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  • articleNo Access

    Impact of Qualitative Characteristics on Market Equilibrium: Simulation with Agent-Based Modeling

    This paper involves developing financial utility function that considers compliance to a certain qualitative characteristic and studies the impact on market equilibrium prices, should this criterion be Sharia compliance, fair-trade, environmental, social and governance principles or other ethical aspect. The goal is to show that individual utility can depend on other parameters than wealth and risk aversion, that therefore influence equilibrium market prices. This has been done by examining a possible utility function that takes into account individual sensitivity to the criterion and the intrinsic quality of compliance of this parameter. In order to prove the effectiveness of the proposed utility function, a simulation is made using agent-based approach with NetLogo platform. Upon examination of the impact of these parameters, it becomes clear that compliance to a qualitative characteristic would impact individual utility, supply and demand and result in equilibrium prices. This research highlights the importance of ethical arguments on individual decision making and how markets behave to this.

  • articleNo Access

    OPTIMAL TIMING AND EQUILIBRIUM PRICE FOR SOE PROPERTY RIGHTS TRANSFER UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION

    This paper develops a model of pricing for state-owned enterprise (SOE) property rights transfer in a dynamic economic environment. We incorporate competition and imperfect information in the model, and determine the equilibrium selling price and optimal timing of takeovers by solving a real options exercise game between bidders and a target. The main conclusions are consistent with real-world experience. The model generates new results as the equilibrium transfer price and the optimal timing relate to industry, the target, the transfer costs, the expected synergies, the re-divestiture option, and the transfer markets' microstructure. The more the bidders' expected synergy effects, the faster the acquisitions. The expected synergy effects differ among various bidders, and auction is the only way to reflect the synergy effects correctly. An active market for corporate control will be helpful for the transfer of SOE property rights. The model's applications include pricing M&A, venture capital, and IPOs.