East Asian Policy

In order to realise the goal of the Paris Agreement, China has announced to enhance its nationally determined contributions (NDCs), demonstrating its determination to adopt more rigorous policies and measures to achieve a peak in carbon emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060. China’s pledge to carbon neutrality not only has a profound impact on its economic reforms, but also spurs the country to be more proactive in global climate governnance.

Japan eventually joined the 2050 net carbon neutrality club soon after the Suga administration emerged. What are the primary drivers of Japan’s decision and why this timing? This article argues that the interactions of domestic and international factors can explain this policy change in the context of global competition over energy transition and technological breakthroughs to mitigate climate change. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s move was almost an established policy line brewed during the predecessor government.

On 28 October 2020, President Moon Jae-in declared Korea’s 2050 carbon neutrality strategy as a comprehensive transformation plan towards a sustainable and green Korean economy. The key elements for the 2050 carbon neutrality are: expanding the use of clean power and hydrogen across all sectors; improving energy efficiency to a significant level; commercial development of carbon removal and other future technologies; scaling up the circular economy to improve industrial sustainability; and enhancing carbon sinks. The success of the 2050 net-zero depends on whether the energy sector can be decarbonised on schedule. More fundamentally, the strength of carbon pricing to secure private climate finance will determine the future of Korea’s vision to go carbon neutral by 2050.

The EU–China relations have already changed significantly since 2019. Despite the deeply intertwined technology supply chains between the European Union (EU) and China, the EU could neither ignore Beijing’s new aggressive “wolf warrior” diplomacy nor could it capitalise on just the US–Chinese rivalry and mutual sanctions policy as wider transatlantic economic and security interests are at stake. China’s economic challenges are only part of a wider systemic competition and strategic rivalry globally and even in Europe.

China, Japan and India are overwhelming forces in world politics because of their large population, economic size and trade volume, strategic weight, potential for further technological advancement, economic growth, diplomatic heft and military power. Together they could be an unmatched global force, act as a catalyst to the much touted “Asian century” prospect and help redesign the existing international order to reflect power shift. Yet their relationship to each other is highly complex, and their world views on key issues and strategies of global interaction diverge significantly. Such an unhealthy politico-strategic landscape of the Asian continent is likely to continue. While these three recalibrate and redesign their relations to each other, other regional nations will need to carefully work around this tangled triangle.

Research findings show that China and Japan realise the utility of regime-building with ASEAN, so both have started to build trust with ASEAN since 1997. ASEAN established the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area with China and the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership with Japan in 2010 and 2008, respectively, and bilaterally, both sides gained mutual benefits from interdependence. However, China–ASEAN increasing cooperation is a state of asymmetric dependence in favour of China and the changing Japan–ASEAN cooperation is not so symmetrical.

This article traces the developments in Japan’s peacebuilding policy in Abe Shinzo’s second term (2012–2020) and presents illustrative case studies to highlight the change and continuity that occurred during this period. Although Abe is internationally known for launching a new doctrine of “active pacifism”, his reforms in international peace cooperation policy incrementally built upon the existing discourses and practices. Abe’s vision of a more proactive peacebuilding policy has also been heavily circumscribed by Japan’s Constitution.

South Korea’s management of the COVID-19 outbreak and its economic fallout has been largely effective. The challenges are procurement of vaccinations and addressing rising socio-economic inequalities. In addition, the Moon Jae-in administration has to stabilise domestic politics to achieve greater harmony in a highly polarised society and improve Korea’s relationships with the United States, China, Japan and North Korea, which have been stalled in one way or another. If managed well, Korea will emerge stronger from COVID-19 and consolidate its international status as a high-tech, advanced economy.