International Game Theory Review

Nowadays, to cater the increasing green customers, firms have switched to green manufacturing. In a dual-channel green supply chain (DCGSC), customers experience products at offline stores and buy them online (free-riding). Often imprecise cognitive biases (“fairness concern” and “overconfidence”) are observed among the supply chain (SC) members. With these facts, this study introduces the free-riding and above cognitive biases in a DCGSC with a manufacturer selling a green product through own online and offline retail channels and examines their effects. A centralized and four decentralized models (for green and nongreen products) are formulated depending upon channel members’ cognitive biases individually and jointly with and without free-riding. The fuzzy objectives and constraints are made deterministic using expectation and possibility measures, respectively. Models are solved and illustrated numerically. The results indicate that free-riding is harmful and beneficial to retailer and manufacturer, respectively. Manufacturer’s overconfidence enhances the retailer’s profit but decreases or increases own profit depending upon the salvage value. Retailer’s fairness concern is catastrophic for manufacturer but beneficial for her. Product greening increases manufacturer’s profit than the carbon tax regulation for lower emissions. In addition to above observations, for maximum profit, management should not go for greening beyond an optimum level.

Security Games traditionally assume sequential interactions, with the defender acting as the leader and the attacker as the follower. In this paper, we challenge such an assumption by showing that security interactions can also be simultaneous or that even the attacker might be the leader. Specifically, we consider a simple security game framework consisting of two possible targets, one attacker and one defender. Then, we extend that basic interaction using a well-known endogenous timing framework (the Game with Observable Delay) to endogenously obtain the timing of the game as part of the equilibrium outcome. Our results show that, for the same set of general assumptions, the interaction can be simultaneous or sequential (with either the defender or attacker being the leader). Although the simultaneous case could be discarded using payoff dominance, it is impossible to compare the two sequential configurations using the same criterion. The risk dominance criterion also turns out to be helpless in this case. Thus, we argue that considering attackers as leaders in Security Games is a plausible scenario that merits further consideration, not only from a theoretical point of view but also due to its alignment with certain types of real-world crime.

The purpose of this work is to study the pursuit-evasion problem and the “Life-line” game for two objects (called Pursuer and Evader) with simple harmonic motion dynamics of the same type in the Euclidean space. In this case, the objects move by controlled acceleration vectors. The controls of the objects are subject to geometrical constraints. In the pursuit problem, the strategy of parallel pursuit (in brief, the $\mathrm{\Pi }$-strategy) is suggested for the Pursuer, and by this strategy a capture condition is achieved. In the evasion problem, a constant control function is offered for the Evader, and an evasion condition is derived. Employing the $\mathrm{\Pi }$-strategy we generate an analytic formula for the attainability domain of the Evader (the set of all the meeting points of the objects), and we prove the Petrosjan type theorem describing that the attainability domain is monotonically decreasing with respect to the inclusion in time. In the “Life-line” problem, first, by virtue of the $\mathrm{\Pi }$-strategy solvability conditions to the advantage of the Pursuer are achieved and next, in constructing a reachable domain of the Evader by a control function, solvability conditions to the advantage of the Evader are identified. Differential games under harmonic motions are more complex owing to some troubles in determining optimal strategies and in building the meeting domain of objects. Accordingly, such types of games have not been fairly investigated than the simple motion games. From this point of view, studying the pursuit, evasion, and “Life-line” problems for oscillated motions arouses a special interest.

Matching models with contracts have been extensively studied in the last years as a generalization of the classical matching theory. Matching in networks is an even more general model in which firms trade goods via bilateral contracts constituting a supply chain. Hatfield and Kominers ([2012] Matching in networks with bilateral contracts, Am. Econ. J., Microecon. 4(1), 176–208, doi:10.1257/mic.4.1.176) showed that a natural substitutability condition characterizes the maximal domain of firm preferences for which the existence of stable allocations is guaranteed in such a model, if the set of all existent contracts is acyclic. Moreover, they asserted that these conditions are sufficient to obtain a suitable lattice structure for the set of all stable allocations. In this paper, we exhibit an inconsistency in the last point through an example, and introduce an additional condition over firm preferences that allows to recover an appropriate lattice structure.

Ecological and environmental economics are inherently dynamic systems requiring dynamic optimization tools. Understanding the interplay between environmental economics, ecological economics, and dynamic games is crucial. This paper presents a systematic literature review on ecological and environmental economics modeled with dynamic games. To be more specific, this systematic literature review analyzes a dataset of 88 peer-reviewed articles from international journals. This study identifies clusters related to resource management, taxation, and policy. It also reveals niche and motor research themes, such as policy, biological invasions, pollution, taxation, abatement, and efficiency, paving the way for future research avenues. By comprehensively examining the literature, this review provides insights into current and future challenges faced by companies, consumers, regulators, and society. It contributes to a deeper understanding of the complex relationship between ecological and environmental dynamics and the field of dynamic games in economics.

To the best of authors’ knowledge, only two methods are proposed in the literature to solve 2-tuple linguistic bi-matrix games. In this paper, a 2-tuple linguistic bi-matrix game is considered to show that none of these methods is valid and hence, it is inappropriate to use these methods to solve 2-tuple linguistic bi-matrix games. Also, a new method is proposed to solve 2-tuple linguistic bi-matrix games. Furthermore, the origin of the proposed method as well as its validity is discussed. Finally, the proposed method is illustrated with the help of the considered 2-tuple linguistic bi-matrix game.