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Outstanding territorial and boundary disputes both on land and at sea between China and many of its neighbors remain a most sensitive, complicated, and enduring matter in their bilateral relations. In 2013, China proposed the Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to promote connectivity and cooperation between China and the rest of the world through the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and the oceangoing Maritime Silk Road. Under this Initiative, frontiers, land boundaries, borderlands, maritime boundaries, and the ocean enjoy unique positions. Obviously, impacts of these outstanding territorial and boundary disputes on the Initiative should not be underestimated. Meanwhile, the Initiative can facilitate cooperation between China and other disputant states on conflict management and dispute resolution. But such an effect should not be overestimated. Indeed, it can have a side effect, inducing some disputant states to take more provocative actions.

This article provides a summary of China’s new strategic foreign initiatives under Xi Jinping’s leadership. These initiatives include the “One Belt, One Road” proposal, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and calls for a “New Asian Security Concept” as well as for “a new type of major power relations.” In a localized Southeast Asian context, they are operationalized, as projects under the so-called 21st Century Maritime Silk Road proposal, a “$2+7$ cooperation framework for China-Southeast Asia relations,” and the so-called “dual track” approach to the management of the South China Sea disputes. These initiatives are expected to provide a favorable external environment for the attainment of the “Chinese dream” and to pave the way for China to emerge into a position of global power and leadership. The article mainly focuses on what these initiatives may be signaling to China’s neighbors, and the subsequent implications for Southeast Asia and its relations with China. There are, for instance, some doubts as to whether China can be a reliable provider of security and stability as public goods in its own region if China itself is a key party in the territorial contentions and power rivalries that could be likely causes of conflict. The fact that China is still trying to defend primordial territorial and cultural-ideational interests, settle historical scores, and find an effective model for its domestic politics and governance that will serve its increasingly globalized economy, indicates that China may not be ready yet to make the sacrifices and compromises that will be required of regional — let alone global — leadership.

There are two prevailing arguments among international observers about China’s role in the Middle East. One is that China has been a “security free-rider;” the other is that China is fundamentally a business-seeker. Yet neither of the two is well-grounded. If viewed comprehensively rather than in terms of military engagement alone, China’s contribution to stability and security of the region is enormous, and its role in the Middle East can be described as a combination of a major economic partner, a low-profile mediator and a modest but important provider of security public goods. As China has proposed various new concepts and initiatives as guidelines of its foreign policy, its future policy toward the Middle East can be best understood through its increasing efforts to promote the “Belt and Road” initiative, to develop a new-type major-power relationship, and to uphold justice and pursue shared interests with all related countries. With ever more Chinese engagement in the region, China’s Middle East policy is expected to be delivered in a more comprehensive way. However, China is not likely to seek dominant presence in the region in the foreseeable future.

Since the Biden administration took office, its approach and strategy for domestic and foreign affairs have become the focus of global attention. The new administration’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula is one of the most heatedly debated subjects among policymakers and pundits. The past four years have seen major changes in regional security architecture, the most noticeable of which are dynamics on the Korean Peninsula and intensified China-U.S. strategic rivalry. In this context, a comprehensive overhaul of Mr. Trump’s approach to global affairs is expected under a Democratic administration staffed with foreign policy veterans, and the Korean Peninsula policy will be among the most consequential decisions for Biden’s White House. President Biden’s policy toward Pyongyang will be substantially different from Trump’s approach. A bottom-up, incremental model is likely to replace Trump’s personalized diplomacy marked by flashy summit meetings and “love letters.” Existing sanctions will be maintained until the Biden administration sees substantive results regarding the North’s nuclear and missile arsenal. While keeping up the pressure to coerce Pyongyang back to the negotiating table, President Biden is expected to respond more proactively to Kim Jong-un’s overtures or “provocations” and place a high premium on policy reciprocity. The Biden team will elevate the role of Seoul and Tokyo in its strategic planning and increase trilateral coordination and consultation. Stiff competition is more likely to hinder China-U.S. coordination on the Peninsula. The tone, substance, and results of diplomatic engagement between Beijing and Washington over the nuclear issue in the early days of the new administration will give a foretaste of what could ensue on the Peninsula. Positive initial interactions may generate broader implications for China-U.S. relations, regional stability, and global security at large.

Over the decades, Middle Eastern security has been influenced by both strong regional and global security interdependence. Since the end of the Cold War, Washington has played a leading security role in the region, providing an extended nuclear umbrella for its allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council organization. However, the U.S. strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific region and China’s rising profile as a global power has set the Middle East’s security dynamics again into flux. This article employs a regional security complex framework, paired with a realist theoretical lens, to analyze how the growing Sino-American rivalry is affecting Arabian Gulf security by identifying the regional interests of these two powers and examining the emerging regional security dynamics.

China’s security presence has been growing steadily in proportion to the progress of the Belt and Road Initiative, reflected in a larger military footprint in Africa in the form of logistical and resupply bases. The BRI/military nexus has allowed Beijing to play a larger role in African affairs more recently, raising alarms in the United States and the European Union. Despite growing speculation and skepticism in some quarters, African societies still welcome Beijing’s increasing investment and deeper involvement in regional security matters. After Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea is the most likely nation to host the next Chinese military base. But at the same time, the West’s scrutiny of Beijing’s rising profile and deeper security involvement in Africa will also grow as China continues to chip away at the West’s influence on the continent. A steadier security footing for China would change great power dynamics in the region even as competition between Beijing on the one hand and Washington and Brussels on the other will still be limited to the economic and financial domains.

Historically, Afghanistan has remained an active and one of the determining factors in shaping regional power structure. The U.S. withdrawal from the country is regarded as a turning point in the ongoing regional realignment process. Once the allies in the United States’ “War on Terror” campaign like Russia, Iran, Qatar, and Central Asian Republics have changed their side and are working very actively with the Taliban regime. These countries even consider the regime as the only option that has the capacity to address their national security threats arising from the country. Considering the situation and India’s strained relations with the Taliban, Pakistan, and China, will Iran emerge as a crucial ally for India in safeguarding its national interests and maintaining its strategic influence in Afghanistan and the wider region? This paper aims to analyze how a Taliban-led Afghanistan could impact India’s relationship with Iran. The research adds a new dimension to the analysis of India and Iran relations and highlights the significance of Iran for India in changing regional and global power structures. The research method was based on the review of research articles, reports both governmental and non-governmental, and surveys published in newspapers. The qualitative analysis clarifies and deepens the understanding of the issue.