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In a rational-choice approach to religious conversion, the conversion rate depends on a person’s costs of switching religions and the costs of having one’s religion deviate from the type viewed as ideal. The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) waves for 1991, 1998, 2008, and 2018 allow for calculations of country-wide conversion rates based on religious adherence at the time of each survey and a retrospective question that gauges adherence when the respondent was raised. The analysis applies to eight types of religion in 58 countries (129 total observations). The rate of conversion depends positively on measures of religious pluralism, negatively on official restrictions that inhibit conversion, negatively on a history of Communism, negatively on real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and positively on years of schooling. These empirical findings accord with predictions from the theoretical framework.

A reverse auction can be likened to a tendering process where a contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. This is in contrast to a conventional forward auction where the highest bidder wins. In this paper we analyze a minority game version of the reverse auction where an extra condition is imposed that, namely, the bid must be unique. In other words, the bidder with the lowest positive unique integer (LUPI) wins. We examine and compare two extrema, namely, the case when all players are rational and the case when all players make random selections.

In Zeng et al. [Fluct. Noise Lett. 7 (2007) L439–L447] the analysis of the lowest unique positive integer game is simplified by some reasonable assumptions that make the problem tractable for arbitrary numbers of players. However, here we show that the solution obtained for rational players is not a Nash equilibrium and that a rational utility maximizer with full computational capability would arrive at a solution with a superior expected payoff. An exact solution is presented for the three- and four-player cases and an approximate solution for an arbitrary number of players.

This work is an example for the use of computer simulation for testing theory completeness. The multi-agent model Dreamscape is a transformation of the Rational Choice Theory into a computer program. In this work the general applicability of the Rational Choice Theory is tested. The research question is: Does social order emerge out of the "state of nature"? In particular: Do social norms evolve? In a computer-based analysis for non-violent agents it is shown, that conjunct, proscriptive norms are able to emerge – apart from their legitimacy. On the contrary, in a violent population social order does not emerge.

In this paper, we present a new agent-based model for the simulation of tax compliance and tax evasion behavior (SIMULFIS). The main novelties of the model are the introduction of a "behavioral filter approach" to model tax decisions, the combination of a set of different mechanisms to produce tax compliance (namely rational choice, normative commitments and social influence), and the use of the concept of "fraud opportunity use rate" (FOUR) as the main behavioral outcome. After describing the model in detail, we display the main behavioral and economic results of 1,920 simulations calibrated for the Spanish case and designed to test for the internal validity of SIMULFIS. The behavioral outcomes show that scenarios with strict rational agents strongly overestimate tax evasion, while the introduction of social influence and normative commitments allows to generate more plausible compliance levels under certain deterrence conditions. Interestingly, the relative effect of social influence is shown to be ambivalent: it optimizes compliance under low and middle deterrence conditions, but not when deterrence is made harder. Finally, SIMULFIS economic outcomes are broadly in line with theoretical expectations, thus supporting the reliability of the model.

Among war scholars, power shifts between states have been a persuasive explanation of the occurrence of war, with Power Transition Theory (PTT), in particular, demonstrating powerful and systemic research. Their deduction of the conditions of war matches the empirical phenomena. However, extant studies fail to explain why in some cases power shifts and dissatisfaction lead to war while in some cases they do not. This paper argues that the story of power shifts and war is not completely told. There are other options that states can choose from in a period of power parity. For instance, the rational choice approach can discover and compare the utilities of the options. To be specific, scholars who are concerned for power shifts have taken states as individual actors in the international system for granted, but the goal, preference orders, and utilities of actors should be illuminated. Hence, this paper adopts an interaction framework of actors to demonstrate how states may act and react in a period of power shifts. Two cases, namely, Britain and Germany before WWII and the U.S. and Japan in 1980s, demonstrate how well the interaction framework fits the reality. Overall, the framework discloses the interaction of the players and strengthens the explanation of PTT. More importantly, the story behind power shifts and war is fully told.

Why do so many voters finance candidates, even out-of-district ones? We exploit two datasets from a candidate in the 2014 Taiwan City Mayor Election derived from 14,838 detail donation records and the candidate’s 296 Facebook posts during the campaign. We replicate previous findings at the district level, indicating that donations are influenced by both physical proximity and ideology. The post-level analysis shows that the neighboring effect does not build as a spillover of public policy or administrative reforms. Instead, residents donate more merely because they are closer to a campaign. Meanwhile, a candidate’s ideological posts can successfully increase donations within a few hours from a district where there are more friendly voters.

We consider two-stage strategic choice problems in which a decision maker first chooses a strategy and subsequently an alternative from a nonempty subset of feasible alternatives that may depend on the strategy chosen in the first period. The preferences over alternatives that the decision maker starts out with may change after a strategy is chosen and the new preferences may depend on the chosen strategy. We consider sophisticated trajectories and provide conditions under which such trajectories exist. Then we consider problems with a finite number of strategies and alternatives. We define the sophisticated choice function and provide characterizations for its rationalizability.