Narrow Results

This paper explores the strategic motivation for a platform to open its superior logistics service to a third-party seller with an endogenous service level. We consider a Stackelberg game between the platform and the seller who sells products to consumers who perceive the platform’s product as having a higher value than the seller’s product. We characterize the equilibrium results in two schemes regarding opening or not opening the service and present conditions for the platform to open the service and the seller to accept the service. In equilibrium, the platform’s logistics service remains at the same level before and after opening. Particularly, we demonstrate that the motivation for the platform to open the service is not simply collecting extra revenue from the service but can be understood from mitigating price competition and securing its demand and price. We find that the platform is always willing to open the logistics system because it provides the platform an additional tool to manipulate the seller’s pricing behavior and therefore improves its own profit. With a high commission rate, the platform is even willing to subsidize the seller for using the logistics service. A Pareto improvement can be realized for two firms when consumers are highly sensitive to the service level. Consumers are worse off after service opening in most cases. Our analysis offers insights into the incentives of one retailer providing high-quality service for its rival when retailers differentiate in price and service.

Some prominent e-commerce giants, such as Amazon and JD.com, have established their own logistics service and shared it with other merchants. In this paper, we study the channel (reselling channel or agency channel) and logistics service (platform’s logistics or third-party logistics) selection strategies in an e-commerce supply chain composed of a limited capital supplier and a platform within the consideration of the supply chain finance. We show that the supplier’s channel and logistics service selection strategies depend on the cost coefficient of the platform’s logistics service and the production cost. Interestingly, the supplier prefers the reselling channel rather than the agency channel with the platform’s logistics service. This explains why the merchants in JD.com rarely use JD.com logistics in the agency channel. From the perspective of the platform, the platform may prefer the supplier to use third-party logistics service to deliver goods in the agency channel particularly when the cost coefficient of the platform’s logistics service is relatively large. Furthermore, the platform will put in more effort level aimed at enhancing the logistics service in the reselling channel.

The purpose of this research is to determine the effect of logistics management and electronic data interchange (EDI) in enhancing competitive advantage. A total of 100 questionnaires were distributed to senior managers, middle-level managers and junior- level managers and 76 were filled and returned (76% response rate). The study adopted a quantitative method through simple and multiple linear regression analysis and qualitative descriptive method through analysis of variance (ANOVA). The results of this study found that logistics management dimensions such as transport management, physical distribution management, inventory management and warehousing management have a significant positive effect on competitive advantage. As for EDI, it is found that two out of the three dimensions such as better communication, and improved billing have a significant positive effect on competitive advantage. While quick access to information was found to have a significant negative effect on competitive advantage. The results further revealed that logistics management has a significant positive effect on competitive advantage.