Narrow Results

The text and associated Supplemental Materials contribute internally consistent and therefore entirely comparable regional, temporal, and sectoral risk profiles to a growing literature on regional economic vulnerability to climate change. A large collection of maps populated with graphs of Monte-Carlo simulation results support a communication device in this regard — a convenient visual that we hope will make comparative results tractable and credible and resource allocation decisions more transparent. Since responding to climate change is a risk-management problem, it is important to note that these results address both sides of the risk calculation. They characterize likelihood distributions along four alternative emissions futures (thereby reflecting the mitigation side context); and they characterize consequences along these transient trajectories (which can thereby inform planning for the iterative adaptation side). Looking across the abundance of sectors that are potentially vulnerable to some of the manifestations of climate change, the maps therefore hold the potential of providing comparative information about the magnitude, timing, and regional location of relative risks. This is exactly the information that planners who work to protect property and public welfare by allocating scarce resources across competing venues need to have at their disposal — information about relative vulnerabilities across time and space and contingent on future emissions and future mitigation. It is also the type of information that integrated assessment researchers need to calibrate and update their modeling efforts — scholars who are exemplified by Professor Nordhaus who created and exercised the Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy and Regional Integrated Climate-Economy models.

This article explores how conventional military doctrines shape U.S.-China military engagement in the West Pacific under varying degrees of cooperation, competition and potential conflicts. Although military doctrines possess a certain level of influence on the ways and means of engaging each other in military terms, such engagement is not confined to using deadly force with a clear aim to destroy the other party. Instead, these doctrines can act as an instrument to forestall conflicts by maintaining credible deterrence. As rational actors that follow clear rules of military engagement, both the United States and China are fully aware of the defensive, offensive and deterrent value of their respective military doctrines, as well as the consequences of a potential conflict; and they have tried to expand cooperation on a number of non-traditional security issues. However, given their forward deployment-oriented military doctrines and the rising role of non-state actors, the United States and China are very likely to be engaged in an unintended escalation of conflicts if each holds a rigid view toward the other’s military doctrine and fails to maintain stable military ties based on timely communication and constructive interaction.

This research delves into core–periphery dynamics in Pakistan’s relations with the United States and China, with a focus on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It investigates how these dynamics shape interactions and Pakistan’s global stance. The study analyzes the Pakistan-U.S. relationship, where the U.S. core dominance influences Pakistan’s socioeconomic trajectory. Shifting to the Pakistan-China partnership, China’s dual core–semi-periphery roles define its involvement in CPEC, merging developmental investments with strategic interests. This study employs a comparative analysis to dissect the core–periphery dynamics within Pakistan’s interactions with the United States and China, specifically in the case of CPEC. Correspondingly, the core–periphery framework exposes structural imbalances and the interplay of power, economics, and geopolitics. The research highlights the framework’s insights — revealing traditional core–periphery dynamics in Pakistan-U.S. ties and intricate complexity in Pakistan-China relations. China’s multifaceted role as a developmental supporter and strategic actor adds layers to the narrative. In essence, the core–periphery framework unveils the interwoven narratives of power, economic reliance, and strategic motivations that underpin the evolving global order.

Unlike many, or most, Western leaders, David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister and primary founder, had become interested in Asia, and especially India and later even more in China, since the 1930s. He predicted the disintegration of colonialism, the liberation of Asian countries, and the emergence of China not only as one of the world’s great powers, but as the greatest. From the very beginning, he criticized Washington’s support of the Kuomintang’s corrupted regime and, following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, blocking its admission to the United Nations as a colossal foreign policy mistake. In a number of papers, speeches, interviews, and conversations, Ben-Gurion expected President Kennedy to correct this mistake and regarded U.S. involvement in Vietnam as another mistake. Long before his death in December 1973, he had warned of the gradual and relative weakening of the United States in contrast to the eventual rise of China in military, economic, and technological terms. He also underlined that Moscow, rather than Beijing, is Washington’s main enemy and that the essence of the conflict between China and the Soviet Union is not ideological but primarily territorial, related to lands occupied by Russia since the 17th century, which China would never forget nor forgive. Along with his other prophecies (Israel’s peace with Egypt, European unity, and the Soviet collapse), his conclusion that Washington would have no choice but to resume its partnership with China soon materialized.

The Six Day War was one of the most defining moments in the history of the Modern Middle East. This paper seeks to add to the existing scholarship on the subject by going beyond the structural explanation. It gives special attention to the role of unit-level variables like perception, personality, and political psychology of decision-makers. As one scholar noted, threats are not perceived in a vacuum, and are, instead, products of complex synthesis of subjective appraisal of events by the decision-makers. The focus will be on the beliefs and perceptions of the most impactful actor in this crisis: Egyptian President Nasser. As will be argued, his decision-making was shaped by his experience with foreign imperialism, a general misconception of super power intentions, an incorrect analogy between two crucial crisis situations with Israel: the February 1960 Rotem Crisis, and the build-up to the June War in 1967, and especially his complicated relations with the US leaders.

In this article, the political–security relations between the United States and Pakistan in the Post-Cold War era are analyzed. The allied relationship between the two countries during the Cold War was abruptly disrupted following the conclusion of the Cold War in 1991 and the United States imposed a series of sanctions against Pakistan following the nuclear issue in 1990. However, the September 11 attacks of 2001 and the global anti-terrorism war launched by the G. W. Bush government resumed the relationship. Again, Pakistan became one of the principal allies of the United States and bilateral political–security relations were promoted unprecedentedly thanks to their collaboration against terrorism. The war against terrorism, however, has also produced many contradictions, which brought the relationship between the two countries into disputes and crises. This article discusses the U.S.–Pakistan relations in the Post-Cold War Era with special attention to the political–security aspects. Attempts will be made to clarify the nature, impacts and tendencies of the relationship. The U.S.–Pakistan relationship is a typical example of the international relationship between a superpower and a middle power, and it is also typical of the U.S.’s changing alliance relations.

2021 was a watershed year for the US, Japan, India, and Australia vis-à-vis their Quadrilateral Cooperation mechanism, which successfully transitioned from a loose coordinating body to a grouping of allied actors. Reviewing the historical development of the Quad, three distinct phases can be identified: the conceptual stage, the strategy development stage, and the third phase of evolution toward an alliance. During the first two phases, the Quad was not more than a loose coordinating structure, but in the last phase, it started to take on the characteristics of an alliance-like body. The primary reason we can conclude that it has evolved into an alliance body is that the organization has started to mold behavioral norms, and it further aims to establish a monopoly over the provision of norms in the Indo-Pacific region. Three factors have played a role in driving the US, Japan, India, and Australia to build the Quad into an alliance body: first is the pursuit of general interests; second is the global situation brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on their relations; third is the formation of a shared objective. These three factors combined worked to shape the Quad into an alliance. As the Quad primarily targets China, its emergence as an alliance will have impacts on China’s security environment that cannot be ignored. In response, China should implement its “neighborhood first” strategy, promote the $1+1$ Leader’s Summit on Mutual Respect with its neighboring countries, and advance the comprehensive deepening of economic cooperation between China and ASEAN. These steps can help China respond to the rapidly changing Indo-Pacific geo-political situation.

The U.S. coronavirus recession began in late February of 2020 and was over in two months. The rapid recovery was due to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Stability Act (CARES Act), a large fiscal stimulus program initiated in late March 2020, that was accompanied by a strong expansionary monetary policy. This paper advances the notion that although the Corona-Recession was historically short it had two more permanent—longer-run—impacts that have largely been ignored. First, it accelerated two emerging trends—expansion of remote work, and more rapid adoption of digital technologies—and each will have a profound effect on work, society, and well-being in the U.S. Second, the pandemic-fuelled downturn fostered a new pathway—loneliness and social isolation—that exacerbated the emotional health concern that is part of all recessions, especially for younger persons. This occurrence is also likely to have an enduring footprint on economic and social life.