Narrow Results

In two-sided matching markets where direct negotiations take place over the division of profits between the partners, the appropriate solution concept is the core. Only a minority of the experimentally observed bargaining results are within the core, and the number of core solutions further decreases with an increase in market complexity. For differently-sized matching markets, two adjustments to the core requirements are introduced. Projected cores from smaller markets (partial condition core) are confirmed in larger markets. The possibility of Pareto improvements from the perspective of individual players (individual condition core) does not vanish but may even increase with market size. In all the investigated experimental markets, a high percentage of equal profit splits between matching partners in face-to-face bargaining was found, especially in larger, decentralized matching markets.

The efficient management of waste is important in order to reduce negative externalities, such as air, water and soil pollution. A major challenge is the increasing amount of municipal solid waste (MSW) produced by households. Municipalities around the world have implemented pay-as-you-throw (PAYT) schemes in order to incentivise the reduction of MSW. Although the literature has shown that these financial incentive schemes are often effective, they are criticised in practice for raising costs to society. This paper aims to assess whether or not this criticism is correct. A social cost-benefit analysis was conducted in order to take into account economic, environmental and social costs and benefits. Our results show that PAYT schemes reduce overall social costs and therefore positively contribute to the social efficiency of a municipality. The above criticism is not supported by empirical evidence, but in practice forms a barrier to the implementation of PAYT schemes. In order to remove this barrier, we encourage the readers of JEAPM to disseminate our findings to a wider audience.