Narrow Results

This study examines management’s response to the change in accounting for stock option-based compensation imposed by SFAS No. 123R, whose implementation is expected to reduce reported income. To cope with this impact, management may be motivated to decrease the use of stock options as part of compensating employees and engage in stock repurchases in an attempt to increase the value of outstanding employee stock options. Our findings demonstrate a significant negative relation between stock options granted and shares repurchased in the aftermath of SFAS No. 123R, particularly for the S&P 500 firms known for their heavy use of employee stock options. Furthermore, evidence of a contemporaneous increase in repurchases and leverage in the post SFAS 123R period may suggest that some of the buybacks may have been funded with debt. Our findings are robust to the inclusion of traditional determinants of share repurchases.

In 2021, the United States (U.S.) publicly traded firms repurchased nearly $850 billion of their own shares, setting an all-time record. Given the enormous scale of this resource allocation away from investment in innovation and growth and toward shareholders, it is reasonable to consider if these buybacks create opportunity costs. Stock buybacks increase earnings per share, even in the wake of no earnings growth, driving up share price and benefitting the top executives who make these capital allocation decisions by increasing the value of their stock options. Pundits disagree on the impact that high levels of buybacks have on the economy, some arguing that stock buybacks come at the expense of strategic investment in innovation while others point to diminishing returns to research and development (RnD) investment as the reason for decreases in innovative activity. This paper empirically tests whether share buybacks are suppressing corporate innovation in ways that control for widely observed declines in returns to R&D investment, and the endogenous relationship between stock buybacks and innovation. Statistical analysis provides strong evidence that share buybacks are suppressing corporate innovation. This has enormous ramifications to the long-term viability of U.S. industries and to social justice.