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  • articleNo Access

    EFFECT OF CORONA DISCHARGES ON THE INCEPTION OF POSITIVE UPWARD LEADER-STREAMER SYSTEM

    The critical-charge criterion of the stem-leader transition and the shielding effects of space charges on the streamer inception are two most contested issues on the inception of positive upward leader–streamer system (LSS). In this paper, a series of simulation experiments on the LSS inception were designed and carried out. A new critical-charge criterion in the range of 0.2–0.3 μC was proposed, and the previous criterion of 1.0 μC was proved to be harsh. The shielding effect of positive space charges on the streamer inception was verified directly by the experiment results. A theoretical formula for calculating the LSS inception voltage by the first-corona inception voltage was obtained. An appropriate first-corona inception time for getting an earlier LSS inception was proved to be existent. At last, the effects of the so-called improved lightning rods, such as the early streamer emission rod (ESE) and the controllable lightning rod (CL), were discussed, and it seemed that they would not help to extend the protective zones of the lightning rods.

  • articleNo Access

    Equilibria in the Stackelberg Oligopoly Reflexive Games with Different Marginal Costs of Agents

    This paper considers the problem of searching for information equilibria in an oligopoly market in the case of Stackelberg leaders. A framework considers the reflexive behavior of three agents, and linear agent’s cost functions with different coefficients (i.e., marginal and fixed costs) are considered. The results of the study are as follows. First, models of the reflexive games for a triopoly that consider a diversity of agents’ reasonings about environmental strategies are developed. Second, formulas for calculating equilibria in the games with three agents for arbitrary reflexion rank are derived.