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After Japan occupied Taiwan from the Quin Dynasty in 1895, the Japanese government immediately held talks with Spain to delimit the sea boundary between Spain and Japanese Taiwan. According to the Convention between Japan and Spain in 1895, the sea boundary of both countries was in the middle of the navigable channel of Bashi. For it did not refer to the longitude and latitude, thus it resulted in confusion when the United States negotiated a peace treaty with Spain. What is the meaning of “in the middle of the navigable channel of Bashi?” In the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain in 1898, Spain ceded the Philippines archipelagoes to the south of 20^∘ North latitude to the United States. In fact, the Batanes Islands are located at 20–21^∘ North latitudes. Geographically, the Batanes Islands were not included in the Treaty of Paris. This paper will focus on the reasons why did not Spain cede the territory to the north of 20^∘ North latitude to the United States? And, it also discussed the problems of the legal status of the Batanes Islands and the rights of claim by Taiwan.

China is geographically distant from Central European states, but cultural, economic and political exchanges between the regions are increasing. As such, the perception of China in these societies is susceptible to frames and narratives that are either instrumentally or organically created by local political elites. This paper aims to scrutinize the narratives and frames employed in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland during their most recent election cycles. It identifies five basic types of frames employed in the selected countries: sovereignty, opportunity, the balance of trade, debt-traps and human rights. This paper then concludes by evaluating these thematic frames and summarizes the key similarities in public discourses concerning relations with China.

The main contribution of this research is to provide evidence on the key drivers that shape individual opinions toward multilateralism. In particular, we show that even when people consider that international organizations take away too much power from the governments, this fact is not necessarily seen as a negative aspect. People’s opinions are relevant given that, in the decision-making process, governments should balance several elements and the opinion of voters may be a key driver. The goal of this analysis is to show that there is a robust U-shaped effect in the case of the level of educational attainment.

The current geopolitical environment is characterized by a multiplicity of actors, both state and non-state, a growing constellation of multifaceted and often contradictory issues and interests, and an increased velocity wrought by technology and the resulting compression of physical and cyberspace, all of which are churning in a type of expanding “geopolitical metaverse”. In parallel, states find themselves “sharing” sovereignty in a co-dependent relationship with the private sector, particularly as large technology concerns increasingly control key vectors of national power. These dimensions equate to a significant disruption of the international environment. This paper examines the impact of this dynamic on the evolving Sino-US relationship, with ASEAN asserting its “centrality” as a key regional player and intermediary. The ultimate goal of this commentary is to put forward certain targeted suggestions as to how the Sino-US relationship can move toward a new equilibrium amid the prevailing climate of disruption, using an enlightened approach to conditional transactional undertakings and an astute engagement with ASEAN and other regional instances to facilitate constructive compromise and the adoption of an agenda focused on stability, modernity, and economic uplift.

The economic and political crises that have recently engulfed the countries of Southeast Asia provide a stark reminder of just how difficult the challenge of sustained regional development remains. In retrospect, the hyperbole that surrounded the ‘East Asian miracle’ looks overblown, and testimony to the manner in which rhetoric can outstrip reality, especially in the minds of international investors. Certainly, some observers had questioned the depth and resilience of capitalist development in Southeast Asia (Kunio 1988), but in the years immediately prior to 1997 such analyses tended to be in the minority. Now, of course, it is painfully obvious that much of Southeast Asia’s economic and political development was extremely fragile. And yet, when seen in historical context, this outcome should not have been so surprising. For the fact remains that the countries of modern Southeast Asia, both as independent nations and as colonies of various imperial powers, have been highly vulnerable to the actions of powerful external political and economic forces. This chapter will examine the economic bases and the political consequences of this vulnerability, both domestically and at a regional level. I argue that the recent crisis has served as an unwelcome reminder of just how constrained, dependent and vulnerable the Southeast Asia region’s development prospects remain, a situation that is exacerbated by, and which contributes to, domestic political crises…

This chapter explores the dual relevancies of technology to diplomatic engagement; that is, technologies as both the subject and catalysts of bilateral and multilateral interactions. The former is explored in the first section, and the latter in the second. Both are conducted with empirical cases. In the third section, the chapter seeks to highlight the encroachment of the “Westphalian” monopoly of states on the international diplomatic stage in light of the growing number of actors involved in responding to new challenges brought on by the development of emerging technologies, particularly nuclear proliferation, climate change and e-waste management. Additionally, it ponders the diplomatic implications of AI and other emerging technologies.

Based upon the Republic of China’s (ROC) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) archives, United Nations’ Treaty Series, Japanese wartime archives collected in Japan’s Asia Historical Material Center, publications collected by pre-1945 Taiwan Governor-General Office’s Library, and related studies, this chapter points out how the Taipei Treaty (TPT) could be a more effective legal basis to achieve the goal of Hague Arbitration (HA) of July 12, 2016.

In an endeavor to establish certainty over territorial and sovereignty claims, research at National Archives could prove invaluable. A period of research, whether in your nation’s capital city or elsewhere, at home or in other countries, that may or may not have trading relations or administrative linkages, could uncover a wealth of information contained in the original documents such as agreements, Memoranda of Understanding, treaties, and particularly, in files maintained by the relevant departments and ministries such as foreign and home affairs and trade. Examples of where such research has produced documents that were presented at international courts and arbitration tribunals to prove sovereignty claims include the cases in which Malaysia was party to disputes with Indonesia and Singapore at the International Court of Justice, in 2002 and 2008, respectively. In January 2017, reports emerged that Malaysia had “discovered” three important documents at the UK National Archives that had become available to the public. Such a discovery may go some way forward to turn a decision set by the ICJ in 2008 in Malaysia’s favor. This chapter demonstrates, illustrates, and discusses the manner in which research at national archives, public and private libraries, and other institutions that are depositaries of primary documents, and by inference also secondary, may support claims to territory may be conducted.

Since the Second World War, Africa and especially Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has had the poorest economic performance of any region in the world. Ironically, many African countries had set out with high hopes once they had thrown off the yoke of colonial rule but it was not long before disaster struck. Against the background of an expanding world economy Africa experienced ‘a chronic failure of economic growth’ (Collier and Gunning, 1996), so that by the end of the 20th century incomes per capita were little better than they had been at the time of independence, and in some cases a good deal worse. The main problem was the failure to improve the efficiency of resource use; in contrast to the position in many other developing countries total factor productivity was either static or negative for much of the time (Ndulu and O'Connell, 1999; Crafts, 2000). Thus while poverty was declining elsewhere, it was increasing steadily in SSA. By the turn of the century two-thirds of the population were estimated to be living at subsistence or below the absolute poverty line, while nearly one-half the world's poor lived in Africa (United Nations, 1997).

There are of course many factors which can explain this remarkable state of affairs, but the one we shall focus on this chapter is Africa's great weakness in statecraft, by which we refer to political systems, bureaucracies, administrative organizations, property and legal rights and general issues of trust and contract enforcement. In other words, it is a question of good governance as opposed to bad governance and corruption. The general argument here is that with few exceptions African countries have lacked a sound social and political base which would favor growth and development and that this base has tended to deteriorate over time.