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Chapter 8: Existence of Unique Equilibrium in Cournot Mixed Oligopoly
Preview AbstractThe properties of Cournot mixed oligopoly consisting of one public firm and one or more than one private firms have mostly been analyzed for simple cases on the basis of numerical calculations of the equilibrium values for a linear market demand function and linear or quadratic cost functions. In this chapter, after proving the existence of a unique equilibrium in Cournot mixed oligopoly under general conditions on the market demand and each firm’s cost function, we derive conditions ensuring the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium for the mixed oligopoly where one public firm and at least one of the private firms are active in a general model of Cournot mixed oligopoly with one public firm and several private firms.