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We examine the evolutionary path of companies’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) since their debuts as public companies. We find that firms’ average CSR score is rising over the time they are listed in the public capital market. The phenomenon is likely driven by the number of years the firms have been in the public market. We further find supporting evidence that this pattern of rising CSR since the public listing is more pronounced when the firm is more profitable, holds more cash, has a higher payout ratio, or has more free cash flows. Overall, our findings support the hypothesis that improving CSR performance may not be the priority of most firms new to the public market, but the “public camera effect” is an effective mechanism to assure the growth of CSR assuming the firms remain in the public market.
Drawing from recent research on the international new ventures' (INVs) internal and external characteristics and conditions, this article explores the trajectory of growth for high-tech INVs from firms' life cycle perspective, and examines the divergent features of INVs, including internationalization, organizational learning, and alliance network, at various stages of development. Our findings are based on information from a database covering 226 INV firms funded in the US after 1980. We suggest that INVs' features are different at various stages of their life cycle, and develop dynamically under divergent conditions.
We explore the moderating effect of firm life cycle on the relation between staggered boards (classified boards) and innovation. To examine this relationship, a panel data fixed effects model is used to account for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. Results indicate the presence of a staggered board in the introduction stage of firm life cycle hinders innovation leading to a decreased number of patents. The outcomes of this research enable the decision-makers of companies and regulators to make more informed decisions regarding the varying corporate governance mechanisms that may be beneficial to their set of circumstances and inform investors of the nuanced consequences of staggered boards.