Water Economics and Policy

Given the complexity of bay water ecological environment governance, the bay chief system is a pilot policy carried out by the state as an innovative exploration to establish a new model and systematically solve related marine problems. By exploring the evolution path of policies related to environmental governance, this study demonstrates the theoretical logic between environmental policies such as the bay and river chief systems and comprehensively deconstructs the institutional framework of the bay chief system from the aspects of organizational structure, key tasks, and accountability mechanism. In addition, this study evaluates the implementation effect of the bay chief system based on the differences-in-differences method. Results show that: (i) As an institutional innovation of regional environmental governance, the implementation path of the bay chief system has undergone a bottom-top evolution. (ii) The institutional framework of the bay chief system has changed and promoted the original environmental governance model, providing an important manifestation of the modernization of China’s water pollution prevention and curing capacity. (iii) Empirically, the pilot cities of the bay chief system promote economic growth while reducing pollutant emissions, and achieve a win–win situation between emission reduction and growth. This conclusion remains valid after many robustness tests. In the future, further efforts are necessary to enhance the policy effect of the bay chief system according to local conditions and boost sustainable marine development.

This study examined the effect of water conservation projects on the economic and ecological development of a city from the perspective of different stakeholders. We used Xiling Gorge as a case study and recruited people in Yichang as the study respondents. The study was conducted using a mixed research method. Samples were collected and analyzed through fieldwork, a questionnaire survey, and structured interviews using intentional sampling and snowball sampling. The study revealed that modern water conservation projects could improve convenience by stabilizing water sources, increasing the government’s willingness to invest, and improving public infrastructure and transportation facilities. The projects can also lead to developing special products, creating business opportunities, raising awareness, and attracting young people to return to their hometowns. However, industries and projects cannot be differentiated because of the lack of funds for urban development, lack of necessary considerations in decision-making, and lack of entrepreneurial skills among the public. Additionally, population aging could lead to a labor shortage, which may prevent tourism areas from improving the quality of services and meeting the needs of tourists. Consequently, the perceptions of residents and tourists on the current state of economic, social, environmental, and ecological development in the village diverge.

There is ample evidence indicating that political institutions and official mobility influence the economy, finance, and environment. Specifically, political turnovers have been found to be essential for the functioning and oversight of economic institutions. Chinese cities, where the party secretary frequently changes every few years, provide an interesting context for studying political turnovers. In this study, we investigated the effects of political turnovers on urban sewage discharge in 242 Chinese cities between 2003 and 2018. The findings revealed a significant impact of the timing of the Chinese Communist Party Congress on urban sewage discharge. Leading up to and including the year of the Party Congress, there was a marked reduction in urban sewage discharge. Conversely, discharge increased substantially during the year or two years following the Party Congress. These results suggest that political turnovers play a critical role in environmental governance performance in China.

Water resources are indispensable strategic primary resources for sustainable social development. To solve the water shortage problem, promoting the innovation and diffusion of water-saving technology is the key to improvement. In contrast, governmental regulation is a necessary means to promote the innovation of water-saving technology. This study builds a game model with the involvement of governments and businesses. The objective of the game model is to simulate the performance of imposing a tax or a subsidy to promote water-saving technology. In addition, this study introduces the bionic model Lotka–Volterra to investigate the diffusion process of water-saving technology by simulating the performance of the growth rate and competition coefficient. To explain this process more scientifically and intuitively, this paper uses MATLAB to simulate it. The results show that (i) when the subsidy coefficient is between 0.6 and 0.7, the enthusiasm of the government and enterprises to participate in innovating water-saving technology is high; (ii) when the tax penalty coefficient is higher than 0.8, it can not only motivate governmental control but also promote the innovation of enterprises’ water-saving technology; and (iii) the final equilibrium of the diffusion of water-saving technology is irrelevant to the growth rate in the long term, but it is closely related to the competition coefficient. Based on the above conclusions, this paper puts forward some relevant political suggestions to promote the innovation and diffusion of water-saving technology, such as reasonably increasing the water resources tax and government subsidies.

Environmental economists have long been interested in the relationship between policy enforcement, technological progress, and economic growth. A multidirectional process exists where factors such as the economy, policy, technology, and environment interactively work. Based on the balanced panel data of 261 prefecture-level cities in China from 2000 to 2020, this study innovatively examines the diversified channels in the policy–technology system within the structural equation modeling framework. Conclusions can be drawn as follows. First, the policy uncertainties curb the technological improvement in the water sector, particularly in southern Chinese cities. Second, the incubation and adoption of water technology are closely intertwined, significantly affecting water quality. By clarifying the interaction of the factors in water technology diffusion, this study provides a comprehensive framework to investigate China’s water economics and policy uncertainties.

Xinjiang had been suffering from acute water scarcity, which is an important constraint factor for its economic sustainability. Virtual water plays an important role in its sustainable development, and this paper tries to re-investigate the role of virtual water trade among the generalized trade framework in its sustainable development. The term generalized trade encompasses both physical and virtual trade. Physical trade refers to the transfer of commodities in monetary or barter form, and virtual trade refers to the transfer of inputs embodied in physical form (e.g., virtual water, energy, or land). It was in the water-scarce status, but it transported a net volume of about 13.1 billion tons of water to other economies, 94.6% of which was transported to other provinces. This phenomenon is contradictory to the comparative advantage theory. Water is a critical input in the production of commodities, but it is only one factor from the perspective of generalized trade. It is rich in energy resources but imports a large amount of external virtual energy from other provinces. Many labors come to Xinjiang both in physical and virtual senses. This situation indicates that generalized trade plays a more important role, and suggests that it should continue to improve its industrial system and optimize its business environment.

The shortage of water resources has seriously restricted the sustainable development of China’s economy. Contracted water-saving management (WSMC) has emerged as an important measure to effectively alleviate this problem. However, the rationality and fairness of benefit allocation affect the stakeholders’ enthusiasm for participating in the project. The lack of a water-saving benefit allocation scheme is one of the critical obstacles hindering the implementation and promotion of the project. This study identifies the core stakeholders in WSMC projects in Field-project in an irrigation district. Then, with comprehensive consideration of the importance, cost input, risk-taking, and effort of each participant, we examined the benefit allocation scheme in the WSMC projects of Field-project in an irrigation district by building a model based on Nash Equilibrium, Shapley value method, and modified Shapley value method. We found that the case in which the WUA E implements the WSMC project alone yields the lowest total revenue of the schemes considered, and each participant’s benefit is also at the lowest. Nash Equilibrium can achieve the maximum expected return for both participants. With the Shapley value method, the WUA E earns the largest benefits, accounting for 57.5% of total revenue, followed by the WSSE D. Under the calculation principle of the modified Shapley value model, the WUA E’s benefit decreases significantly, implying that the revenues previously earned by the WUA E are transferred to the WSSE D. This result is due to the below-average levels of importance, cost input risk-taking, and effort for WUA E in the project. It can be seen that the modified Shapley value method is more suitable for benefit allocation of the WSMC project of Field-project in an irrigation district. Finally, a typical case study in China on a shared WSMC project of Field-project in an irrigation district showed how the proposed method works. Then, we proposed policy implications for promoting project implementation from three perspectives: stakeholders, income distribution, and risk management, and identified the limitations of the research and outlined the future research directions.