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The rapid fall of the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia on January 14, 2011 has not only sparked a wave of uprisings across the Arab region, but has also raised many questions about the rotes of socio-economic inequality, youth unemployment, corruption, and government oppression in the making of the Tunisian uprisings. This paper argues that what seemed to be an island of stability in the region was in fact a ticking time bomb that was set off by Mohamed Bouazizi in December 2010. It further argues that the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime could not have taken place had it not been a leaderless revolt. As a result, the paper provides a critical analysis of the making of the Tunisian revolution by investigating the key factors that maintained stability, and the mechanisms that set the stage for the uprisings. In doing so, the analysis reveals the radical social transformation that took place since the early 1990s leading to the breakdown of the social contract, and the gradual drift of the middle class away from its implicit support of the Ben Ali regime. The new political landscape opens up a real opportunity for democratic transformation, vibrant civic engagement, and sustainable economic revival. Therefore, our analysis would be incomplete without a careful look at the new dynamic between the forces of political Islam, secularism, and the middle class. Finally, the paper closes with a summary and some concluding remarks.

This paper expands the micro-foundations of the traditional greed and grievance non-cooperative model of civil conflict. First, we allow for greed and grievance to be orthogonal, so that they may affect each other rather than being exogenous. Second, we allow for the reaction curves of both parties in non-cooperative games to be substitutes and not inevitably complementary, so a peaceful strategy from a group may be followed by a belligerent upsurge from the other. Third, we also allow for Diaspora transfers to rebel groups, thus generating a trade-off between the gains associated with peace and war among rebels. Fourth, we expand external aid in the form of fungible financing of government transfers 'buying' peace by allowing for mechanisms that induce behavioural change towards peace. These extensions provide a better understanding of conflict persistence, the consequences of competing international aid and sub-optimal sanctions provision ("cheap talk") by the international community.

Although the topic of sustainability has become ubiquitous, it is a complex subject, and there is little agreement as to what exactly is meant by the term. This chapter considers a range of issues which need to be addressed in achieving sustainability. It argues strongly that sustainability is a global matter and can only successfully be addressed on a global basis — with the many issues which this raises. In doing so, this chapter acts as an introduction to the volume and sets the scene for many of the issues which are addressed in subsequent chapters.