Narrow Results

Historically cognition was understood as the result of processes occurring solely in the brain. Recently, however, cognitive scientists and philosophers studying "embodied" or "situated" cognition have begun emphasizing the role of the body and environment in which brains are situated, i.e. they view the brain as an "open system". However, these theorists frequently rely on dynamical systems which are traditionally viewed as closed systems. We address this tension by extending the framework of dynamical systems theory. We show how structures which appear in the state space of an embodied agent differ from those that appear in closed systems, and we show how these structures can be used to model representational processes in embodied agents. We focus on neural networks as models of embodied cognition.

There are many facets to mental life and mental experience. In this chapter, I attempt to account for some central characteristics among those facets. I argue that normative function and representation are emergent in particular forms of the self-maintenance of far from thermodynamic equilibrium systems in their essential far-from-equilibrium conditions. The nature of representation that is thereby modeled — an interactive, pragmatic form — in turn, forces a number of additional properties of mental process, such as consciousness being inherently contentful and from a situated and embodied point of view. In addition, other properties of interactive representation make strong connections with the central nervous system properties that are found to realize mental experience, such as a field organization of oscillatory and mutually modulatory neural processes.