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The European Union (EU) has certainly reduced its influence in the global economic affairs. Despite the fact that it unites 28 nations, including the former great powers such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy, the political and economic power of the community has considerably decreased starting with the second half of 2000s. The present research is undertaken with the aim of increasing the readers’ awareness regarding the necessity of enforcing the EU economic security through consolidating the authority of the supranational bodies in relation with national representatives. The objectives to be reached in this regard include assessing how much the governance efficiency alternations among the EU member countries influence the efficiency of the single market in a globalised society. It was found that several processes determined the decline of Europe’s strength including raising globalisation and increasing competition, economic weaknesses of the EU which worsened during the crisis, stagnation of the integration process, feeble leadership and lack of resoluteness, especially in the most developed EU nations, declining adherence to “core” values, migration crisis, little political commitment to protecting EU’s citizens’ interests, and countries’ individualism in promoting key initiatives.
Complex national and economic security imperatives drive American China policy. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) heightens the tension between national and economic security requirements and between different levels of economic security. This renders the established American policy approach, which centers around pursuing national and economic security as separate policy tracks, difficult to sustain. The threat posed by the Initiative to the national security of the United States encourages a focus on it in these terms. Such a focus is all the more likely under President Donald Trump, who is not predisposed to consider the BRI an economic security threat.
The economic security of middle powers across the world is being challenged by great power rivalry and, more recently, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. One of the largest trade and investment countries globally, South Korea is amongst the middle powers most affected by these developments. In this context, South Korea needs to finetune its economic security strategy. One way of doing so is by diversifying its economic relations. In this respect, India, a fellow middle power and also one of the biggest economies in the world, is a key partner. Supply chains, trade, investment and human capital have all been benefiting from strengthening links between South Korea and India, and will be key moving forward as the former seeks to further boost its economic security. Indeed, South Korea and India have been strengthening their links in the intertwined areas of maritime security, cyber security, and economic security in recent years. This suggests that economic security is part of broader security cooperation between the two partners.
The US-China chip war is becoming more intense as both countries understand the significance of semiconductors for their economic security and national defense. As a result of nationalist and unilateral actions taken by the US and China under the chip war, other Asian economic powerhouses are reassessing their semiconductor strategies, leading to new opportunities for semiconductor partnerships in Asia among middle powers. South Korea, a leading semiconductor power in Asia, is facing critical challenges amid the chip war, that, in turn, resulted in reshaping its trade and overseas production strategies that are heavily reliant on China. To maintain its semiconductor dominance and ensure economic security, Korea is adopting new approaches such as export and production diversification. In the meantime, India, amid the ongoing US-China tech war, is also seeking to construct a resilient supply chain and decrease its reliance on China for imports. In the process, New Delhi is looking to develop its semiconductor industry and build chip ties with like-minded countries in production and workforce development. This opens up significant prospects for Korea-India semiconductor partnerships. This paper proposes three areas where Korea and India could collaborate: semiconductor trade partnerships, semiconductor production partnerships, and semiconductor workforce collaboration. By doing so, it highlights how the US-China chip war is creating new opportunities for other Asian economic powerhouses to collaborate in the semiconductor industry. This paper also provides insights for policymakers to set a new agenda for India-Korea partnerships as both countries celebrate the 50th anniversary of their diplomatic ties in 2023.
The world is witnessing a new technological order as major powers restructure their national strategies to dominate the supply chains of semiconductors, which have emerged as the most critical technology in the post-COVID era. In this context, the origins of the India-US semiconductor alliance represent a significant development. This paper explores the drivers and defining characteristics of this partnership. By combining geo-economic and geopolitical perspectives, the paper explains India's emerging semiconductor strategies and the rationale behind the India-US semiconductor collaboration. Geo-economic factors—such as India's recognition of economic security risks during the pandemic-induced chip shortages, the crucial role of semiconductors in India's future economic growth, and its ambitions to become a chip exporter—have driven the formation of India’s new semiconductor strategy and its quest to strengthen ties with the US. Geopolitical factors, including India's heightened threat perception regarding its dependence on chip imports from China and concerns about China's technological advancements, have further bolstered this technological partnership. The India-US semiconductor alliance in the post-COVID era is defined by three major characteristics: first, unprecedented high-level political commitment to building chip partnerships; second, significant enhancement of chip-related agreements and institutional collaborations between the two countries; and third, the promotion of US semiconductor companies' presence in India. The paper also examines the future prospects of this alliance, emphasizing the substantial convergence between India and the US in the semiconductor sector and identifying key challenges that will shape the future trajectory of this partnership.
The present research comes to comprehensively analyse the path towards a confident Europe both in the regional and global environment by considering the necessity of European foreign policy consolidation as an imminent premise to enhanced European economic security & competitiveness. Despite of multiple competing political and economic interests, socio-cultural and linguistic heterogeneity, and historical animosities, the only choice of the European Union's nations to maintain and improve their current regional and global politico-economic positions resides in their capacity to act jointly through a unique representation. Accordingly, the results of the present research explicitly underline the idea that: as long as the “influence” centre of the European Union will be dispersed among national governments, each of them promoting individual interests contrary to the groups’ ones, the community as an integrational block will face important difficulties in defending its regional and global positions. The qualitative analysis undertaken highlights the idea that the European Union in the present form and institutional arrangements is not able to provide feasible and efficient solutions to the current and future challenges. This fact can be explicitly noted in the area of foreign affairs where the dualism between national and supranational bodies makes the European Union to falter on key directions including the Middle East, Eastern Partnership, the Russian Federation, and Turkey as well as on the global arena.
Dower-giving symbolizes the love that a husband holds for a wife, and in Islamic teaching it is also a type of socio-economic guarantee for the wife. This chapter investigates the practice of dower-giving among Muslims in Malaysia. The interview method was used to collect data that could be used to identify dower practices among Muslims in Sabah, a state in Malaysia. It was found that, notwithstanding the fact that a dower, according to the religion of Islam, should be a form of economic security for women in their marriage contract, this is not the case in practice in Malaysia.
Although the political separation across the Taiwan Strait has now lasted for six decades, in recent years, Taiwan and China have engaged in intensive cultural, social, and economic exchanges, and these have led to the phenomenon of cross-strait migration, thus giving rise to considerable anxiety with regard to economic security. Maintaining economic security is the key principle in Taiwan’s economic exchanges with China. Since Taiwan and China are still engaged in a political struggle with each other, and one that could even lead to war, the issue of cross-strait migration is much more complex than the migration that occurs between many other countries. The economic concerns related to cross-strait migration are inevitably politicalized, and if Taiwan and China cannot fundamentally normalize their economic engagement with each other, then this will remain an important issue well into the future.