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This paper explores the cointegration between agricultural commodity prices, crude oil prices and exchange rates. Vector autoregressions (VAR) or vector error correction models (VECMs) are applied to price data for French maize and milling wheat, U.S. corn prices and spot and future oil prices. The series are split between 2000-2007 and 2009–2019 omitting the “Great Recession” allowing for analysis of structural market changes. While oil prices influence futures pricing, the link is neither stable nor widespread. Modeling of time series in search of cointegration must consider structural market changes. Results from a “one-model-fits-all” approach are unlikely to be satisfactory.

In this paper, we formulated a dynamic game model of the firms’ process innovation with technological spillover under different market structures (market competition intensity) in a duopoly market, in which the firms are concerned about relative profits as well as their own profits and investigated the relationship between the degree of competitiveness faced by the firms and their R&D expenditure. Our results showed that, under certain conditions, the system always admits saddle point steady-state equilibrium under independent ventures and R&D cartel games, respectively, and although the process innovation investment under R&D cartel is higher than that under the independent ventures, whether the marginal production cost under R&D cartel is less (higher) than that under the independent ventures depends on the degree of technological R&D spillover and the market competition intensity. Furthermore, the marginal production cost under independent ventures is not monotonically decreasing with spillover for the given region of market competition intensity; while the marginal production cost under R&D cartel game always monotonically decreases with spillover for any market competition intensity.

An evolutionary model is built which uses structural and random factors to account for the emergence of market share instability and industry concentration. The structural factors are studied through the relationship between firm size and innovation (dynamic returns to scale) while the random factors are studied through the effect of shocks on this feedback relationship. We find that market share instability is the highest under the negative feedback regime, when the industry specific level of technological opportunity is intermediate, and when shocks are neither very large nor very small.

Merger and acquisition is known as a market expansions strategy. This paper examines several factors associated with M&A namely bank size, intermediary role, modes of financing, bank-specific variables, and macro-economic variables on the operational performance and stability along with the mediation role of market structure for Islamic banks. This paper employs empirical research methods, namely POLS, panel data techniques and SEM to analyse a set of unbalanced panel samples of 10 Islamic banks during 2004Q1 to 2020Q4 from six countries, namely Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Pakistan. Stata package 14.2 is used to estimate M&A results (5 years pre and 5 years post). The results indicate that M&A improve Post-M&A performance of Islamic banks while stability does not improve. Interestingly, there is no mediation effects of market structure on the relationship between M&A, operational performance, and stability. Policymakers should take into consideration those factors taking M&A decisions considering the role of market structure.

The article explores the effects of financial depth and market structure on banking stability for 24 advanced economies and 18 emerging economies over the period of 2003–2010. We examine how commonality in banking stability varies from emerging markets to advanced nations. Our findings suggest possible explanations for what affects the banking stability with economic transitions on the dynamics evolving from emerging to advanced economies.

The credit default swap (CDS) market has experienced tremendous changes over the last two decades. This chapter reviews recent studies on the CDS contract and the CDS market, highlighting recent developments in CDS contracts and market structures. Characteristics of CDS contracts make them outstanding from other derivatives products, and the rapid development of CDS markets shows the popular use and importance of CDS contracts in general. Policies and regulations on CDSs have brought huge changes to the market and the availability of publicly reported data. The relationship between firms and CDS has long been a focus among academics. Moreover, CDSs are also commonly used among mutual funds, hedge funds, and banks, affecting the trading activities of various financial intermediaries. While the sovereign CDS and index CDS are shown to be more and more significant in financial markets, other CDS products, including CDS options and tranches, also experience changes. We summarize the evolution in CDS markets and the structure of CDS studies, aiming to gain a better understanding of CDS markets and provide insights for future studies on the CDS market.

This paper compares intraday volatility on two different market structures: specialist and multiple dealer. Return volatility based on 15-minute returns is compared for stocks trading on the NYSE and NASDAQ. It is hypothesized in the paper that the price continuity obligation of specialists will lead to lower volatility for stocks traded in that market structure. The results support the hypothesis. Regressions are performed to control for firm-specific variables. The results of the regressions do not alter the conclusions of the paper that a specialist-based market is associated with a lower level of volatility than a multiple dealer market.

In a North–South vertically differentiated duopoly we analyze (i) the effects of parallel import (PI) policies on price competition and (ii) the interdependence of national PI policies. Prices can be higher in the North if both countries permit PIs relative to when only the South does. If governments maximize national welfare and demand asymmetry across countries is sufficiently large, the North forbids PIs to ensure its firm sells in the South and international price discrimination — the South’s most preferred market outcome — obtains. When demand structures are relatively similar across countries, the North permits PIs and uniform pricing — its most preferred outcome — results.