The Quarterly Journal of Finance

This paper presents a portfolio model of asset price effects arising from central bank large-scale asset purchases, or quantitative easing (QE). Two financial frictions — segmentation of the market for central bank reserves and imperfect asset substitutability — give rise to two distinct portfolio effects. One is well known and derives from the reduced supply of the purchased assets. The other is new, runs through banks’ portfolio responses to reserves expansions, and is independent of the types of assets purchased. The results imply that central bank reserve expansions can affect long-term bond prices even in the absence of long-term bond purchases.

Exploiting a novel measure of corporate culture based on cutting-edge machine learning algorithms, we examine how female board representation influences a culture of innovation, and also whether female directors spur innovation culture in the presence of an active takeover market. Our results show that higher board gender diversity improves a corporate innovation culture considerably. Specifically, a rise in female board representation by one standard deviation improves an innovative culture by 4.37%. The findings corroborate the argument that female directors infuse the firm with new ideas and different perspectives, thereby enhancing an innovative culture. Furthermore, we also show that female board representation’s interaction with the takeover market, which is a crucial external governance mechanism, spurs a corporate innovation culture as well. This implies that board gender diversity substantially softens the negative effect of hostile takeover threats on corporate innovation. Our study is the first to link board gender diversity to a culture of innovation and show the interaction effect with takeover threats.

We investigate a little-known executive compensation device called dividend equivalents, which are provisions on some options and performance-based equity awards permitting executives to receive dividends on shares not owned and which they may ultimately never own. We find that up to 30% of sample firms have had this policy. While dividend equivalents may appear to exacerbate agency problems, they have a positive impact on cash holdings and help align incentives — firms with dividend equivalent policies tend to pay dividends, and firms that make dividend equivalent payments tend to pay higher dividends and keep lower excess cash.

In this paper, we introduce a conditional measure of skill, the correlation between funds’ residual trades, net of common trading motives, and future news about the stocks traded. Using this measure, we show that the average mutual fund manager in the cross-section has stock-picking skill. This result is robust to different benchmarks and is mainly driven by the manager’s ability to predict a firm’s cash-flow news. This skill has short-term persistence and is distinctly related to traditional measures of performance. Importantly, consistent with Berk and Green [2004, Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in Rational Markets, Journal of Political Economy 112(6), 1269–1295] fund flows are increasing with respect to managerial skill after controlling for fund performance.

We find evidence that markets anticipate the potential loss of firm value in the event of the CEO falling sick and eventually dying of COVID-19 in a sample of almost 3000 listed firms from across 137 regions in 10 European countries. First, we use soccer games as “super-spreader” events. The instrumented number of infected cases per capita in the region where company headquarters are located predicts a significant drop in stock returns during March and April 2020 for firms managed by CEOs with a higher probability of dying from COVID-19. Second, we show that the stock price of these firms increases significantly the day on which positive news on the development of COVID-19 vaccines are released in the market.