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This study evaluates the performance of mainstream large language models (LLMs) in Chinese security generation tasks, examines the potential security risks associated with these models, and proposes strategies for mitigating these risks. To this end, we developed the multidimensional security question answering (MSQA) dataset and the multidimensional security scoring criteria (MSSC). This study compares the performance of three models across six distinct security tasks. Pearson correlation analysis was conducted using GPT-4 and questionnaires, while automatic scoring was implemented using GPT-3.5-Turbo and Llama-3. Experimental results reveal that ERNIE Bot excels in ideology and ethics evaluation, ChatGPT demonstrates strong performance in assessing rumors, false information and privacy security, and Claude performs well in evaluating factual fallacies and social biases. Additionally, the fine-tuned model showed effectiveness in security scoring tasks, and the proposed Security Tips Expert (ST-GPT) successfully mitigates security risks. Despite the promising results, all models exhibit inherent security risks. Based on these findings, we recommend that both domestic and international models adhere to the legal frameworks of their respective jurisdictions, minimize AI hallucinations, continuously expand training corpora, and undergo regular updates and iterations to enhance their reliability and safety.

This article examines the implications of the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for Africa’s connectivity. The BRI seeks to rebuild the ancient Silk Road trade route with the overall goal of opening global markets, thus creating a trade and investment network involving three continents: Africa, Asia, and Europe. Using secondary data, this article assesses the opportunities and potential challenges of the BRI for Africa with a special focus on various BRI national projects. It concludes that China’s involvement in infrastructure projects in Africa and the BRI’s vision for increased connectivity among beneficiary countries can lead to integrated and streamlined economic and infrastructure development in Africa, while improving China’s corporate and product image, generating mutual benefits to both China and Africa. This article also argues that for those BRI-based benefits to materialize, certain challenges need to be dealt with, particularly security risks and corruption, which could increase the long-term costs of infrastructure projects for countries involved.

An increasing number of Chinese enterprises and citizens are going abroad, which exposes them to risks threatening their personal safety and security of their property. With the expansion of Chinese overseas interests, traditional protection methods fall short of a demand for diverse services, revealing a major shortfall in the Chinese government’s capability to provide overseas security protection for its citizens. New service providers are therefore urgently needed, and private security company are becoming an increasingly popular choice. As this is a fairly new demand, only a small number of Chinese private security companies are operating overseas at present. Difficulties abound for them, such as absence of regulatory clarity on business operation and gun control. The presence of private security providers could also pose a challenge to host nation authority and trigger conflicts. To serve as true protectors of overseas Chinese interests, Chinese private security companies have a long way to go.

Security risks arising from accelerating technological advances have become increasingly evident as humanity now stands on the threshold of a new industrial revolution. Not only are technology-driven military reforms and technology races intensifying broader geopolitical competition among major powers, advancing frontiers of scientific inquiry such as cyberspace and outer space are also opening up new domains of potential conflict, making governance of the global commons an increasingly contentious issue. Promoting global science and technology governance to mitigate and reduce the potential security risks presented by the technological revolution has become an increasingly urgent task. However, today’s global efforts at risk control and prevention face significant challenges and constraints, including a fragmented governance architecture, an outdated power politics mentality, and inequitable distribution of technological power. To improve global science and technology governance, the international community should build an inclusive, resilient, and effective platform that is able to accommodate and reflect the interests and aspirations of both developed countries and developing nations, with a focus on addressing major risks accompanying emerging and foundational technologies like information and communications, artificial intelligence, and digital infrastructure.

China’s ambitious initiative to build infrastructure in dozens of countries along land and sea trade routes stretching from China to Africa and Europe is set to grow bigger than first envisaged in 2013. Added to the original overland Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road is the Polar Silk Road, now written into China’s Arctic Policy that was published in January 2018. The China-centric initiative also got itself written into the Chinese Communist Party’s constitution in October 2017, leading many outside China to view it as more than an economic plan to build infrastructure to facilitate trade and boost development in developing countries. Foreign observers see it also as a scheme to expand China’s influence overseas by binding other nations more closely to it economically. That there is demand for the infrastructure that the Chinese want to build is unquestionable — in Asia alone, to keep the economies humming, there is a need to invest US$1.7 trillion annually in infrastructure up till 2030. However, the security and financial risks of this venture are daunting to investors as the routes run through some of the riskiest countries in the world. The situation is not helped by suspicion over China’s intentions and concerns about the lack of transparency and whether tender processes meet international standards. China needs to listen to and allay the concerns of governments, corporations and international organizations to gain their support and participation in this project that is so massive it cannot pull off alone.