Narrow Results

This paper examines the association between institutional ownership and income smoothing through bank loan loss provisions for a sample of Japanese banks during the period 1991–1999. We find that as the percentage of institutional ownership of banks increases, income smoothing via loan loss provisions increases. Additional tests show that there is a significant positive relationship between the extent of income smoothing and the percentage ownership of banks by domestic financial institutions and affiliated (keiretsu) institutions. Consistent with the idea that foreign institutional holders do not play an important role in the corporate governance of Japanese banks, we do not find a significant association between foreign institutional ownership and the extent of income smoothing. Our results imply that institutional owners may play a different role in monitoring income smoothing during the recessionary period in Japan from the normal economic periods studied in most prior studies.

This study examines substitution or complementarity relationships between discretionary loan loss provisions (LLP) and dividend signals. The statistical tests and results presented in this study indicate that bank managers may signal simultaneously with an accounting policy (i.e., discretionary LLP) and a financial policy (i.e., dividend change). This finding primarily points out the possibility that a bank manager with an incentive to mitigate asymmetric information can select multiple signals to maximize signaling effects. Thus, LLP signaling is a complementary (rather than a substitute) signaling device of dividend signaling.