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As the strategic importance of cyber security increases, the question of how to foster a stable cyber order compatible with the current international order is one of the most urgent issues for the international community. International cyber governance and strategic cyber stability maintenance have thus become two emerging fields in international studies. Generally, there are three states of stability in cyberspace: stable, delicately stable, and unstable. To promote the study of cyber order and enhance rational decision-making, it is necessary to adopt a cyclic perspective and fully explore the transition of cyberspace among the three states. International cyber governance is mainly about managing the cycle of transition of cyberspace and designing robust institutions to prevent instability; in these institutions, international norms, rules, and law will be made as essential guidance for cyber behavior of individual countries. As existing human knowledge and theoretical frameworks are the basis of studies on cyber strategic stability, it is imperative that effective dialogue and joint research among all international stakeholders be conducted on issues of their common concern. This helps to shape the strategic thinking and policy deliberation of individual countries on cyberspace and foster an international order that is conducive to cyber strategic stability.

Climate change is a threat to all of humankind, yet there is still a leadership vacuum on climate governance. At the same time, the deepening climate crisis also presents a golden opportunity for Beijing to assume the role of a global leader. China has the capacity to do it in a way that the United States, Russia, India, and the European Union do not. Taking swift climate action is in Beijing’s interest. Greater contributions to climate governance will certainly help advance China’s long-term political interest in both raising its political status and demonstrating the claimed superiority of its system of government. Positive rhetoric and robust action by China are likely to have a disproportionate effect on the rest of the world. Policy adjustment and implementation by Beijing will bring benefits to the rest of the world. Climate policy options that Beijing may take in the future are not mutually exclusive. The policy shift on climate change could also be attached more firmly to the idea of sustainable development as a defining factor of China’s approach to tackling the climate change threat.

U.S.–China competition has been widely viewed as the most important feature of world politics that will shape the emerging international order. Whereas Washington increasingly sees Beijing as the sole great power with the intent and capabilities to dismantle the U.S.-led liberal order, Beijing views Washington’s military buildup and new partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region as the latest U.S. attempt to contain and encircle China. This paper adopts a power transition perspective to compare the advantages and disadvantages of both powers, using six parameters to measure their relative national strength. In doing so, the authors try to update and modernize A.F.K. Organski’s theory in the 21st century, applying it to the most consequential relationship of our time.

The early third millennium AD witnessed the outbreak of global crises and challenges that exposed the weaknesses of the possible unilateral order and the negative aspects of globalization. This led to a widespread debate among international relations thinkers about the transition period and the future of world order. The recent occurrence of two major global crises, namely, the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, has accelerated this transition period, prompting representatives of different schools of international relations to think through various scenarios for the future of world order. These scenarios can be classified into several categories, including the revival of the unipolar order with new characteristics, multipolar order, new bipolar order, non-polar world, and the emergence of multiple regional hegemonies. However, due to the differences and gaps in the consolidation of power centers, as well as the lack of agreement on international norms, it is unlikely that any of these scenarios will be realized in the short term. In the absence of a pervasive, tangible threat or a fundamental shift in political culture, the rules and structures of the old order will persist, albeit in a weakened state. This will prolong the transition period and heighten instability. Thus, it is crucial to manage this transition peacefully by fostering regional alliances, while honoring the cultural and civilizational differences of the key players. Ultimately, a new world order can only emerge through dialog among major powers and consensus on the rules that will shape the international system. Until that time, the global community must prioritize maintaining stability and navigating the transition to ensure a peaceful evolution toward the future order.

The rise of China has become a central debate in the academic field of international relations. In the Western world, the scholars within this debate can roughly be divided into the ‘pessimists’ and the ‘optimists’. The pessimists see in the rise of China an inevitable hegemonic war, or at least prolonged and intense zero-sum competition, with the US as it will seek to replace the latter and overturn the existing liberal international order. The optimists, on the other hand, see an opportunity for sustained Western dominance through selective accommodation of China in exchange for China’s acceptance of the existing norms and values of the liberal international order and continued US dominance. In this paper, we maintain that both perspectives in the debate are misleading. We argue that China seeks to push for a multipolarized world rather than replacing the US, and that Beijing prefers the relations between the great powers within a multipolar order to be based on the conception of a ‘community of common destiny for humankind’. We also argue that China is unlikely to accept the existing norms and values of the liberal international order as they reflect and reinforce Western dominance. Rather, China has become an ‘order-shaper’ seeking to reform the existing institutions to better reflect the interests of the ‘Rest’, and establish new networks and institutions that will complement and augment the existing arrangements of the liberal international order, instead of challenging it.

The rise of the “Middle Kingdom”, China, has been a source of intense academic debate amongst the Western scholars. On the one hand, the pessimists epitomized the “rise of China” as a threat to the US-led liberal international order. They provided a one-sided and biased analysis. On the other hand, the “rise of China” is portrayed as that of a peaceful rising power which is neither a threat nor a changer of the existing international order. Apart from these opposing perspectives, the US-led liberal international order has been facing an internal crisis within the liberal states. This shows that history has never been going as the liberal prophets predicated. The manifesto of “liberalism is the only governing ideology of post-Cold War period” is now falsified by the rise of populism and nationalism in the countries who drafted the manifesto of “end of history”. Alongside this, the inherently unjust system of the US-led liberal international order has also been facing increasing challenge from the emerging powers of the rest, notably China. This paper thus examines the implication of the rise of China to the US-led liberal international order by taking the “One Belt and One Road Initiative” (BRI) as a case. I argue that through the BRI, China envisioned a new equitable international order that can replace the prevailing exploitative order being established by the “Western powers” during colonialism. On the one hand, BRI foreshadows that China is a dissatisfied actor of the existing order and it is a revisionist power. On the other hand, BRI itself is a liberal project. Thus, BRI is not at odds with liberalism. It is functioning under the liberal order, but envisioned a new international order. Thus, it can be argued that BRI seems to be a liberal project challenging the US-led unipolar world order intended toward a more inclusive and transformative world order.

The issue of order is the core of international relations. Both the dimensions of history and reality should be explored in order that the relationship between Japan and the world should be acknowledged in a scientific way. This paper analyzes Japan’s cognition and practice from such three aspects as the evolution of Japan’s view of international orders from a historical perspective, the post-war international order and “the crisis of liberal international order” and Japan’s responses to the international order under the ongoing unprecedented changes in the world. Based on principles of pragmatism, Japan strove to maintain its independence while expressing its respect with the order within the framework of the Hua-Yi Order. In face of the impact of rising Western civilization, Japan attempted to extricate itself from and overthrew the Hua-Yi Order and achieve the objective of “leaving Asia and embracing Europe,” and then turned from a follower of the Western dominant order into a challenger. After being defeated in WWII, the US occupation and the democratic transformation, Japan chose to accept and integrate into the liberal international order dominated by the US and gradually formed a unique view of international order through constantly sizing up the international situation, maintaining dynamic adjustment and making efforts to seek advantages and avoid disadvantages. Faced with the changing international relations nowadays, Japan has been committed to enhancing the “comprehensive strategic activity” and repairing the liberal international order in crisis. The relationship between Japan and the international order not only reflects historical continuity but also presents newly emerging characteristics.

We live in an era of prolonged uncertainty in highly complex contexts with many unknowns on top of known calculable risks. This reflects Knightian uncertainty, where unique events leave us unsure about future outcomes. The uncertainty of the new century was compounded by events such as 9/11, financial crises and the COVID-19 pandemic. It has eroded our social capital through increased isolation and a general decline in trust. Conspiracies proliferate, enhanced by the mobilizing potential of social media, where populism has gained a stronger political foothold. A previously bipolar world is moving toward one of unbalanced multipolarity among rivaling powers. Policies are shifting from neoliberal views to recognize the need for more explicit government roles, implementing longer-term industrial policies, and reconsidering prior rationales behind international trade and the global economic order. This is partially induced by tepid growth rates, national security concerns tied to the rise of China, and the need for political intervention to reach net-zero goals. The state is returning to engineering optimal solutions, replacing the liberal international order with realism by recognizing the prerogatives of great and middle powers. This is accompanied by authoritarian nationalism across much of the West as well as East Asia and South America. We should not expect these developments to reduce the level of uncertainty in the future ahead of us.