International Game Theory Review

This paper revisits the link between strategic trade policies and the mode of competition in the product market, emphasizing the emergence of a different mode of competition if only one of the two governments implements such a policy. We show that with an endogenous mode of competition and an asymmetric strategic export policy we can lead to a mixed Cournot–Bertrand competition between firms. If the game is sequential and the second government wishes to react to this policy, we show that the final equilibrium will be even more unfavorable to the newly protected national leader: the second firm would not prefer this retaliation to be implemented. This reinforces the interest of the asymmetrical framework of this model.

In the last moments of the highly polarized and contentious 2022 presidential elections campaigns, two final debates took place for the second-round of the election. This paper proposes an analysis of these debates using an iterated game theory perspective, where the debates are sequential decision-making environments, with the candidates’ statements being classified as cooperative or defection. Cooperative actions denote constructive dialogue revolving around governmental plans, whereas defection encompasses negative campaigning tactics, including ad hominem attacks and the spread of misleading information. Through an exhaustive analysis of transcriptions from both debates, the candidates’ strategic moves are extracted and categorized. The findings offer new insights into the role of strategies in shaping electoral outcomes, emphasizing the nuanced interplay of policy discourse and personal character assessments in a politically charged environment. Additionally, the research underscores the profound implications of such strategies on voter perceptions and decisions, offering a new perspective to the existing literature on political communication and electoral game theory.

In this paper, we enhance the application of coalition structure (CS) games to the distribution of portfolio risk across individual assets in a portfolio. In a recent paper, CS games were applied for the first time as a risk measure that takes into account the contributions of individual assets to portfolio risk and contributions to the risk of the stock market as a whole. We enhance this approach by using five values for CS games in a simulation study. In this simulation, it can be shown that using CS games has an even higher potential to solve the so-called low-risk puzzle than shown in previous literature.

This paper develops subgame consistent cooperative equilibria of multi-objective dynamic games. The presence of multiple objectives in decision-making is prevalent and inherent. Given that the set of objectives of each player will be affected by the actions of other players, non-coordinated maximization by individual players could lead to the case where some prominent objectives may reach an undesirably level. Cooperation is the best way to alleviate the problem and enhance the participants’ payoffs. This paper presents the techniques for solving subgame consistent cooperative equilibria of multi-objective dynamic games with utility-based players. In such an equilibrium, individual rationality, group efficiency, and subgame consistency are realized. An application of collaboration between Australia and New Zealand is provided. This is the first time that subgame consistent cooperative equilibria are applied in multi-objective dynamic games with utility-based players, ample applications in various fields are expected.

A cooperative product game is a transferable utility game defined by associating the product of given players’ coefficient to coalitions. This idea has been introduced by Rosales, D. ([2014] Cooperative product games, unpublished mimeo, www.academia.edu/40176429) where he investigates the core. Here, we analyze a corrected definition of a product game and cover the Shapley value to which we provide an axiomatic foundation.

This paper enhances previous studies of the so-called low-risk puzzle with concepts from cooperative game theory. To allocate portfolio risk to single assets, previous studies used concepts such as the Shapley value. In these concepts, the marginal contributions of assets to risks of subsets of the portfolio are evaluated with fixed pre-specified weights. In this paper, we vary these weights. We show the application by means of a simulation study. In this context, varying the weights of the marginal contributions generates added value to the solution of the so-called low-risk puzzle.

The paper is dedicated to the 300th anniversary of St. Petersburg State University. Creation of the school of mathematical game theory at St. Petersburg State University is associated with Nikolai Nikolaevich Vorobyov. The school has an interesting history described in the paper. More than 50 scientists working in the leading Russian and international scientific centers all over the world in the field of differential, dynamic, and cooperative games were the students of this school.