Narrow Results

In discrete time, every time-consistent dynamic monetary risk measure can be written as a composition of one-step risk measures. We exploit this structure to give new dual representation results for time-consistent convex monetary risk measures in terms of one-step penalty functions. We first study risk measures for random variables modelling financial positions at a fixed future time. Then we consider the more general case of risk measures that depend on stochastic processes describing the evolution of financial positions or cumulated cash flows. In both cases the new representations allow for a simple composition of one-step risk measures in the dual. We discuss several explicit examples and provide connections to the recently introduced class of dynamic variational preferences.

In this paper we consider the problem of time-consistency of the subcore in a multistage TU-cooperative game. We propose necessary and sufficient conditions for the time-consistency of an imputation from the subcore. Based on these conditions, we suggest an algorithm providing time-consistency of a selector of the subcore. Besides, we prove consistency of the subcore with respect to the MDM-reduction. Finally we introduce the notions of reduced game and dynamic consistency for multistage cooperative games. One of the main results of this paper is a theorem stating some properties of dynamic consistency of the subcore selectors. We focus particularly on the conditions of the dynamic consistency of the subcore with respect to the MDM-reduced game.

This note deals with time-consistency and agreeability, two dynamic individual rationality concepts, in special linear-quadratic differential games. Conditions ensuring their satisfaction are derived and a link between sustainability of cooperation and fair sharing of cooperation surplus is established.

A game-theoretic model of territorial environmental production under Cournot competition is studied. The process is modeled as cooperative differential game. The stable distribution mechanism of the common cooperative benefit among players is proposed. We proved that the cooperative total stock of accumulated pollution is strictly less then the pollution under Nash equilibrium for the whole duration of the game. We design a stable Shapley value as a cooperative solution, which is time-consistent. The Shapley value is also strategic stable and satisfies the irrational-behavior-proofness condition. The numerical example is given.

Three different solution concepts are reviewed and computed for linear-state and homogeneous linear-quadratic cooperative differential games with asymmetric players. Discount rates can be nonconstant and/or different. Special attention is paid to the issues of time-consistency, agreeability and subgame-perfectness, both from the viewpoint of sustainability of cooperation and from the credibility of the announced equilibrium strategies.

In discrete time, every time-consistent dynamic monetary risk measure can be written as a composition of one-step risk measures. We exploit this structure to give new dual representation results for time-consistent convex monetary risk measures in terms of one-step penalty functions. We first study risk measures for random variables modelling financial positions at a fixed future time. Then we consider the more general case of risk measures that depend on stochastic processes describing the evolution of financial positions or cumulated cash flows. In both cases the new representations allow for a simple composition of one-step risk measures in the dual. We discuss several explicit examples and provide connections to the recently introduced class of dynamic variational preferences.