Narrow Results

The trajectory of Singapore's population size and composition can be mapped out with its progression through the various phases of demographic transition from high birth and death rates in the post-war years to very low birth and death rates today, all within the context of rapid economic and social development that has taken place in the past 50 years. Population planning has been integral in Singapore's national development strategy, balancing the economy's needs for more and better qualified workers with social considerations such as the dependency burden and the integration of large numbers of foreigners in a global city-state. This paper considers Singapore's population and manpower planning policies, with an account of the country's passage through the various stages of its demographic transition, and how its working age population composition has evolved. Population and labor force policies are examined with specific consideration of the social, economic and political implications resulting from those policy choices. A final section considers the challenges for the future stemming from these demographic trends.

In India the formal, or organized, sector is not able to generate employment opportunities for the unskilled or semi-skilled workers on a large scale, forcing them to get residually absorbed in the unorganized sector. At the same time, the unorganized sector is believed to have work consignments from the organized sector and this ancillarization process is contributing to employment creation. In the backdrop of these views the present study, using the unit level data of the National Sample Survey (NSS, 2010-11), makes an attempt to estimate the employment elasticity and wage-productivity nexus in the unorganized sector. Although the employment function estimated in the paper suggests employment can be raised through wage reduction, it can affect the wellbeing of the workers because the wage rate in the unorganized sector is already very low. Further, subcontracting or ancillarization does not seem to be contributing to employment generation in unorganized manufacturing or trade related activities. However, in the services sector it shows a positive impact. The equation representing determinants of wages shows units with assets are better-off compared to those that do not have them. This has an important policy implication, suggesting that through asset creation, government may bring in improvements in livelihood of the unorganized sector enterprises.

Fossil fuel subsidies are widespread in developing countries, where reform efforts are often derailed by disputes over the likely distribution of gains and losses. The impacts of subsidy reform are transmitted to households through changes in energy prices and prices of other goods and services, as well as through factor earnings. Most empirical studies focus on consumer expenditures alone, and computable general equilibrium analyses typically report only total effects without decomposing them by source. Meanwhile, analytical models neglect important open-economy characteristics relevant to developing countries. In this paper, we develop an analytical model of a small open economy with a preexisting fossil fuel subsidy and identify direct and indirect impacts of subsidy reform on real household incomes. Our results, illustrated with data from Viet Nam, highlight two important drivers of distributional change: (i) the mix of tradable and nontradable goods, reflecting the structure of a trade-dependent economy; and (ii) household heterogeneity in sources of factor income.

A commentary on the Doha Development Round by a representative of the AFL-CIO.

Thea Lee is Policy Director at the AFL-CIO in Washington, D.C., where she oversees research and strategies on domestic and international economic policy. Previously, she worked as an international trade economist at the Economic Policy Institute in Washington, D.C. and as an editor at Dollars & Sense magazine in Boston. Lee is co-author of A Field Guide to the Global Economy, published by the New Press. Her research projects include reports on the North American Free Trade Agreement, the impact of international trade on U.S. wage inequality, and the domestic steel and textile industries. She has testified before several committees of the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate on various trade topics. She serves on several advisory committees, including the State Department Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy and the Export-Import Bank Advisory Committee. She is also on the Board of Directors of the Worker Rights Consortium and the National Bureau of Economic Research. She received a Bachelor’s degree from Smith College and a Master’s degree in economics from the University of Michigan.

This study examines labor and capital service inputs as well as multi-factor productivity growth in Japan and compares results to eight other industrial nations using OECD's productivity data from 1985 to 2007. The study reveals that since 1991 Japan's economic growth has been negatively measured by all three discriminant functions identified.

This article focuses on the potential trade spillovers of Chinese policies to maintain employment and discusses how nations might work collaboratively at the WTO to address this problem. Chinese leaders are determined to maintain employment and have long ignored Chinese employment laws (as well as international law) that could empower workers. Chinese leaders have not made sufficient effort to either educate workers and managers about their rights and responsibilities under the law (demand side of the law) or to educate policymakers throughout China as to their enforcement obligations under the law (supply side). The failure to enforce these laws has distorted trade.

Norms regarding the rule of law underpin the GATT/WTO but they are implicit. China became the first (but not only) nation to have explicit rule of law obligations. China was “required to enforce the rule of law throughout all of its territories.” I suggest a way in which WTO members can address this problem and at the same time provide incentives to China to improve its rule of law.

As a result of human economic activity, the planet Earth is facing a climate change emergency (IPCC, 2013). Scientific research suggests that bold and immediate solutions are required to avert the worst impacts of climate change (US Global Change Research Program, 2017). At the same time, societies are facing unprecedented levels of income and wealth inequality — often along the lines of race and gender — which threaten the very foundations of democratic governance (OECD, 2011)…

The present paper subjects unions to a libertarian analysis and finds this organizational structure highly problematic from the perspective of the criminal law. Libertarianism is defined as that philosophy which opposes the initiation, or the threat thereof, of violence against non-aggressive people. Unions are characterized as groups which although need not in principle act contrary to this stricture, as a matter of fact always and ever do so. Hence, organized labor, as presently constituted, cannot be reconciled with libertarian principles of non-aggression. However, it is clear that although they cannot be reconciled with libertarian principles, unions are not breaking any current laws, and therefore cannot be considered to be criminal or illegitimate from a legal perspective. They can only be looked upon as criminal or illegitimate from a libertarian point of view.

We analyze whether linking international cooperation in trade policy to environmental policy (or other issues with nonpecuniary externalities) promotes more cooperation in both policies, or whether cooperation in one is strengthened at the expense of the other. In the context of self-enforcing agreements, we show that if the policies are independent in the government’s objective function, then linkage promotes cooperation in one policy at the expense of the policy that is easier to enforce under no-linkage. However, if the linked policies are not independent and if these policies are strategic complements, then linkage can sustain more cooperation in both issues than no-linkage. The policies are strategic complements only if (i) the production externality has cross-border effects; (ii) the weight on the externality cost is high; (iii) import competing lobbies are not “powerful”.