Narrow Results

The paper argues that East Asian regionalism is fragile, since (i) each nation's industrial competitiveness depends on the smooth functioning of "Factory Asia" — in particular, on intra-regional trade; (ii) the unilateral tariff-cutting that created "Factory Asia" is not subject to WTO discipline (bindings); (iii) there is no "top-level management" to substitute for WTO discipline, i.e., to ensure that bilateral trade tensions — tensions that are inevitable in East Asia — do not spillover into region-wide problems due to lack of cooperation and communication. This paper argues that the window of opportunity for East Asian "vision" was missed; what East Asia needs now is "management", not vision. East Asia should launch a "New East Asian Regional Management Effort", with a reinforced ASEAN + 3 being the most likely candidate for the job. The first priority should be to bind the region's unilateral tariff cuts in the WTO.

A key feature of globalization in the current era has been the rapid spread of cross-border production sharing in many regions of the world, including Europe, North America and Asia. The effects of these developments in the context of regional trade integration have been examined in the recent literature. This paper looks at their implications for regional monetary integration and exchange-rate policies. Cross-border production networks and the intra-industry trade associated with them affect exchange-rate behavior, balance of payments adjustment, and the transmission of shocks and disturbances. This paper examines the policy implications of regional production networks that (i) are confined to the countries of a given region, and (ii) involve a dominant extra-regional economy.

Global economic governance is in flux. The centralized international trade architecture of the post-Bretton Woods era is decentralizing as new regional institutions are being established for various reasons. Decentralization per se is neither good nor bad. It depends on whether there is “healthy” competition and functional complementarity or “unhealthy” competition between global and new regional institutions. This paper has three objectives, to: (i) review the decentralization of the international trade architecture; (ii) identify the benefits and the risks of the decentralization process and its implications for the centrality of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and (iii) recommend policies for the WTO to manage the process. The paper argues that, so far, the benefits of new regional institutions and trade decentralization appear to have outweighed the risks, and as a result global economic governance may have improved. Looking ahead, the paper recommends a number of policy actions that the WTO should take to manage trade decentralization. The paper argues that Asian countries, especially those that are members of the G20, should play a greater role in lobbying and driving the needed reforms of the WTO. They should also seek to expedite the conclusion and ratification of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and eventually institutionalize the complementarity between RCEP, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

This study examines the moderating effects of social media use on regionalist voting behavior in South Korea. Analyzing the survey data conducted during the 2017 Korean presidential election, we test how social media functions in electoral processes, particularly with respect to region-based voting in the Korean electorate. The findings of this study reveal that social media use affects region-based voting behavior among the Korean electorate by connecting people with different regional backgrounds in online political communication. That is, social media use can create “bridging” social capital rather than “bonding” social capital in society. In this respect, results differ significantly from findings in the 2012 presidential election. In 2012, only the independent effects of social media existed with a liberal bias, without revealing interaction with regional dummies. These independent effects disappeared in 2017, and different kinds of social media were statistically significant only when they functioned as moderating variables for regional dummies. This implies that as the functions of social media in the Korean election process have evolved in more complexity, they now are able to affect progressive as well as conservative voters.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the effect of “collective” regional intergovernmental organizations (RIGOs) on global security, national (traditional) and human (non-traditional), of the member states. A total of 12 RIGOs across 222 countries were selected. It has been argued whether the “collective” RIGOs, military or economic, regional or sub-regional, have been effective in enhancing the global security of their respective “individual” sovereign member states. The following 10 variables were chosen as human security: poverty, corruption, unemployment, global food security, income inequality, population growth, human development index (HDI), political freedom, quality of life, and economic freedom. For the national security variables, conflict, military expenditure, and global peace were selected. Based on factor analysis, two global security patterns were found: predominant and peripheral. RIGOs, despite their institutional collectivism, were found not to affect the predominant global security, while their effects on the peripheral global security were found to be spotty. In affecting global security, national or human, RIGO with its collectivism was found not to prevail over individual sovereign member states.

The lofty ideals penned by the heads of the South Asian states at the birth of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) reflect a vision for promoting mutual trust and understanding in South Asia. But the member states have fallen into the intricate web of power balancing games, fluctuating economic growth and volatile ethnic and religious conditions that has marred the potential gains from regionalism. In such a scenario, while SAARCs snail-like progress continues without any remarkable achievements, there has been a rise of new regional organizations that has not only renewed our attention towards economic liberalization and the benefits accrued from multilateral economic cooperation but has also put into question the fundamentals of regionalism. The paper situates regionalism in acts of cooperation that are not isolated and discrete from each other but rather form a pattern of interconnecting expectations about the future of the alliance and the assumptions on legitimate activities. The paper argues that regionalism is a multi-faceted task and involves political harmony, economic interdependence and common identity as the three pillars. But regionalism in South Asia encourages economic interdependence and proscribes political integration and common values and norms. As a result, the attempts at regionalism in South Asia are conceptually narrow, limited in agenda and inadequate to address the issues of regional peace and security.

Since its launch in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has attracted frequent commentary and analysis. Much of these discussions have focused on its effectiveness and viability as a large-scale economic as well as geopolitical project. This paper contributes to that discussion by exploring BRI’s impact on regional organizations, specifically in South Asia. Using South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as a case study, I argue that BRI’s impact on regional organization is inadequately understood. BRI is not a competitor to regional organizations, but its presence in a region creates a priority conundrum for member states i.e., members who join effectively must mainline the BRI into their national interests. By offering transactional functionality, BRI offers member states the opportunity to access immediate tangible benefits like foreign investment and infrastructure development. While states continue to be the members of various international and regional organizations, their commitment and policy priorities inevitably end up aligning with BRI if they choose to sign up. With BRI as a part of their national interest, states inadvertently cede policy autonomy, especially on issues of concern for China. This creates a situation that grants China a voice in organizations where it’s not even a member. This impacts the character and culture of regional organizations creating relevancy and effectiveness concerns.

India’s regional cooperation in neighboring South Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region is undergoing a transformative evolution driven by geopolitical, economic, and strategic dynamics. From the stagnation of traditional regional cooperation frameworks like SAARC to the emergence of sub-regional initiatives and strategic partnerships, the region is witnessing a concerted effort to foster peace, prosperity, and security. India, as a key player in the region, has been actively engaging in various multilateral platforms such as BIMSTEC, SCO, and IORA to advance its strategic objectives while addressing shared concerns like terrorism and energy security. Initiatives like the BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement and SASEC demonstrate India’s commitment to deepening sub-regional integration and unlocking economic potential. However, challenges such as geopolitical rivalries, exclusionary practices, and resource constraints continue to hinder the realization of the full potential of regional cooperation initiatives. Policy recommendations include strengthening sub-regional mechanisms and enhancing connectivity and trade facilitation. By embracing these recommendations, India’s regional cooperation in neighboring South Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region can work toward building a more prosperous, stable, and interconnected future.

In assessing the recent development of economic regionalism in Asia and elsewhere, it is important to carefully examine if the level of integration of intraregional trade is increasing or decreasing. However, it is not easy to answer this ostensibly simple question. There are two ways to assess the level of trade integration: de facto integration and de jure integration. With respect to de facto integration (actual level of interdependence in terms of trade flows), the answer depends on which Asian countries are being considered and which indicator is being used to measure trade interdependence. This paper compares the trade interdependence of different sets of Asian countries using various indices. With respect to de jure integration (the signing of free trade agreements [FTAs]), the number of signed FTAs in Asia is growing but the relation between trade interdependence and the signing of FTAs has not been sufficiently studied. The second half of this paper addresses whether de jure trade integration is ultimately brought about by high-level or low-level de facto trade integration. The analysis in this paper finds that a set of countries that have experienced de facto integration tend to sign a comprehensive agreement to solve issues associated with high levels of trade interdependence, while a set of countries whose level of economic interdependence is low or declining may require a goods-centered agreement to boost trade among members.

The paper starts with a discussion of potential sources of regionalism in trade; and what, on this basis, might have been expected to be the performance of regionalism. In its main part, this is an empirical analysis of the actual change in the degree of regionalism over the last half-century, distinguishing four major groups of countries as “regions”. Judging by two complementary indices, it appears that the share of regional trading in world trade has increased substantially, so that much of the remarkable expansion of global trade has taken place via the channel of trade within specific regions.

The Asian countries are once again focused on options for large, comprehensive regional integration schemes. In this paper we explore the implications of such broad-based regional trade initiatives in Asia, highlighting the bridging of the East and South Asian economies. We place emphasis on the alternative prospects for insider and outsider countries. We work with a global general equilibrium model of the world economy, benchmarked to a projected 2017 sets of trade and production patterns. We also work with gravity-model based estimates of trade costs linked to infrastructure, and of barriers to trade in services. Taking these estimates, along with tariffs, into our CGE model, we examine regionally narrow and broad agreements, all centered on extending the reach of ASEAN to include free trade agreements with combinations of the northeast Asian economies (PRC, Japan, Korea) and also the South Asian economies. We focus on a stylized FTA that includes goods, services, and some aspects of trade cost reduction through trade facilitation and related infrastructure improvements. What matters most for East Asia is that China, Japan, and Korea be brought into any scheme for deeper regional integration. This matter alone drives most of the income and trade effects in the East Asia region across all of our scenarios. The inclusion of the South Asian economies in a broader regional agreement sees gains for the East Asian and South Asian economies. Most of the East Asian gains follow directly from Indian participation. The other South Asian players thus stand to benefit if India looks East and they are a part of the program, and to lose if they are not. Interestingly, we find that with the widest of agreements, the insiders benefit substantively in terms of trade and income while the aggregate impact on outside countries is negligible. Broadly speaking, a pan-Asian regional agreement would appear to cover enough countries, with a great enough diversity in production and incomes, to actually allow for regional gains without substantive third-country losses. However, realizing such potential requires overcoming a proven regional tendency to circumscribe trade concessions with rules of origin, NTBs, and exclusion lists. The more likely outcome, a spider web of bilateral agreements, carries with it the prospect of significant outsider costs (i.e. losses) both within and outside the region.

This paper argues that the growing US trade deficit has caused the decline of the WTO and the rise of regional trade agreements. Growing imbalances make countries more selective about who to cooperate with. This is formally shown in a three-country negotiation game that is based on a goods-market model. Subsequently, the model is parameterized and applied quantitatively. Using historical data, the model correctly predicts the date that US-Canada FTA talks began. Based on current data, moreover, the model paints a bleak picture for multilateralism: US exports to China would have to triple for a new WTO round to stand a chance. But even this may be insufficient: a dynamic extension of the game shows that regionalism can have a lock-in effect. Nonetheless, this does not plead for tougher WTO rules on regionalism. As is argued both qualitatively and quantitatively, these may push countries to less, not more, cooperation.

The well-known question whether regional trade agreements (RTAs) and the multilateral trading system (MTS) are “strangers, friends, or foes” (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996) has gained new importance with the widespread proliferation of RTAs in recent years. Based on an extensive data set which covers most of world trade over the past 60 years and about 240 regional trade agreements, we analyze the relationship between RTAs and the MTS by combining the gravity model framework with vector auto-regression analysis. Impulse-response-functions robustly suggest that multilateral trade liberalization responds in a significantly positive way to regional trade liberalization. We also find robust evidence that RTA liberalization Granger-causes GATT/WTO liberalization. Thus, our results indicate that RTAs do not undermine the MTS but serve as building blocks to multilateral trade liberalization.

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• Theories of Geopolitics and Regions
• Japan: Regionalism Aborted
• The United States: Regionalism Obstructed
• China: Regionalism Resurgent?
• Concluding Remarks
• References

One of the more surprising things about the study of international relations (IR) is that scholars can come to such radically different views about what’s actually happening in the world. Clever people contemplating precisely the same set of events can come to strikingly dissimilar conclusions about their significance and causes, to say nothing of their likely trajectory. One might intuitively expect that greater expertise and the continuing refinement of the techniques and theories we use to try and make sense of the world would help us to come to some sort of consensus about big events, their underlying dynamics and possible impacts. Nothing could be further from the truth — even if we believe that such a thing exists, of course. If anything, the field is becoming more contested and ‘progress’ — another loaded, contentious and surprisingly unpopular term — remains elusive. In short, ‘there remains no agreement on what constitutes proper theory in IR’ (Dunne et al. 2013)…

China has once again become a — perhaps the — major actor within the East Asian region. For a part of the world that has lacked a dominant indigenous actor since Japan’s pre-war regional ambitions ended in tragedy and humiliation (see Beeson 2009a), China’s rapid re-emergence is a development of enormous longterm importance. Unlike Japan’s abortive attempt at regional hegemony, however, China is using diplomacy and a sophisticated ‘charm offensive’ to win over neighbours who remain nervous about China’s current intentions and past record (Kurlantzick 2007). This is hardly surprising as East Asia is, after all, a region whose history has often been violent and traumatic, and where the past continues to cast a long shadow over the present. Given China’s recent history as a source of potentially destabilising revolutionary ideas (Van Ness 1970), it is hardly surprising that some of its Southeast Asian neighbours in particular might feel nervous about the implications of China’s rise. What is most remarkable in such circumstances is how effective China’s increasingly sophisticated foreign policy has been in reassuring many of its immediate neighbours about its intentions and the implications of its rise. Some East Asian states have seen potential advantages as well as dangers in China’s sudden re-emergence as the region’s most important strategic, economic and political actor. But some have not, and the East Asian region consequently offers revealing lens through which to examine the evolution of China’s policies toward the region, the thinking that has informed them on the part of China’s foreign policy-making elites, and the way such policies have been received elsewhere…

The ‘rise of China’ has clearly been one of the most significant events of recent years. Although that phrase does not capture all of the complexity and contradiction associated with China’s remarkable economic development, it does provide a useful shorthand for what is likely to prove one of the most consequential set of processes in the twenty-first century. Indeed, it is not too fanciful to suggest that the transformation that has occurred in China in little more than three decades may prove to be the most important set of interconnected economic, political, social and strategic processes in the history of the planet. Even if it all goes badly wrong — which is not at all impossible — whatever happens in China will, as Napoleon famously predicted, have truly world-shaking ramifications…

East Asia has many distinctive features that set it apart from other comparable regions. Indeed, for students of comparative politics and the growing field of comparative regionalism (Sbragia 2008; Acharya 2012), what we now think of as ‘East Asia’ offers a veritable treasure trove of different political forms, economic structures and strategic perspectives. Attitudes to regional, as opposed to national, development and cooperation are equally varied, and this helps to account for the distinctiveness of East Asian institutions, their multiplicity and ultimately, I shall suggest, their ineffectiveness. The simple underlying regional reality in East Asia is that despite — or perhaps because of — the surprisingly large number of regional initiatives, none of the resultant institutions are especially effective (Beeson 2016). In this regard it is entirely possible that ‘institutional balancing’, like its more well-known power balancing counterpart, is designed not to facilitate but to prevent something from happening…

One of the most striking features of the broadly-conceived ‘Asia-Pacific region’ is that the institutions that have emerged there have been much less powerful and effective than their counterparts in Western Europe. In part, we suggest, this has been a function of history and of a region divided by the Cold War. In part, it has been because many of the institutions have been deliberately designed so that they had less power than the European Union, which was seen as intruding on the sovereignty of its members in ways many Asian states were keen to avoid (Katzenstein 2005). And yet, paradoxically enough, despite a relatively modest level of institutional development and effectiveness in the Asia-Pacific, there is no shortage of initiatives and competing visions about how the region might develop. The questions, as ever, are about how any region is to be defined, who its members might be, and what purpose it might serve…