Narrow Results

We use a monthly dataset to analyze whether Islamic banks have greater market power compared with their conventional counterparts. Using a sample of Indonesian banks, we find that Islamic banks possess greater market power than conventional banks. This condition does not hold, however, when we compare state-owned Islamic and conventional banks. We also find some specific determinants of Islamic banks’ market power: the Ramadan holy month (positive impact), the proportion of profit-and-loss sharing in their financing (negative impact), and the presence of a Sharia board (positive impact). Interestingly, Ramadan benefits not only Islamic banks but also conventional banks. Our findings support prior literature emphasizing the role of religiosity in Islamic banks’ behavior.

This research attempts to explore the impact of banking competition on financial stability employing a more precise measure of market power. It was found that Islamic banks are less stable and are enjoying lower market power. The analysis shows that higher market competition makes the banking sector vulnerable to defaults, supporting the “competition-fragility view”. This research finds no difference in the relationship for Islamic banks indicates that Islamic banks might be involved in traditional banking activities as conventional banks. The results are consistent and robust to different estimation approaches and subsamples. This research carries regulatory and policy implications.

This study examines the causal link between bank efficiency and bank competition. The study estimates bank competition with the Lerner index and bank cost efficiency with data envelopment analysis using annual data over the period 2001–2010. Using system generalized method of moments (system GMM) estimator, the results suggest that bank cost efficiency positively Granger-causes market power and hence causality negatively runs from bank cost efficiency to bank competition indicating that bank cost efficiency precedes bank competition. However, the reverse causality running from bank competition to bank cost efficiency is not supported.