Narrow Results

In this study, we use the number of retail investors in China’s stock market to investigate how retail investors affect stock price synchronicity. We find that a higher number of retail investors in a firm is associated with higher stock price synchronicity. Moreover, we trace this association to two sources. One is a negative effect of the number of retail investors on the probability of informed trading (PIN), suggesting that retail investors generate arbitrage risk which discourages informed trading. The other is a positive influence of the number of retail investors on price comovement (beta), resulting from correlated trading among retail investors.

In an attempt to make money markets safer and more resilient, regulators have created new requirements for market participants. Money market funds are now required to file a new N-CR form if a significant event occurs: for example, fund financial support or liquidity fees. We investigate whether fund stakeholders respond to the N-CR filings. We find that investors do not respond to the N-CR filings. However, fund managers, who do not need the filings to learn of the financial support, reduce the weighted average life (WAL) of the funds and increase the daily liquidity available. These actions have real costs and our results suggest the costs outweigh the benefit of the newly required Form N-CR (N-CR) filing.

Structured products (SP) are synthetic investment instruments specially designed to meet specific needs that cannot be met by acquiring standard financial instruments available in the markets. We argue that many SP currently available to retail investors are designed to exploit several behavioral biases including: loss aversion, the disposition effects, herd behavior, the ostrich effect and the hindsight bias. We perform an experiment that examines investor decision-making in relation to SP investments. Our findings demonstrate that investors tend to be affected by th se behavioral biases, which favor SP investments. Accordingly, regulation dealing specifically with SP may be warranted to improve investor protection. We offer a regulation that would compel issuers to reveal the effective fees they charge investors. In disclosing the effective fees, investors will be able to improve their decisions and will be able to evaluate the costs of their behavioral biases.