Narrow Results

The public controversies over the implementation of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 157 (SFAS 157) and its impact on the recent financial crisis motivate us to examine the association between fair values and reporting lags. With a sample of U.S. banking institutions, we find that less verifiable fair value information is associated with longer earnings announcement lag and audit report lag. Longer earnings announcement lags resulting from less verifiable fair value information are due to the additional time of managerial estimations. Less verifiable fair values may also result in longer audit report lags due to the added training for auditors. Our study extends the current literature on fair values and reporting lags. Our findings contribute to the contemporary research on the timeliness of financial information disclosures which promotes the efficient functioning of the economy. Moreover, the findings of our study may be of interest to the global regulators, investors and other financial statement users.

Chilean publicly listed companies are required by law to pay out a minimum 30% of distributable earnings after taxes as dividends on common stock. The study extends Lintner’s [Lintner, J (1956). Distribution of incomes of corporations among dividend retained earnings and taxes. American Economic Review, 46, 97–113.] model of dividend smoothing and Banerjee [Banerjee, S, VA Gatchev and PA Spindt (2007). Stock market liquidity and firm dividend policy. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 42(2), 369–398.] logistic model of the likelihood of a firm paying a dividend to investigate the signaling, liquidity, corporate governance, and information risk-based theories of dividends. The results show that Chilean firms’ excess dividends are smoothed in relation to the prior period level of excess dividends, and lagged earnings do not drive excess dividends even though the mandatory minimum dividend is defined in terms of lagged earnings. This insight establishes that dividend decisions regarding the size of the excess dividend and the likelihood of paying an excess dividend are distinct from the mandatory dividend payment. Additionally, the size of excess dividends and their likelihood are higher at firms with higher growth opportunities, a result consistent with the use of excess dividends as a signaling device. Results also demonstrate that greater transparency is associated with a greater likelihood of paying an excess dividend, but transparency does not drive policy regarding the size of the excess dividend. Moreover, the corporate governance mechanism creditor monitoring influences the size of excess dividends but not the likelihood of paying excess dividends. These results have implications for securities regulators evaluating the pros and cons of a mandatory dividend policy to protect minority shareholders in emerging markets.

HEAT™ or Hedge Effectiveness Analysis Toolkit is JPMorgan's latest addition to a long list of innovative and cutting-edge risk management solutions. HEAT is destined to help corporations navigate the complexities of hedge effectiveness testing under IAS 39 and FAS 133. HEAT comprises a consistent framework incorporating alternative methodologies for understanding and implementing hedge effectiveness testing. It is unique because it enables corporations to assess the effectiveness of hedges in both economic and accounting terms and also enables corporations to estimate the potential impact on earnings if hedge accounting is not obtained. While HEAT provides corporations with a consistent framework incorporating many alternative methodologies for hedge effectiveness testing, auditors will ultimately determine the appropriateness of any given methodology from a regulatory and accounting perspective, and as such accounting advice should be sought before implementing a particular methodology. In practice, even relatively simple hedge effectiveness methodologies can give surprising and sometimes counterintuitive results. HEAT helps to address the pitfalls that need to be negotiated in developing a consistent and intuitive approach to evaluating hedge effectiveness.

We examine a potential informational cost of adopting the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that mandatory IFRS adoption leads to a significant decrease in accrual reliability. We also find that this negative relation between IFRS adoption and accrual reliability is more pronounced for firms (a) holding more financial instruments and (b) domiciled in jurisdictions with weak institutional features. The above findings are robust to alternative sampling and an extended sample period. Further analysis shows that reduced accrual reliability reflects a trade-off with increased value relevance and that outside investors fail to understand the IFRS-induced reductions in accrual reliability.

Financial markets have developed formulas and models to derive fair values for bonds, futures, swaps, options and other securities. This model derives a fair value of an exchange rate, which might be used as a benchmark for a long-term equilibrium level to stabilize currency markets. The model is based on the value-added tax adjusted purchasing power parity exchange rate. This rate is then modified by five components: the macro-economic component, the foreign currency reserve component, the debt component, the interest rate component, and the political stability/leadership component. With respect to the American dollar, the model shows that the Euro and the Japanese Yen are overvalued compared to its current exchange rate, while the Brazilian Real, the Russian Ruble, the Chinese Yuan and the Australian dollar are currently undervalued.

We examine the impact of Level 3 assets held by nonfinancial companies on credit risk. Specifically, we investigate how the pricing uncertainty of Level 3 assets is reflected in credit ratings, corporate bond yield spreads, and incidences of bond covenants. We find that higher holdings of Level 3 assets are associated with lower credit ratings, higher yield spreads, especially for Level 3 assets sample, and incidences of bondholder-friendly covenants in the bond issues. Our findings are robust to the treatment of sample selection bias and the influence of macroeconomic factors. In addition, our direct test on the relation between the holdings of Level 3 assets and a firm’s distance-to-default shows that higher holdings of Level 3 assets reduce a firm’s distance-to-default. Overall, our findings support the view that Level 3 assets are perceived as increasing credit risk in the bond market.