Chinese Journal of International Review

The Grand Strategy of the United States, including its strategy toward China, has always been the product of the interaction of geopolitics and domestic politics. After the Cold War, with the end of the bipolar structure of the international system and the increasing polarization of domestic politics in the United States, the impact of geopolitics on the formulation of the foreign policy of the United States has been weakened to some degree, while the spillover effect of domestic politics has weighed more heavily than before. This change could be explained in the way that while two opposing trends of Partisan Realignment began to emerge in the post-financial crisis era in the United States, the elites from both Democratic and Republican Parties had often focused on the preferences of their core political coalition as basis in foreign policy making, in order to further their own respective political interests. In regard to the American strategy toward China, with the deepening of the structural contradictions between China and the United States as well as changes in their respective external strategic choices, geopolitics became the primary logic in the formulation of American strategy toward China since 2009, thus the “strategic competition” has become the dominant mode of bilateral relations. In the view of Washington, China and the United States have formed a competitive relationship in the areas relating to the core interests of the United States, such as economy, security, values and the dominance of the existing international order. However, the questions of reality, such as how to compete with China and how to decide the priorities of their own core interests, are defined by demands of core political coalitions represented by the elites from both Democratic and Republican Parties in the context of a new round of Partisan Realignment. From Obama to Trump, different domestic political logics made the focus of American strategy toward China shifted from “institution–values” competition based on globalism to “economy–security” competition based on nationalism. Therefore, the changes in American domestic politics will present an important channel through which the orientation of American strategy toward China would be clearly observed in the future.

The rise of the “Middle Kingdom”, China, has been a source of intense academic debate amongst the Western scholars. On the one hand, the pessimists epitomized the “rise of China” as a threat to the US-led liberal international order. They provided a one-sided and biased analysis. On the other hand, the “rise of China” is portrayed as that of a peaceful rising power which is neither a threat nor a changer of the existing international order. Apart from these opposing perspectives, the US-led liberal international order has been facing an internal crisis within the liberal states. This shows that history has never been going as the liberal prophets predicated. The manifesto of “liberalism is the only governing ideology of post-Cold War period” is now falsified by the rise of populism and nationalism in the countries who drafted the manifesto of “end of history”. Alongside this, the inherently unjust system of the US-led liberal international order has also been facing increasing challenge from the emerging powers of the rest, notably China. This paper thus examines the implication of the rise of China to the US-led liberal international order by taking the “One Belt and One Road Initiative” (BRI) as a case. I argue that through the BRI, China envisioned a new equitable international order that can replace the prevailing exploitative order being established by the “Western powers” during colonialism. On the one hand, BRI foreshadows that China is a dissatisfied actor of the existing order and it is a revisionist power. On the other hand, BRI itself is a liberal project. Thus, BRI is not at odds with liberalism. It is functioning under the liberal order, but envisioned a new international order. Thus, it can be argued that BRI seems to be a liberal project challenging the US-led unipolar world order intended toward a more inclusive and transformative world order.

The Arctic is being seen as a hotbed of strategic competition between major powers. In recent years, not only the United States, but also Russia and China have increased their engagement within the Arctic region by the implementation of research surveys, exploration activities, and gradually increased their military presence in order to consolidate influence in the resource-wealthy region (Hân, 2021) [, May 31, https://www.qdnd.vn/thoi-su-quoc-te/doi-song-quoc-te/suc-nong-cua-bac-cuc-661233]. Up to now, China has launched many strategies and related policies for the Arctic region. In the recently announced 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025), China emphasizes the importance of the “Polar Silk Road across the Arctic”, seeing it as a component of the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). The Government of China also calls for enterprises to invest in the Arctic Ocean and Antarctica. The paper provides an objective and a multidimensional assessment on the formation and construction of a project known as China’s Polar Silk Road across the Arctic or Arctic Silk Road so that we can better understand this new Chinese ambition.

Currency dominance has been the symbol of national power, influence, and dominance. After the Second World War, the Dollar has maintained its unrivaled influence as a currency reserve by central banks and as a global transaction currency. Recently, cryptocurrency and the distributed ledger system were seen as a challenge. However, due to the challenge it poses to the sovereignty of nation-states, central banks have resorted to developing the central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). China is the only major economy to have tested a CBDC, a symbol of its increasing economic power and innovation. Contrary to Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism, developments show that China can use its offensive economic capabilities to build a regional order through the belt and road initiative (BRI). With the recent release of its Central Bank Electronic Payment and the Blockchain-based Network System, China can seek to regionalize the use of its renminbi (RMB) and rival the power of the Dollar.

Based on the social adaptation theory, this paper explores the adaptability of the elderly in Elderly Care Institution during the epidemic prevention and control of COVID-19. The elderly over 60 years old in J Elderly Care Institution in Z City, Guangdong Province are considered as the research object. The statistical results explain that the adaptability of the elderly is significantly affected by the individual adaptability, that is, the subjective feelings of life. The sense of abandonment caused by the quarantining policy that hinders the elderly in Elderly Care Institutions to meet their family members rather than the feeling of loneliness leads to their overall maladjustment, psychological depression, and interpersonal problems during the epidemic. This study also contributes to the improvement of Chinese government policies for caring about the elderly during the normalization of epidemic prevention and control over the COVID-19.