Water Economics and Policy

This research analyzes the local implementation of China’s central clean water policies over the recent decades. Based on a series of panel data analyses on Chinese provinces between 2004 and 2015, this study empirically examines the impact of decentralization and interest groups on water policy implementation, leading to three main findings. First, fiscal decentralization has a significant positive effect on policy output as measured using per-capita provincial expenditures on industrial wastewater. But it has no significant influence on policy outcome as measured by per-capita emissions of chemical oxygen demand. Second, while increasing environmental decentralization at the provincial level tends to increase provincial expenditures, wastewater discharge also increases. Third, increased industrial contributions to the provincial economy are associated with increased environmental spending from the province, yet foreign trade and environmental petitions do not have the expected impact. The results suggest that China’s decentralization reforms appear to have increased provincial policy responses without improving the actual environmental outcomes. Experiences from authoritarian China may provide lessons for other countries.

Using unique data on chemical manufacturing facilities regulated under the Clean Water Act (CWA), this paper analyzes the effect of one particular environmental management practice — internal monitoring — on regulated facilities’ compliance with wastewater discharge limits. To deepen our understanding of the role played by internal monitoring, we extend our analysis by exploring the interaction between internal monitoring and self-audits, which should share a similar purpose to internal monitoring by providing systematic information to regulated facilities on their pollution abatement efforts. Baseline empirical results robustly demonstrate that increases in the extent of internal monitoring significantly improve facilities’ environmental compliance. The extended empirical results offer moderate evidence that audits complement internal monitoring (and vice versa): as facilities audit more frequently, the productive effect of increased internal monitoring grows.

Policy intervention is a critical measure to address water resources challenges and improve water governance capacity. The strictest water resources management (SWRM) policy is an important water policy system that aims to deal with water shortage, water pollution, and institutional dysfunction in China. This study conducts a quantitative analysis for policy text characteristics of the SWRM through the methods of text mining and content analysis. First, we construct an analytical framework with the combination of policy instruments and policy targets, and then code and classify policy instruments in policy text and conduct statistical analysis. Finally, the research conclusions and policy suggestions are put forward. The results show that major policy instruments are structurally imbalanced in China’s SWRM policy. China’s government prefers to issue a mandatory, standardized, and restrictive policies in water resources management. Most of the policy instruments are focused on institutional management, followed by resources allocation, technological progress, and the ecological environment. This study contributes to the knowledge body of water policy evaluation and water governance, provides decision-making references for optimizing and promoting China’s water resources management policy, and offers a peer reference for water governance in other developing countries.

Using primary data collected from Ethiopia’s Awash River basin, we study the economics of irrigation water for smallholder farmers. We estimate the impact of irrigation water on gross margin and chemical fertilizer uptake. Our results show that irrigation water has a statistically significant and positive effect on the profitability of crops and chemical fertilizer uptake. We also generate qualitative data on irrigation water returns by producing various crops in the different parts of the basin. In addition, we present the intensity of irrigation water used for various crops in the different parts of the basin as reported by farmers. In doing so, we offer some qualitative evidence on the economic trade-offs involved in irrigation water use at farm and basin levels. The policy implications of the findings are discussed.

A conceptual model to assess the literacy level of water consumers is presented. On the one hand, a literature search was performed using the ScienceDirect and B-On platforms, conjoining the terms literacy, awareness, water, water for human consumption, drinking water, environmental, disease prevention and public health, resulting in seven papers with the mingle of literacy and water and five on literacy and the environment being uncovered. On the other hand, the lack of papers and information on the subject caused us to consider developing a conceptual model to transform the processes of planning and operationalization of the studies of literacy of water consumers. The model can support the development and validation of measurement tools capable of apprehending different dimensions in the context of water literacy. A questionnaire was conceived and applied to a cohort of 147 respondents in order to assess water literacy. In addition, the articulation of the proposed model and Deming’s PDCA model was demonstrated in order to achieve excellence through the evaluation of the current reality to promote improvement solutions.

Water system revenue losses, inefficiency, mismanagement, lack of productivity, and federal mandates are rapidly escalating the cost of water and wastewater for Baltimore consumers. Baltimore’s water and wastewater systems are municipally owned and poorly managed by Baltimore City. Due to a lack of maintenance, these systems are plagued by an immense number of leaks, main breaks, and sewage backups. In addition, the billing system has a long history of errors. The overall deterioration of the systems, inadequate capital management, and operational problems are symptomatic of the fact that the Baltimore City Department of Public Works lacks proper accounts, including a balance sheet. Despite these glaring flaws, the systems have been politicized and are now protected by an amendment to the Baltimore City Charter that prohibits the assistance of private enterprise and markets in addressing Baltimore’s endemic water and wastewater problems by tapping the competency and skills available in the private marketplace. In order to reverse the politicization of Baltimore’s water system, which will only make operation and capital mismanagement problems worse as well as increase costs for the citizens of Baltimore, the charter amendment must be eliminated, allowing for the private provision of infrastructure and its maintenance. We recommend that this private provision is based on the centuries-old tried and tested French model.