Asian Development Review

This paper contributes to the literature on growth in Asia in several respects. I provide estimates of potential growth for 21 Asian economies using an aggregate supply model with time-varying parameters and a Kalman filtering methodology. My estimates indicate that the actual growth slowdown experienced by many of these economies in the 2000s is associated with a falling trajectory in potential growth. Relying on Bayesian model averaging, I select robust determinants of potential growth and find that the latter is driven by the technology gap, trade, tertiary education, and institutional quality, as well as by working-age population growth. Effective reforms in these areas can help counterbalance declines in potential growth in Asia. I also investigate the relationship between business cycle features and potential growth, finding that higher volatility in actual growth has significantly negative effects on potential growth. Thus, stabilization policies can have beneficial effects on Asian economies’ long-term growth performance.

This paper presents estimates of potential output growth for a sample of 26 Asian economies and projects potential output growth through 2040 under several scenarios. Results suggest that in the absence of further capital deepening, and assuming continued total factor productivity growth at recent rates, potential output growth across economies could slow from a median of 4.6% during 2010–2015 to 2.7% between 2035 and 2040. Demographic trends and an assumed stabilization in capital–output ratios account for most of the slowing. Much better outcomes are possible if trends are supported by policy. Better total factor productivity growth could raise potential output by between 11% and 24% by 2040, while lower unemployment and higher participation rates could boost potential output by 10% or more in some South Asian economies. An improved investment climate could add between 6% and 10% to potential output in most economies, while accelerating structural convergence (moving labor from lower to higher productivity sectors) could raise potential output by 10% or more in half of the examined countries.

We study the effects of projected population aging on potential growth in Asian economies over the period 2015–2050. We find that an increase in the share of the population over 64 years of age will significantly lower output growth through decreased labor participation. Population aging can also reduce economic growth through increased labor income taxes and dampened productivity growth.

In this paper, we combine data on gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and sectoral employment shares to undertake a decomposition of GDP per capita growth for a sample of 43 Asian and non-Asian economies. We decompose income changes into three components: (i) changes in labor productivity within sectors, (ii) employment shifts across sectors (structural change), and (iii) changes in the intensity of employment participation. We then compare the decomposition results for the Asian economies that moved between different income levels of interest with those from a representative typical economy and other comparison economies. The results suggest that in most Asian economies labor productivity growth was the dominant source of gains in GDP per capita, with the observed gains in labor productivity often driven by changing labor productivity within sectors rather than by shifts in employment across sectors. This is not to diminish the role of structural change, which at lower income levels can explain a significant proportion of overall labor productivity growth.

This paper attempts to measure the effect of resource misallocation on aggregate manufacturing total factor productivity, focusing on Vietnamese manufacturing firms during the period 2000–2009. One of the major findings of this paper is that there would have been substantial improvement in aggregate total factor productivity in Viet Nam in the absence of distortions. The results imply that potential productivity gains from removing distortions in Vietnamese manufacturing are large. We also find that smaller firms tend to face advantageous distortions, while larger firms tend to face disadvantageous ones. Moreover, the efficient size distribution is more dispersed than the actual size distribution. These results suggest that Viet Nam's policies may constrain its largest and most efficient producers, and coddle its smallest and least efficient ones.

Using a database of 23,000 firms in 45 economies, we test the quantitative importance of access to finance and access to public and private credit for the determination of misallocation. We first derive measures of factor market and size distortions, and then use these measures within a regression framework to test the significance of self-declared access-to-finance obstacles as well as the effect of access to a credit line issued by either a government-owned or private bank. We find that access-to-finance obstacles and private credit increase the dispersion of distortions. Public credit has a very small effect. For firms that do not face financial obstacles, public credit increases the dispersion of distortions; for firms that face financial obstacles, it slightly decreases dispersion. Public credit does not appear to compensate for the distortions that exist in private credit markets. Quantitatively, however, financial variables explain a very small part of the dispersion of factor market and size distortions.

We construct a two-sector (agriculture and modern) overlapping generations growth model calibrated to India to study the effects of sectoral tax rates, sectoral infrastructure investments, and labor market frictions on potential growth in India. Our model is motivated by the idea that because misallocation depends on distortions, policies that reduce distortions raise potential growth. We show that the positive effect of a variety of policy reforms on potential growth depends on the extent to which public and private capital are complements or substitutes. We also show that funding more infrastructure investments in both sectors by raising labor income taxes in the agriculture sector raises potential growth.

Why do some middle-income economies implement policies to achieve sustainable growth driven by innovation, while others fail to do so? In this paper, I propose a politico-economic explanation: innovation leads to the creative destruction of existing technology that can harm the interests of the pivotal policy maker. Therefore, the pivotal policy maker may implement policies that prevent innovation and harm potential growth in order to protect its own interests. Political institutions, which are endogenously determined by fundamentals of the economy such as state capacity, shape policy maker decisions. This paper studies the relationship between growth, policies, institutions, and fundamentals. Understanding the relationship allows for the design of more efficient aid programs to help the growth of middle-income economies, especially in the long run.