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Global public goods (GPGs) have been moving to the focus of discussion in international organisations due to globalisation, deepening economic integration, and technological advancements. We provide an overview of the research field of GPGs by conducting a bibliometric analysis for the period from 1993 to 2021. The increasing number of publications and citations of articles dealing with GPGs in the Web of Science is particularly noteworthy in the last decade. Publications on GPGs related to climate change experienced the largest relative growth. Analysis of the co-occurrence networks on authors’ keywords revealed that the focus of GPG research shifted between the 1993–2008 and 2009–2021 subperiods. In the latter period, our results show that sustainable development and the use of GPGs are interconnected and that the need for global governance related to GPGs is increasingly recognised in the literature. Several interrelated challenges of today’s world, related to environmental, technological, health, (cyber)security, economic, and geopolitical transformations have created the need for a new approach to GPGs.

Human society is facing great challenges to address global climate change. How to move the international climate process forward is still a serious problem for politicians. Geoengineering's, so called Plan B to cope with climate change has attracted attentions of the international community with a lot of debate on its impact, risks from an ethical view as well as global governance at the level. In this paper, we focus on some important issues of geoengineering including the definition, characteristics, ethics and global governance, etc. and then put forward some suggestions for China's considerations.

In 2012, the 18th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP18) of the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (hereinafter referred to as the Convention) in Doha concluded a package of results which included the second commitment period of the "Kyoto Protocol", ending the Bali Roadmap negotiating mandate (hereinafter referred to as the Bali mandate) after five years, and officially opening the intensive negotiations of Durban Platform. Compared to the "dual-track" negotiation under Bali mandate, Durban Platform mandate is on "one-track". But it does not mean that some parties' concerns and positions about "dual-track" have been adjusted. They are seeking a way to realize their needs in Durban Platform. Therefore, "one-track" negotiation on Durban Platform does not simplify problems, but presents problems intensively. At the beginning of Durban Platform mandate, whether to mandate the Durban Platform negotiations was controversial among developing countries, while after consultations, Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the emerging developing economies divided on main concerns, such as mitigation targets, legal forms, sources of finance mechanism, etc. In fact, AOSIS's position gradually converged with the European Union (EU). And EU and AOSIS became the most aggressive powers to promote the Durban Platform negotiations. The traditional North–South divergence is facing adjustment, and new powers are restructuring negotiations. The huge disparity of interest among parties hinders progress in the Durban Platform negotiations. Parties will continue to debate and seek consensus on the interpretation of the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities", emission reduction models and targets, sources of finance mechanism, the legal form of the future agreement, etc. With the social and economic development, China is receiving growing attention in the international climate governance processes. China's status as a developing country is being questioned by some developed and developing countries. Rapid increase of China's foreign investment and aid attracts worldwide attention, which stimulates the voices and expectations for China to shift its role as a developing country to shoulder more international obligations. However, China should be clearly aware of the fact that China's power of discourse is still very limited and far from being a leader in the world in various fields, including the international climate governance processes. China's participation in global climate governance, no matter its role being passively changed by others or a voluntary shift, still needs to keep a low profile, strengthen its economy, balance rights and obligations, and commit according to capabilities.

As the world moves from "governance by the West" to "co-governance by both the West and East," the inherent deficiency in current global governance architecture becomes obvious to all of us. The author, through his own experiences as both a practitioner and student of global governance, has highlighted where the deficiency is and how to remedy it. By explaining China's recent moves in proposing the Chinese dream and building "one belt and one road," the author suggests that China continue on this proactive approach in dealing with global governance and offers some ideas from Chinese cultural heritage on how to reform the global governance architecture, with an emphasis on the G20, as well as on what China and the United States can do together to achieve better global governance.

The China-U.S. relationship is the most important major power relationship in the 21st century. That this relationship can remain strategically stable and embrace further positive development is not only in the interests of themselves, but also of the whole international community. In other words, the relationship has gone far beyond the bilateral level to have increasingly significant implications for the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. Currently, China and the U.S. are actively engaging each other in framing a new regional order in the Asia-Pacific, dealing with a series of global governance as well as geostrategic issues. During this process, some new challenges in their bilateral relationship are outstanding, including their ever more intense competition for a new world order, difficulty for their deepening cooperation on the new strategic basis of global governance, and their deficient security cooperation in the global arena. Facing these new challenges, both countries need to strive to manage their relationship more prudently and flexibly in order to keep it on the right track.

Development of international cyberspace law has attracted world-wide attention in recent years and was placed on the agenda of the Tehran Session of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO) in 2014 under strong advocacy from China. In its Beijing Session on April 13 to 17, 2015, the AALCO held a special meeting on international cyberspace law and adopted a resolution for the establishment of an open-ended working group to further discuss relevant issues through meetings or workshops to be co-sponsored with the governments of member states and some international organizations. This article is based on the author’s presentation at that special meeting, as well as his views and ideas expressed on other occasions. It first elaborates on some key issues of international cyberspace law such as global cyber governance, state sovereignty, internet freedom, application of armed conflict laws and international cooperation on combating cybercrime, and then proposes a legal framework and potential roadmap for future international cyberspace legislation.

The 2016 G20 Summit in Hangzhou takes place within a tense global political context. The outcome of the UK Brexit referendum in June revealed the deep divide between the politics of competitive nationalism and the commitment to international cooperation. It also reflected the depth of public reaction to global economic integration and the absence of response to public anxieties about social well-being and environmental sustainability from the political middle in many countries. China’s hosting of the G20 Summit presents an opportunity to turn a corner in global summitry by strengthening global leadership at this critical juncture, while China’s ability to do so depends on the willingness of other G20 members to comprehensively address public anxieties. The UN 2030 Agenda and the Paris Climate Agreement, both reached in 2015, do provide political and policy answers to the public anxieties. The question is the effectiveness of the initiatives governments are taking to implement them, which could be framed together to achieve sustainability for all in the face of serious, demonstrable systemic risks. Many governments may resist this level of ambition and prefer to strike a lower profile as the world shifts its focus from goal setting in 2015 to goal implementation in 2016. Yet even with this less ambitious approach, there are ways that G20 countries can initiate processes that engage stakeholders in envisioning the future and developing alternative approaches and pathways to move their nations toward where they need to be by 2030 in terms of social, economic, and environmental sustainability. As people-centered and planet-centered agendas, the sustainable development goals (SDGs) set in the UN 2030 Agenda and the Paris Climate Agreement have the policy content necessary to provide hope and direction for anxious publics. Similarly, it is hopeful that G20 leaders can develop narratives and define commitments to address the economic insecurity of their people and in the meantime strengthen the G20’s role in global governance.

The United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Paris in late 2015 is regarded as a milestone in the progress of global climate governance. Adopting the approach of “Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) plus Periodic Review”, the Paris Climate Agreement reached at the conference has rejuvenated the multilateral negotiation process and established a hybrid governance structure as the basic framework of the post-2020 climate regime. The Agreement also sends a clear and strong signal regarding the sustainable transformation of the world economy. Through low-carbon economic transformation and international climate diplomacy, China played a leadership role in achieving the Paris Agreement, which ushered in a new era for the international community to combat climate change. The future of global climate governance will depend on the follow-up measures of all contracting parties, and China should continue to show climate leadership in the post-Paris era.

Since its establishment, the Group of Twenty (G20) has undergone three phases of institutional transition: from an informal forum among finance ministers and governors of central banks at the beginning, to a crisis-management mechanism mainly to cope with the global financial crisis, and increasingly to a long-term platform for global governance in recent years. With increasing representation and mandates, the G20 has been playing a key role in forging high-level consensuses and coordinating policies and actions among major economies so as to keep the world economy and development on track. Faced by the many challenges within itself and from the changing dynamics of the world economy and development, the G20 has to improve its cooperative spirit, representativeness and effectiveness before it can become a full-fledged institution for global governance.

China, Europe, and the United States constitute a very important trilateral relationship in China’s diplomacy. This trilateral relationship is incomparable to that of China, the United States, and the Soviet Union during the Cold War not only in that “polar” is no longer a valid concept to describe major-power relations today, but also in that China-U.S.-Europe relations are not deliberately constructed for the three parties to balance each other or oppose any party. To be more specific, China’s deliberations on Europe’s role in the world have gone beyond the logic of balance of power. Especially after the 2008 global financial crisis, China has taken ever more efforts to strengthen its ties with European nations, both to meet its growing economic demands, and because it seeks to learn from the post-modern social governance experience in Europe. In comparison, China’s relationship with the United States is far more complex as the two countries have been engaged in increasing divergence and competition not only on specific issues, but more importantly, in trends of the world order. As three giants that have the potential to lead the world to a better future, China, Europe, and the United States need to deepen their mutual understanding and foster greater consensus about the future world order through closer communication and exchange, as well as enhanced cooperation on global governance.

Due to institutional fragmentation and conflicts among various actors, a systematic reform to improve the effectiveness of the global energy governance system has become increasingly urgent. Currently, the Group of Twenty (G20), which consists of the world’s major economies and constitutes 60 percent of global energy trade, is in a good position to remold the global framework for energy governance. The past G20 summit meetings have witnessed more attention and efforts from member-state leaders to address problems associated with global energy. However, most of the discussion has been focused on technical issues rather than a comprehensive review of the whole governance system. In the future, the G20 should take proactive measures to enhance its leadership role and policy innovation in the reform of global energy governance, in order to spur green development of the world. As the largest developing nation, China should tap into the G20 platform to advance the transformation of its domestic and international energy systems.

As China emerges as a global power, it has showed great willingness to remake global development finance by setting up new multilateral financial institutions. The creation of those new institutions represents a marked departure from the existing multilateral development bank (MDB) system. For the first time, the new institutions do not depend on the financial largess of the West. To understand the circumstances that have led China to create these new institutions and the likely consequences, the article first examines the Bretton Woods institutional architecture that was created by the United States when it emerged as the principal global economic superpower in the aftermath of World War II. In the second part, it analyzes the competition between China and the United States in global financial governance given Beijing’s expanding interests and Washington’s declining influence. The article further explores in the third section new opportunities and challenges that the new financial institutions could bring to China, and finally proposes how China could better leverage those new institutions to play a transformative role in promoting its global leadership.

As protectionism and isolationism rise against globalization, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides strong momentum for advancing the transformation of global governance. First, the BRI strengthens the awareness of building a community of common destiny for mankind and promotes the evolution of epistemology in global governance. Second, it offers more sustainable global public goods, thus improving ethical standards for global governance. Third, the BRI combines the top-down and bottom-up approaches to encourage voluntary actions in global governance. Fourth, the BRI draws on China’s own experience in integrating reform, development and stability, which helps balance the economic, social, ecological, and security dimensions of global governance, so as to foster common development among countries and regions along the routes and ultimately create a new equilibrium between South-South and North-South cooperation. Promoted through consultation to meet the interests of all, the BRI will make both tangible and intangible contributions to the transition of global governance by delivering public goods and enhancing the notion of compatible justice in a deglobalized world.

The liberal international order has been under heavy strain in recent years. From Brexit to Trump’s presidency, its tenacity is being put to the test. The resultant commotion should be a window of opportunity for China to materially revise the existing order or establish an alternative order under its leadership. However, the puzzle that is unfolding but not yet significantly examined is that China is seemingly not taking advantage of the upheaval in the liberal international order to substantially revise the order or set up a new one. Premised on the metaphor of “following the flow,” this paper argues that there is understandable rationale as to why China is appearing to ignore the opportunity to establish a China-led global order. It then explores the approach in China’s posture as protector of globalization and the liberal international order.

With the world’s largest number of netizens, China has been engaged in the ever more intense global competition for cyber governance over the past decade. Based on some preliminary studies, this article discusses China’s position, approach and contribution to global cyber governance, as well as the understanding gap on major issues between China and developed countries in the cyber arena. In the past decade, China has made significant contributions to the reform of global cyber governance utilizing a “patch-work” approach, and it will try to play a more active role as a constructive participant in global cyber governance while enhancing its own cyber capacity. Unlike many developed countries that advocate “Internet freedom,” China will continue to uphold the principle of cyber sovereignty. Yet in the meantime, China will try to work with other countries to build a “Community of Shared Future in Cyberspace,” in order to promote freedom, democracy and transparency in cyberspace in an incremental, stable and reasonable way.

President Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change is both a major reversal of the Obama administration’s climate policy and a huge blow to global climate governance. The comprehensive regression of President Trump’s climate policy manifests mainly in three aspects: abolition of the clean energy plan, exit from the Paris Agreement, and a return to traditional energy policies, which reflect the cyclical and volatile nature of the U.S. climate policy. With its lasting negative impact, the China-U.S. cooperative leadership in global climate governance is stranded. In this light, China should strive for a bigger role in leading global efforts to address climate change and enhance cooperation through various mechanisms. Under the current U.S. policy environment, China can still strengthen cooperation with the United States in such fields as traditional energy, infrastructure investment, global energy market, and green finance.

Since the 2008 global financial crisis, the landscape of South-South cooperation has greatly changed mainly due to the ongoing power shift from the North to the South. Rising economies like China and India are taking the lead in driving forward the institutional development of South-South cooperation despite lingering challenges that call for collective actions and mutual support among developing countries. Based on the principle of achieving shared benefits through consultation and collaboration, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has presented a good opportunity for reinvigorating South-South cooperation and drawing concerted efforts from the international community to reduce the global deficits in peace, development and governance. In the long run, the BRI is expected to facilitate a new round of economic globalization and help shape a more balanced and efficient system of global economic governance, which will serve as the basis for jointly building a “community of shared future for mankind” proposed by the Chinese government.

Despite the traditional resistance to consider climate change as a national security issue, the security impact of climate change has been increasingly recognized by official discourses in China over the past few years. The Chinese perception on climate change has shifted from a development issue to a security topic; and two driving forces are behind the emergence of the climate security discourse: the shift of China’s economy towards a “New Normal” and the commitments China made in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Meanwhile, two modalities of discourse that characterize the Chinese context are also discerned. One that involves national security has a rather fixed procedure about how security can be spoken of and by whom; the other is more relevant for issues like climate change and air pollution. In both cases, even if the language of security is used with regard to climate issues, they are handled as normal politics and governmental actions are legitimized by the use of security language. Although China has taken on more climate responsibilities, it seems unprepared for global climate leadership because security considerations not only determine the country’s participation but also limit its international commitments in global climate governance.

The Trump administration has waged a technological war against China due to the differences between China and the United States in political values and geopolitical pursuits, as well as their rivalry on regional and global arenas. The United States regards itself as being on the moral high ground in the existing international order and intends to force China to abandon its policies in high-tech industries and technology transfer from foreign enterprises, in order to maintain its global supremacy. With a zero-sum mentality, the Trump administration is trying to use the leverage of advanced science and technology to maximize benefits for the United States in trade with China. Its tech war attempts against China mainly include trade sanctions, investment control, export control, and restrictions on the exchange of technological personnel. These moves will further harm China-U.S. security relations as well as their science and technology cooperation and undermine the regional situation and global science and technology governance. In order to promote sustainable global development and strategic stability, both sides need to undertake more effective efforts to manage their strategic competition, build a more balanced and mutually beneficial relationship in high-tech industries, and expand the space for cooperation in the field of global science and technology governance.

In December 2018, the 24th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was held in Katowice, Poland, and reached a package of agreements. It provided a new opportunity for the promotion of global climate negotiations and new momentum for the transformation of global climate governance as well. The Katowice conference continued the tradition of the previous conferences in enhancing policy coordination and contribution among various actors. The success of the conference depends on scientific reports of climate disasters, coordinated efforts by major countries, and the contribution of various non-state actors. However, as an ongoing process, global climate governance is still faced by many difficulties, such as weak synergy, staggering development of global environmental governance, daunting challenges to least developed countries (LDCs) in climate actions, and lack of fairness, which need to be tackled through joint endeavor by both developed and developing countries. As the second largest economy and biggest greenhouse gas emitter, China’s future engagement in global climate governance will be focused on promoting green competitiveness, enhancing its institutional power in the governance process, and strengthening pragmatic multi-stakeholder climate diplomacy, so as to promote common understanding among countries and help with their policy coordination for climate actions.