A smart grid consists of two networks: the power network and the communication network, which are interconnected by edges spanning across the networks. We model smart grids as complex interdependent networks, and study targeted and adaptive attacks on smart grids for the first time. Due to an attack on one network, nodes in the other network might get isolated, which in turn will disconnect nodes in the first network. Such cascading failures can result in disintegration of either or both of the networks. Earlier works considered only random failures. In real life, an attacker is more likely to compromise nodes selectively.
We study cascading failures in smart grids, where an attacker selectively compromises the nodes with probabilities proportional to their degrees, betweenness, or clustering coefficient. We mathematically and experimentally analyze the sizes of the giant components of the networks under different types of targeted attacks, and compare the results with the corresponding sizes under random attacks. We show that networks disintegrate faster for targeted attacks compared to random attacks. We next study adaptive attacks, where an attacker compromises nodes in rounds. Here, some nodes are compromised in each round based on their degree, betweenness or clustering coefficients, instead of compromising all nodes together. We show experimentally that an adversary has an advantage in this adaptive approach, compared to compromising the same number of nodes all at once.