Narrow Results

The debate around centralized versus decentralized control of forest usually focuses on the incentive and information structures under these two forms of control. This paper however examines on a less analyzed feature, that of elite capture of the revenue generated out of forest use. In particular, I examine a scenario where the bureaucrats controlling forest management are corrupt, and also have significant influence at the central level. I find that state control leads to lower degradation if and only if the extent of elite capture is not too small. Further, if the central government controls the allocation of forest income among states, in addition to controlling the magnitude of forest use, then forest degradation is lower relative to the case when the central government controls forest use alone.

Conflict between local state and churches in China has increased both in number and intensity in recent years due to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) tightened regulation and control over religious affairs and religious groups. Drawing on the theoretical insight of the positive function of social conflict proposed by Coser and the empirical findings in China, this paper tries to decode the impact of China’s religious policies on state–church interaction under Xi Jinping’s rule. It finds that the overall impacts of state intensified control over religions are twofold. On the one hand, state intervention paradoxically serves as a facilitating factor to enhance religious group’s internal cohesion, reinforce their group identity and help them reflect on and change their survival and development strategies. On the other hand, increased state control at the same time generates an unpleasant outcome that is not beneficial for a peaceful state–church interaction.