Narrow Results

We develop a series of diagnostic models covering 82 of the world’s poorest countries over the period 1991–2015. Our purpose is to assess several important attributes of water governance in these developing countries. Specifically: (1) do water-related public services make important contributions to per capita GDP and general livelihood prospects? (2) what factors seem to explain the quite different national commitments to the provision of water-related public services? and (3) do observed variations in water-related public services provide evidence of governance quality? Our diagnostic models suggest that water-related public services indeed contribute to per capita GDP and to improved public health outcomes across these developing countries. We then derive a variable capturing fiscal effort in the provision of quasi-public services — the availability of improved water supply and sanitation services — controlling for variations in national ability to pay (per capita GDP). We call this commitment an index of instrumental governance. With this index of instrumental governance, we conclude that water governance offers an important measure of a proxy for the civic commitment of governments in the world’s poorest nations. We conclude that an important aspect of “governance” is captured by the extent to which governments make difficult financial commitments that will improve per capita GDP and general livelihood prospects of their citizens.

Good leaders can greatly influence the effective governance of water resources, however, how their attributes relate to group cooperation in Water User Associations (WUAs) remains an open question. Using the case of Chile, we explore the factors of three non-cooperative behaviors in WUAs by performing a two-stage cluster analysis. The results describe four clusters that differ in structural and human characteristics, where highly cooperative WUAs are characterized by having presidents who dedicate more time to their duties, are more active in applying for governmental subsidies, are embedded in social organizations, have high levels of bridging social capital, and have a positive attitude toward the presidency. Our results add to the limited empirical knowledge about the role of leadership in fostering cooperation in the use of common-pool resources. This article sheds light on this matter as the results suggest that policy interventions should aim at strengthening social capital and providing incentives to increase the time dedication of presidents to the WUAs duties.

Policy intervention is a critical measure to address water resources challenges and improve water governance capacity. The strictest water resources management (SWRM) policy is an important water policy system that aims to deal with water shortage, water pollution, and institutional dysfunction in China. This study conducts a quantitative analysis for policy text characteristics of the SWRM through the methods of text mining and content analysis. First, we construct an analytical framework with the combination of policy instruments and policy targets, and then code and classify policy instruments in policy text and conduct statistical analysis. Finally, the research conclusions and policy suggestions are put forward. The results show that major policy instruments are structurally imbalanced in China’s SWRM policy. China’s government prefers to issue a mandatory, standardized, and restrictive policies in water resources management. Most of the policy instruments are focused on institutional management, followed by resources allocation, technological progress, and the ecological environment. This study contributes to the knowledge body of water policy evaluation and water governance, provides decision-making references for optimizing and promoting China’s water resources management policy, and offers a peer reference for water governance in other developing countries.