To this effect, we allow for possible differences that depend upon the level of development, the sample of 110 countries used here was split into four different income groups: high, upper-middle, lower-middle and low income. On balance, the results yielded using the Polity 2 index of democracy point to a positive impact of globalization on democracy but this was not a universal finding across all income groups and differences were unearthed by the estimated panel models covering the period 1970–2011.

This study aims to contribute to drawing a more complete picture of the role of multilateral economic and political institutions. Particularly, we pursue answers to questions such as how much influence participation in multilateral trade arrangements and military alliance has on bilateral trade of the states involved. Our results show that political institutions, set apart from trade issues, do affect bilateral trade--even though these effects are demonstrably smaller than those that occur within economic institutions. Military disputes between two states are sure to decrease bilateral trade, while joint democracy and policy similarity between two states, although moderate, increase bilateral trade, but military alliance is indeterminate.

The remarkable levels of economic development associated with East Asia continue to attract attention. Significantly, the primary driver of East Asian economic development in the future looks likely to be China rather than Japan. Passing the baton of economic leadership in the region is significant not just for geopolitical reasons — China is, after all, notionally a ‘communist’ country and not aligned to the US — but also because the political systems that underpin economic development in China and Japan are so very different. China is an unambiguously undemocratic, authoritarian regime and its growing economic and political importance has potentially profound implications for East Asia and the wider international system. As a consequence, the possible relationship between economic and political development will come under renewed scrutiny as given the geopolitical and comparative significance of China’s rise in particular. At the very least, it is entirely possible that the authoritarian forms of politics that were associated with state-led industrialisation processes across much of the region in the post-war period may not disappear. On the contrary, the success of China’s economic development in particular may prove an attractive role model or source of legitimation for other regimes that may not be enthusiastic about initiating wholesale political reform or encouraging democratisation…