Narrow Results

In this paper we explore the BACI-CEPII database using Network Analysis. From the visualization of the World Trade Network, we define and describe its topology, both in its binary version and in its weighted version, by calculating and discussing a number of the commonly used network statistics. We finally discuss various specific topics that can be studied with Network Analysis and International Trade data, both at the aggregated and at the sectorial level. The analysis is carried out with multiple software (Stata, R and Pajek). The scripts to replicate part of the analysis are included in the appendix and can be used as a hands-on tutorial. Moreover, local and global centrality measures, based on the unweighted and the weighted version of the aggregated World Trade Network, have been calculated for each country (178 in total) and each year (from 1995 to 2010) and can be downloaded from the CEPII webpage.

In a political-economy setting where tariffs and duty drawbacks are endogenously chosen through industry lobbying, it is shown that full duty-drawbacks are granted to exporters who use imported intermediates in their production. This in turn decreases their incentives to counter-lobby against high tariffs on their inputs. In equilibrium, higher tariffs will be observed on these goods. The creation of a regional block will change the political equilibrium. Duty-drawbacks will be eliminated on intra-regional exports, which in tum will lead to lower tariffs for goods used as inputs by intra-regional exporters. Evidence from Mercosur suggests that the elimination of duty-drawbacks for intra-regional exports led to increased counter-lobbying by users of intermediate products. In its absence the common external tariff would have been on average 3.5 percentage points (25 percent) higher.

With preferential trade agreements on the rise worldwide rules of origin—which are necessary to prevent trade deflection—are attracting increasing attention. At the same time. preference erosion for Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) recipients is increasing resistance to further multilateral negotiations. Drawing on different approaches, this article shows that the current system of rules of origin that is used by the European Union and the United States in preferential trade agreements (including the GSP) and that is similar to systems used by other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries should be drastically simplified if developed economies really want to help developing economies integrate into the world trading system. In addition to diverting resources for administrative tasks, current rules of origin carry significant compliance costs. More fundamentally, it is becoming increasingly clear that they are often been designed to force developing economies to buy inefficient intermediate products from developed economies to "pay for" preferential access for the final product. The evidence also suggests that a significant share of the rents associated with market access (net of rules of origin compliance costs) is captured by developed economies. Finally, the restrictiveness of rules of origin is found to be beyond the levels that would be justified to prevent trade deflection, suggesting a capture by special interest groups. The article outlines some alternative paths to reforms.